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Individuals across the tree of life make costly contributions to resources that benefit the group 
as a whole. However, such ‘public goods’ come with a problem; a selfish individual could 
refrain from contributing to public goods, instead leeching off the contributions of others. How 
does cooperation stay stable in the face of such exploitation? This problem of the maintenance 
of cooperation is commonly understood through the ‘tragedy of the commons’, with 
resolutions to the problem largely focused on avoiding the individuals who can undermine 
cooperation – cheaters. In this thesis, I counter the perspective of cooperation being most 
vulnerable to ‘cheater’ individuals who contribute nothing, aiming instead to highlight the 
problem caused by the strategic (i.e. conditional and quantitative) behaviour of all individuals. 
To this end, I use the model organism of the social amoeba D. discoideum as an empirical 
system to test new models of strategic behaviour, and back an argument for the importance of 
conditional and quantitative contributions in the evolution of cooperation in public goods. I 
develop a theoretical framework of the public goods game, and empirically test its utility to 
predict social behaviour in simple and complex social groups, finding a close match between 
model predictions and empirical data (Chapters 1-2). Further, I demonstrate the important 
consequences of strategic contributions for how we think about conflict in public goods 
(Chapter 3) and how genetic self-recognition (in D. discoideum and beyond) can occur through 
the ‘greenbeard’ effect, which has previously been considered highly unlikely to occur in 
nature (Chapter 4). My work in this thesis combines theory and data to demonstrate that 
cooperation and conflict can be misunderstood by a binary ‘cooperate’ vs ‘cheat’ perspective, 
and are instead better understood through the more complex idea of conditional and 
quantitative strategies of all individuals shaping the patterns of cooperation and conflict we 
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Cooperation is pervasive across nature, from single celled organisms to complex 
societies (Maynard Smith & Szathmáry, 1995; West et al., 2007b). Individuals acting in ways 
that benefit their group as a whole form the basis of groups from viruses to meerkats, through 
traits as diverse as evading host immunity (Domingo-Calap et al., 2019), biofilms (Nadell et 
al., 2009), policing of worker reproduction (Wenseleers & Ratnieks, 2006a), communal 
offspring care (König, 1993), and anti-predator vigilance (Santema & Clutton-Brock, 2013). 
Yet, wherever we find cooperation, we also find conflict (Hamilton, 1996). If individuals can 
come together and share in the benefits of cooperation, conflict can arise through selfish 
individuals who don’t contribute, but instead exploit the contributions of others. In this way, 
conflict and cooperation are two sides of the same coin, operating hand-in-hand to determine 
the outcome of social interactions between individuals whose fitness interests are only 
partially aligned (West & Ghoul, 2019). Consequently, the problem of the evolution of 
cooperation, and its maintenance in the face of conflict, is at the heart of evolutionary biology. 
Understanding conflict and cooperation is crucial in explaining the diversity of social 
behaviours seen in nature, from the secretion of iron scavenging molecules of bacteria (West 
& Buckling, 2003; Griffin et al., 2004) to the reproductive sacrifice and specialization of social 
insects (Wilson, 1971; Hamilton, 1972), and the cooperative breeding of many vertebrates 
(Hatchwell & Komdeur, 2000; Clutton-Brock, 2002).  
In the theory of evolution by natural selection described by Darwin, the organism was 
king - with natural selection favoring organisms that selfishly maximize their own survival 
and reproduction (Darwin, 1859). Although Darwin’s organism-based ideas readily explained 
many social phenomena, such as the grouping together of individuals for mutual survival and 
reproduction benefits (Kokko et al., 2001), the problem of individuals sacrificing their own 
survival and reproduction to aid others (exemplified by social insects; Hamilton, 1972; Trivers 
& Hare, 1976) remained problematic. The evolutionary problem of such cooperation was 
eventually solved by Hamilton (1964a; b), who proposed a framework for understanding 
sociality that separated social behaviours based on their fitness effect on the actor (who 
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performs the social behaviour), and the effect on the recipient of the behaviour. Such a 
framework is commonly represented as in Table 1 (see below). 
Table 1: Hamiltonian framework of social behaviour: The categorization of social 
behaviour devised by Hamilton (1964) based on fitness effects on the actor and recipient of a 
social behaviour. (+) or (−) refers to a positive or negative fitness effect. The rows refer to the 
fitness effects on the actor, and the columns refers to the fitness effect on the recipient. The 
four categories are mutual benefit (+/+), selfishness (+/−), altruism (−/+) and spite (−/−).  
 + − 
+ Mutual benefit Selfishness 
− Altruism Spite 
 
From the individual-based perspective understood by Darwin, mutual benefit and 
selfishness are readily explained (by their positive effects on the fitness of the actor), but 
altruism and spite create the problem – why would an individual pay a cost to benefit another 
individual, or act to harm others if it also harms them?  
Hamilton (1964a; b) solved the problem by showing how seemingly cooperative 
behaviour at one level (i.e. individuals) has its basis in selfishness at another (i.e. genes), an 
idea later clarified by Dawkins in The Selfish Gene (1976). With this perspective, it’s easy to 
see how a gene for altruism will spread if it benefits the fitness of the gene. Hamilton’s great 
insight was to show that this can occur through benefits given to related individuals, with 
whom an actor has certain likelihoods of sharing genes. Such indirect fitness effects (on related 
individuals) combine with direct fitness effects to form ‘inclusive fitness’, which is the 
property that individuals appear designed to maximize (Grafen, 2006a; West & Gardner, 
2013). In short, a gene for altruism can spread even if it causes direct fitness costs to the 
individual bearing the gene, as long as these are outweighed by the indirect fitness benefits to 
the gene, through impacts on the fitness of the recipients of the behaviour. This logic forms 
the basis of the famous ‘Hamilton’s rule’, which stipulates that a gene for a social action such 
as altruism will spread if 𝑟𝑏 − 𝑐 > 0, where c and b are the costs and benefits of the social 
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behaviour on the actor and recipient respectively, and r is the relatedness of the actor to the 
recipient (Hamilton, 1964a; b; Charnov, 1977). In this way, relatedness represents the 
probability of the actor and recipient sharing the gene for the social behaviour (relative to the 
average in the population; Grafen, 1985). Inclusive fitness theory therefore grants a special 
place to kinship and common ancestry in the evolution of cooperation, as this is the most 
common reasons for individuals to share genes. With this is mind, it is easy to see how a gene 
for altruism could spread via ‘kin selection’ (Maynard Smith, 1964). Hamilton’s rule predicts 
that cooperation is more likely to be favoured when the relatedness of interactants is higher 
(or when b is higher, or c lower). Altruism is therefore likely to be favoured if the benefits of 
cooperation can be directed to relatives (Frank, 1998), which can often be easily achieved by 
kin discrimination or limited dispersal (Hamilton, 1964b, 1972; Fletcher & Michener, 1987; 
Russell & Hatchwell, 2001; Kümmerli et al., 2009), with some caveats on the role of kin-
competition (West et al., 2002b). 
Despite the special role for kinship in cooperation, it is important to note that, as 
Hamilton himself highlighted (1964), it is strictly relatedness that matters, not kinship, as there 
are other (presumed less common) means for individuals to share genes. Dawkins popularized 
these ideas in his ‘greenbeard’ thought experiment, that postulated a gene with three properties 
(1) a signal of the presence of the gene (such as a green beard) (2) the ability to recognize the 
signal in other individuals, and (3) the ability to preferentially cooperate with individuals 
displaying the trait (Dawkins, 1976). Such greenbeard genes are generally thought to be 
unlikely to occur in nature, mainly due to the problems of falsebeards that display the signal 
without performing the cooperative behaviour (Gardner & West, 2010; Biernaskie et al., 2011; 
West & Gardner, 2013; Gardner, 2019), but in recent years there have been many suggested 
examples, particularly in microbes and colonial invertebrates (Pathak et al., 2013; De Tomaso, 
2014; Karadge et al., 2015; Heller et al., 2016; Gruenheit et al., 2017).  
5 
 
The Hamiltonian ‘inclusive fitness’ approach has proven widely applicable as the 
basis of social evolution theory, providing a general explanation of how situations that lead to 
high relatedness can support cooperation (Grafen, 2006a; Lehmann & Keller, 2006; Bourke, 
2011). Inclusive fitness theory has been a huge success, of great use in understanding the 
conditions favoring the evolution of a range of social and cooperative behaviours such as 
cooperative breeding (Cockburn, 1998; Hatchwell, 2009), spite (Gardner & West, 2004b, 
2006), parasite virulence (Frank, 1992; Buckling & Brockhurst, 2008; Wild et al., 2009), and 
many more (Abbot et al., 2011; Bourke, 2011). Furthermore, inclusive fitness theory has 
provided the basis for understanding potential conflicts of interest in social interactions, such 
as those over sex allocation (West, 2009) or through intragenomic conflict (Gardner & Úbeda, 
2017), highlighting the close relationship between cooperation and conflict. In some respects, 
the problem of cooperation (at least how Darwin saw it) was solved by the inclusive fitness 
framework. If the ‘selfish’ agents are genes, rather than individuals, and fitness can be accrued 
indirectly through other individuals, we can readily explain all four categorizations of social 
behaviour (Table 1).  
Despite great progress in understanding conflict and cooperation (aided by inclusive 
fitness theory), some forms of the evolutionary problem of cooperation remain. How does 
cooperation stay stable in the face of exploitation? The problem of the maintenance of 
cooperation in the face of exploitation is captured by the ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin, 
1968). Consider a group of herders sharing a common resource on which to graze cattle. Each 
herder will have an incentive to increase the size of their herd, sharing the resource cost of 
doing so with the rest of the group, whilst gaining the benefit privately. This leads to the 
resource being damaged, to the disadvantage of all individuals, and yet is the logical outcome 
of rational individuals competing to maximize their own success. The potential for such 
‘tragedies’ is well known in evolutionary biology (Wenseleers & Ratnieks, 2004; Rankin et 
al., 2007; Strassmann & Queller, 2014), and many solutions have been proposed (Rankin et 
al., 2007).  
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One important factor that can suppress selfishness and resolve a potential tragedy of 
the commons is constraint, particularly in information. A perfectly adapted individual would 
know its relatedness to every potential social partner, and dole out help and harm accordingly 
(Hamilton, 2001). Such perfect information would however generate much conflict, and 
potentially undermine cooperative societies. Taking honey bees as an example, perfect 
information would allow workers to help offspring of super-sisters and harm offspring of half-
sisters. Distinct patrilines would team-up and protect against worker policing, whilst 
preferentially nursing offspring of their own patrilines, with likely large effects on colony 
efficiency (Moritz & Crewe, 2018). Incorporating imperfect information into models of 
cooperation can change optimal strategies, as may occur for meerkats where errors in 
relatedness estimation may select for indiscriminate altruism (Duncan et al., 2019).   
Despite the likely importance of non-adaptive constraints, solutions to the tragedy of 
the commons have generally focused on two main themes; restricting access to cooperative 
benefits to kin, thereby aligning the fitness interest of all individuals (Foster et al., 2006; 
Dionisio & Gordo, 2007; Taylor et al., 2007), or a raft of ‘enforcement’ measures that can 
suppress selfish behaviour (Pellmyr & Huth, 1994; Frank, 1995; Wenseleers et al., 2004b; 
Boyd et al., 2010). In this way, the resolutions to the tragedy of the commons have been often 
expressed as avoiding the individuals that can undermine cooperation – cheaters (Kiers et al., 
2003; Travisano & Velicer, 2004; Rankin et al., 2007). 
The field of social evolution makes great use of terms such as ‘cheating’, ‘altruism’ 
and ‘spite’ that have general meaning in everyday life, which has caused semantic confusion. 
What is meant by ‘cheater’ has been particularly muddled (Strassmann et al., 2000, 2011; 
Santorelli et al., 2008; Buttery et al., 2013; Ghoul et al., 2014; Wolf et al., 2015). For example, 
there is disagreement over whether it is cheating if one individual beats another in social 
competition (Strassmann & Queller, 2011), or whether cheaters have to be taking advantage 
of the cooperation of others (Fiegna & Velicer, 2003). In an influential review, Ghoul & 
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colleagues (2014) define cheating as involving inclusive fitness benefits (to the cheater) and 
costs (to the cooperator) “arising from the actor directing a cooperative behaviour towards the 
cheat, rather than the intended recipient”. Under this definition acts such as eavesdropping on 
cooperative signals (Zuk & Kolluru, 1998) aren’t cheating, but cuckoos exploiting the parental 
care of warblers (Davies, 2000) is. Others may however argue that since there is no expectation 
of a cuckoo ever cooperating with a reed warbler, it is not helpful to view the cuckoo’s 
behaviour as cheating.  All of this goes to show that the issue is complicated, and subject to 
disagreement.  
Much of the narrative around cheater avoidance has arisen in microbes (Velicer, 2003; 
Travisano & Velicer, 2004), particularly in Dictyostelium discoideum (Strassmann et al., 
2000; Santorelli et al., 2008; Khare & Shaulsky, 2010; Noh et al., 2018; Ostrowski, 2019) 
where the prominent view is that cheating is a breaking of some ‘social contract’ of expected 
fair cooperation (Strassmann & Queller, 2011). It is however difficult to non-arbitrarily 
designate what a ‘fair share’ of cooperation would be, or how much of an individual’s potential 
rewards they are expected to sacrifice for the ‘greater good’. These problems are likely to be 
particularly important in natural systems with substantial genetic variation in cooperative traits 
blurring the line between ‘cheat’ and ‘good competitor’ in a given scenario’ (Wolf et al., 
2015).  
Perhaps influenced by the prominence of simple game theory such as the ‘Prisoners 
Dilemma’ and ‘Snowdrift game’ (Maynard Smith & Price, 1973; Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; 
Doebeli & Hauert, 2005), alongside the ease of genetic manipulations through knock-outs 
(Velicer & Yu, 2003; Greig & Travisano, 2004; Griffin et al., 2004; Santorelli et al., 2013), 
cheating has most often been used to refer to so-called ‘obligate’ cheaters (Velicer, 2003; 
Travisano & Velicer, 2004; Van Dyken et al., 2011) that are incapable of cooperation. This 
has led to a focus on a  dichotomy of cooperators competing against cheaters (Travisano & 
Velicer, 2004; Ross-Gillespie et al., 2007; Ho et al., 2013; Sanchez & Gore, 2013), despite 
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some evidence for conditional strategies, which would obviously be advantageous (Doebeli 
& Hauert, 2005). Such context-dependence (or ‘facultative’) cheating is a key concept that 
could change the way the problem of cooperation manifests itself. It is quite different to look 
at whether obligate cheaters could destabilize cooperation, or look at the circumstances under 
which an individual would be expected to cheat. Some traits may be developmentally fixed, 
requiring obligate cheating (Santorelli et al., 2008; Popat et al., 2012). However, if the 
cooperative trait in question is the production of a ‘public good’ then it seems plausible that 
an adaptive response would involve modulating that response to different scenarios.  
In order to clarify the confusion and blurring of concepts such as cheating that occur 
in the study of cooperation, a modified approach to understanding how and why individuals 
make contributions to cooperative ventures may be warranted. In particular, a refined view of 
the role of relatedness in the evolution of cooperation could help to clarify the concept of 
cheating.  The classic approach to study the evolution of a cooperative trait looks at relatedness 
between individuals with respect to the allele for cooperation (Grafen, 1985; Frank, 1998). An 
example might be an allele for producing a public good such as nutrient-scavenging 
pyoverdine in Pseudomonas aeruginosa (Griffin et al., 2004). Using this approach, 
predictions can be made from Hamilton’s rule about whether cooperation is favoured (or not) 
between those individuals (e.g. between individuals who share or don’t share the allele for 
producing pyoverdin). However, for many public goods all individuals possess the allele in 
question, but the amount that they contribute to the public good can vary. In this context, 
relatedness at the allele for cooperation is 1 for all individuals. However, relatedness of an 
individual to a social group can still vary, as individuals vary in their relative representation 
within a group. A perspective that looks at how variation in relatedness to a group can 
quantitatively modulate an individuals level of cooperation, rather than how average 
relatedness at an allele for cooperation might fix whether an individual cooperates or cheats, 
can change the way we think about concepts such as cheating. Under this perspective cheating 
can of course still occur, but it isn’t because relatedness with respect to the trait is 0 (creating 
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cheater individuals), its due to variation in relatedness creating the conditions where 
individuals lower their contribution to cooperation. This could reframe the problem of 
overcoming the success of obligate cheating genotypes that disrupt cooperation to a problem 
of how an individual should act (both cooperatively and by cheating) to maximize its success, 
and when might this lead to a breakdown of cooperation. Cooperation may have to ‘beat’ 
adaptive selfish individuals rather than cheating per se – leading to different questions being 
asked about how it persists. Ultimately, whether this approach is warranted depends on 
whether it is both theoretically and empirically useful, in the sense of being able to generate 
testable predictions about social behaviour, that explain the behaviours we can observe.  
In this thesis I am using a social microbe, the amoeba Dictyostelium discoideum, as 
an empirical system for developing and testing social evolution theory. In conditions of 
starvation, free-living amoeba aggregate and a fraction of cells die to form the stalk that holds 
aloft reproductive spores for dispersal (Kessin, 2001; Smith et al., 2014). This provides an 
obvious opportunity for conflict (Strassmann et al., 2000; Wolf et al., 2015), particularly given 
that multiple distinct genotypes are found in close proximity in the wild, and can co-aggregate 
(Fortunato et al., 2003; Gilbert et al., 2007). There are many advantages of using microbes 
such as D. discoideum to study social evolution. Microbes are amenable to extensive 
experimental manipulations of social scenarios, such as identity of social partners and 
relatedness structure within groups, that can be used to test theories of how cooperative 
behaviours should change across social contexts (West et al., 2007b). Furthermore, sociality 
in microbes and beyond often involve ‘public’ goods’ (i.e. those which are available to all 
individuals within a group), ranging from nutrient acquisition (Brockhurst et al., 2008, 2010) 
or biofilms (Nadell et al., 2009) in bacteria, to sentinel behaviour in meerkats (Santema & 
Clutton-Brock, 2013), and milk production in communally nursing mice (Ferrari et al., 2015, 
2016). Consequently, understanding cooperation in terms of public goods provides broad 




Thesis aims and chapters 
One of the main aims of this thesis is to develop and test a new model about strategic 
social behaviour where each individual is a ‘savvy investor’ capable of quantitatively 
modulating their contributions to public goods in response to changes in the social 
environment (i.e. relatedness). Specifically, I aim to test the hypothesis that strains of the 
social ameoba Dictyostelium discoideum are capable of using conditional strategies, whereby 
they respond adaptively to variation in relatedness by quantitatively varying their 
contributions to public goods. Consequently, I aim to argue against the dominance of the 
‘cheater avoidance’ paradigm for the maintenance of cooperation, that suggests individuals 
either ‘cooperate’ or ‘cheat’. I aim instead to highlight the problem caused by the possibility 
of conditional cooperation leading all individuals to be capable of ‘cheating’ or ‘cooperating’ 
depending on the circumstances. 
My opening chapter presents a new theoretical framework for the analysis of strategic 
contributions to public goods that are both continuous (rather than binary ‘cheat or 
cooperate’), and conditional (upon the social scenario such as the relatedness to other 
individuals). I then test the ability of this framework to make accurate predictions of 
contributions to public goods in the social amoeba Dictyostelium discoideum.  
With this model, I aim to assess whether we can make quantitative predictions of the 
degree to which complex groups suffer (or not) from a ‘tragedy of the commons’ due to the 
strategic (selfish) behaviour of all individuals (Chapter 2). Within this chapter, I further 
highlight the importance of several key constraints that can protect groups from a complete 
collapse in cooperation. 
In Chapter 3 I use the model of strategic behaviour developed in this thesis as the 
conceptual basis for an opinion piece that aims to bring clarity to the concept of conflict 
between individuals in groups, with focus on how to avoid the tragedy of the commons, groups 
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often have to deal with the selfish behaviour of all individuals, rather than just avoiding 
cheaters. Within this perspective, I also highlight how differences in perspective between 
theoreticians and empirical researchers have clouded the field. 
The ability of individuals to enact the strategic behaviour that is the focus of this thesis 
depends critically on their ability to measure something about their social environment, and 
act according. Following the development of my own work on strategic behaviour, alongside 
a theme of emerging empirical work on greenbeards and allorecognition, in Chapter 4 I aim 
to bring clarity to the concept of greenbeards. Cooperation directed towards individuals who 
match at one locus (rather than across the genome) is emerging as a much more important 
form of self-recognition in nature than previously expected, particularly in microbes, but a 
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Abstract: Contributing to cooperation is typically costly, while its rewards are often 
available to all members of a social group. So why should individuals be willing to pay these 
costs, especially if they could cheat by exploiting the investments of others? Kin selection 
theory broadly predicts that individuals should invest more into cooperation if their relatedness 
to group members is high (assuming they can discriminate kin from non-kin). To better 
understand how relatedness affects cooperation, we derived the ‘Collective Investment’ game, 
which provides quantitative predictions for patterns of strategic investment depending on the 
level of relatedness. We then tested these predictions by experimentally manipulating 
relatedness (genotype frequencies) in mixed cooperative aggregations of the social amoeba 
Dictyostelium discoideum, which builds a stalk to facilitate spore dispersal. Measurements of 
stalk investment by natural strains correspond to the predicted patterns of relatedness-
dependent strategic investment, wherein investment by a strain increases with its relatedness 
to the group. Furthermore, if overall group relatedness is relatively low (i.e. no strain is at high 
frequency in a group) strains face a scenario akin to the ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’ and suffer from 
insufficient collective investment. We find that strains employ relatedness-dependent 
segregation to avoid these pernicious conditions. These findings demonstrate that simple 
organisms like D. discoideum are not restricted to being ‘cheaters’ or ‘cooperators’, but instead 
measure their relatedness to their group and strategically modulate their investment into 
cooperation accordingly. Consequently, all individuals will sometimes appear to cooperate 
and sometimes cheat due to the dynamics of strategic investing.  
Significance statement: Contributing to cooperation is costly, while its rewards are often 
available to all members of a social group. Therefore, cooperation is vulnerable to exploitation 
by individuals that do not contribute, but nevertheless share the benefits. So why contribute to 
cooperation? This dilemma can be resolved if individuals modulate their ‘investment’ into 
cooperation dependent on whether benefits go to relatives or nonrelatives, which maximizes 
the return on investment to their genes. To evaluate this idea, we derived a model for 
cooperative investment and tested its predictions using a social microbe that cooperatively 
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builds a stalk to facilitate spore dispersal. We find that cooperative investment into stalk 
closely matches predictions, with strains strategically adjusting investment according to their 




Cooperation is widespread in nature (Hamilton, 1964b; West et al., 2007b; Bourke, 
2011), often being manifested as individuals investing in the production of public goods that 
benefit all members of a group (Hardin, 1968; Rankin et al., 2007; Frank, 2010). However, 
these goods are vulnerable to exploitation by ‘cheaters’ (or ‘free riders’) that reap the benefits 
of cooperation without commensurate investment (Hamilton, 1963; Olson, 1965). Because 
such behaviour has the potential to undermine the evolutionary stability of cooperation 
through public good production, successful cooperation is typically thought to require 
mechanisms of cheater avoidance or control (Clutton-Brock & Parker, 1995; Travisano & 
Velicer, 2004; Frank, 2006; West et al., 2007b). This logic implies a simple evolutionary 
scenario where there is competition between alternative ‘cooperator’ and ‘cheater’ strategies. 
However, it is logical to assume that such discrete strategies would lose out to individuals that 
can strategically modify their contribution to public goods. This is because strategic 
investment could allow individuals to balance the costs and benefits of ‘investing’, whilst 
realizing potential opportunities to exploit the investments made by others (Ostrom, 1990; 
Doebeli et al., 2004). Because these costs and benefits can vary across social settings, 
individuals face a strategic dilemma over how much to invest, with the realized success of a 
strategy depending not only on the level of cooperative investments made by the individual, 
but also that made by others in the group.  
Kin selection theory provides an appealing framework for understanding how 
evolution shapes investment in cooperation. In this framework, the competing ‘individuals’ 
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are different genetic variants (Williams, 1966; Cosmides & Tooby, 1981; Taylor et al., 2007), 
with strategies evolving to maximize ‘inclusive fitness’ (Grafen, 2006a; West & Gardner, 
2013). The inclusive fitness accounting considers the total impact of a behaviour on the 
success of the causal genes in terms of the direct costs to the actor and indirect benefits to 
relatives (i.e. others carrying that same genetic variant). For cooperation through production 
of public goods, where all benefits go to the entire group, relatedness to the group should be 
a critical determinant of inclusive fitness because it governs the share of rewards that go to the 
individual, and hence determines the expected net return on investment. Consequently, we 
would logically expect that individuals should optimize their inclusive fitness by facultatively 
modulating their willingness to invest into public goods as a function of their relatedness to 
the members of the group (Hamilton, 1964b; Taylor & Frank, 1996; Pepper, 2000; Frank, 
2010).  
A number of theoretical studies have analyzed facultative cooperative strategies, 
where individuals modulate their behaviour in response to social context (such as the 
behaviours shown by rivals) (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Doebeli & Hauert, 2005). While 
most of these studies have focused on discrete alternative strategies (‘cooperate’ or ‘cheat’) 
(Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Doebeli et al., 2004), there is also a growing literature that 
considers continuously variable strategic cooperative behaviour in response to social contexts, 
including relatedness (Doebeli & Hauert, 2005; Frank, 2010). However, experimental tests of 
theoretical predictions often either rely on the simpler models that do not include such 
potential complexity (Sinervo & Lively, 1996; Dugatkin & Reeve, 1998; Turner & Chao, 
1999; Bshary et al., 2008; Gore et al., 2009) or do not evaluate whether the observed 
facultative patterns are strategic (i.e. match adaptive quantitative predictions from 
evolutionary models) (Buttery et al., 2009; Manhes & Velicer, 2011; Parkinson et al., 2011; 
Xavier et al., 2011; Pollak et al., 2016; Bruce et al., 2017). For example, the opportunistic 
pathogen Pseudomonas aeruginosa facultatively produces iron-scavenging siderophores, 
which represent a cooperative public good (West & Buckling, 2003; Griffin et al., 2004; 
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Diggle et al., 2007). Cells produce quorum-sensing molecules that that allow them to modulate 
their production of siderophores. There is evidence that investment into siderophore 
production is flexible (West & Buckling, 2003; Diggle et al., 2007) and varies between broad-
scale differences of ‘high’ versus ‘low’ relatedness (Griffin et al., 2004). However, it is 
unclear as to whether the level of production can be varied quantitatively as a strategic 
response to fine-grained variation in relatedness.  
To understand how selection shapes patterns of investment into public goods in 
response to variation in relatedness, we therefore first developed a dynamic game-theoretical 
framework that views competing genetic variants as players who can modulate their 
contributions to public goods based on their relatedness to their group. The resulting 
‘Collective Investment’ game offers an intuitive economic logic for why and how organisms 
should modulate their contributions to public goods and provides a set of simple and 
unambiguous predictions that can be tested empirically. To directly test these predictions, we 
next examined the consequences of experimentally manipulating social group composition in 
the social amoeba Dictyostelium discoideum on patterns of individual and collective 
investment in cooperation. These studies revealed a remarkable agreement between patterns 
of individual and collective investment with fine-scale model predictions, where patterns of 
cooperation are explained by savvy investment strategies that maximize the fitness return on 
investment. 
Results and Discussion 
 
The Collective Investment Game 
When individuals engage in social interactions, their success typically depends on 
both their own behaviour and the behaviour of their social partner(s). Under these conditions, 
game theory provides a powerful framework for identifying how individuals should behave to 
maximize their expected social success across encounters (Maynard Smith & Price, 1973; 
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Maynard Smith, 1974; Queller, 1985; Taylor et al., 2007). Game theoretical models predict 
that individuals will display the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), which cannot be invaded 
by any competing strategy (Maynard Smith & Price, 1973; Taylor et al., 2007). In most 
economic and biological scenarios that involve cooperation, we might logically expect that 
individuals could do better by playing dynamic strategies in which they change their behaviour 
quantitatively across different social contexts (Hamilton, 1964b; Ostrom, 1990). While games 
with fixed alternative strategies (e.g. the Prisoner’s Dilemma) have been widely used as the 
basis for analyses of strategic modulation of cooperative behaviour (Doebeli & Hauert, 2005; 
Frank, 2010), they do not yield any quantitative predictions about continuously variable 
behaviour. Instead, models that consider cooperation via public goods (Frank, 1995, 2010; 
Doebeli & Hauert, 2005; Dionisio & Gordo, 2006), typically based on the inclusive fitness 
framework (Taylor, 1992; Taylor & Frank, 1996; Frank, 1998), have proven more 
informative. We extent this work by developing a model based on an equivalent ‘direct fitness’ 
accounting, where different genetic variants are the players in a dynamic game, to provide an 
intuitive logic for the costs and benefits of investing in pubic goods.  The game is described 
with two players, but logically extends to include more.  
The Collective Investment game is based on a scenario in which the payoff to a player 
is determined by two opposing factors: the costs suffered from investing in the public good 
and the resulting benefits from public good availability (Figure 1A). From the perspective of 
the group, this antagonistic relationship between costs and benefits results in a scenario where 
group success is maximized at some intermediate level of collective investment whenever 
public good production is favored by natural selection (Figure 1B). Examples of this sort of 
scenario, where overall success is maximized at an intermediate level of investment, are well 
documented, ranging from economics to biology (Gordon, 1954; Parker & Smith, 1990; 
Foster, 2004; Doebeli & Hauert, 2005). However, the level of collective investment that 
maximizes group success (denoted ΘG in the model) will typically differ from the level of 
personal investment that maximizes individual fitness (Frank, 2006). This is because 
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individuals suffer the cost of investment, yet their payoffs are divided among the collective. 
Therefore, we expect individuals to implement selfish strategies that maximize their return on 
investment in terms of fitness, which must balance their personal costs with the return they 
receive through their influence on collective success (Olson, 1965; Ostrom, 1990). The 
relative magnitude of the costs and benefits together define the strength of selection (denoted 
 in the model), which reflects the rate at which group success declines as investment deviates 





Figure 1. The costs and benefits of cooperation through production of public goods. A) The benefit 
(relative payoff) from public good production is an increasing function of the resources invested into 
the public good (blue line). Because investment is costly it results in a decreasing payoff through 
other components (red line). In the case of the D. discoideum system, the benefits of stalk investment 
come through spore dispersal and come at a cost in terms of reduced spore production. B) The costs 
and benefits of investment in the public good result in a quadratic relationship between total 
investment (𝐼𝐺) and overall group success (𝜔𝐺). Groups have their highest success at some 
intermediate level of investment (ΘG) that balances costs and benefits. In both A and B, investment 
in public good is given as the proportion of the total budget available, with zero being no investment 
and 1 corresponding to investment of all available budget into the public good. In the case of the D. 
discoideum system, this represents the proportion of cells that a strain invests into stalk production. 
For illustration, the optimal level of investment (ΘG) resulting from the relative costs and benefits is 
0.3. To capture different strengths of selection on investment (, see equation 5), the bold lines were 
plotted for a strength of selection where  = 2, with the shaded region indicating the range from  = 





To implement our direct fitness accounting, we consider a player to represent some 
proportion of the group, which is equivalent to the frequency of that genetic variant within the 
group (and therefore can vary between 0 and 1) and represents their ‘whole-group relatedness’ 
(Taylor & Frank, 1996; Pepper, 2000) (in economic terms, this might be described as a 
player’s ‘stake’ in the group). This measure of relatedness is relevant because, as the benefits 
of public goods are accessible to all group members, the whole-group is the beneficiary of 
investment made by an individual, and hence whole-group relatedness accounts for direct 
fitness return from investing in public goods. Despite differing from the more typical ‘kinship’ 
coefficient of inclusive fitness models, the two approaches produce exactly equivalent results 
(Taylor & Frank, 1996; Frank, 1998; Pepper, 2000). To identify the strategy that maximizes 
expected individual fitness, which represents the ESS for the game, we solved the Collective 
Investment game across the full range of relatedness over a broad array of relative costs and 
benefits of investment in public goods. These analyses revealed a general qualitative 
prediction for patterns of investment under the ESS: individuals should modulate their 
investment into public goods as a continuous function of their relatedness to the group. By 
evaluating the patterns predicted by the model across an enormous range of values for the 
optimal level of collective investment (i.e. the value that maximizes group success, Θ𝐺) and 
the strength of selection on investment (), it is clear that the qualitative results are robust 
across a wide array of conditions (Figure 2A and 2D; see also SI Appendix, Figure S1A S1D, 
S1G and S1J). When there is a relatively large asymmetry in the degree to which players are 
related to the group, each player should behave differently. The player with higher relatedness 
to the group has the incentive to invest because their interests are more closely aligned with 
those of the group (and hence investing maximizes their fitness, see SI Appendix, Figure S2), 
while the player(s) that is less related to the group does best by withholding investment (or 
under-investing) and exploiting the investment of their partner (SI Appendix, Figure S2). 
Consequently, under these conditions, the player with the lower relatedness will have higher 
relative fitness than the player with higher relatedness because of this exploitative behaviour 
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(Figure 2B and 2E, see also SI Appendix, Figure S1B, S1E, S1H and S1K). In contrast, when 
the players have similar levels of relatedness to the group, neither is expected to be willing to 
invest heavily, leading to a pattern of under-investment in the public good (Figure 2C and 2F; 
see also SI Appendix, Figure S1C, S1F, S1I and S1L). 
Because organisms in nature presumably rely on some cue(s) to measure their level 
of relatedness to the group (which would represent a mechanism of kin discrimination), we 
also evaluated how the patterns would be affected if individuals make errors when measuring 
relatedness (with the patterns in Figure 2 and S1 illustrating the scenario of no measurement 
error). We included measurement error in the model by integrating over a Gaussian 
distribution centered on the true relatedness (allowing us to vary the degree of error by 
modulating the standard deviation of the error distribution, SI Appendix, Figure S3). We 
further assumed that measurement error depends on group complexity, and so is high at 
intermediate levels of relatedness (where group composition is the most complex), and low 
when one player has very high relatedness to the group. This extension of the model provides 
us with a robust and clear set of predictions for what to expect in nature (see Figure 3 for an 
example and SI Appendix, Figure S4 for illustrations across parameter space). Together, the 
Collective Investment game reveals that although the exact patterns will depend on the relative 
costs and benefits of public good production (which will determine the optimal level of 
investment and the relative strength of selection on investment patterns) and the degree of 
error in measurement of relatedness, the qualitative patterns of individual investment, relative 
fitness, and collective investment are consistent across parameter space (see also SI Appendix, 





Figure 2. Examples of the predictions of the Collective Investment game (and specific application 
to the D. discoideum system). Predictions are plotted as a function of a focal player’s relatedness to 
the group (i.e. a strain’s frequency in the group). For parts A-C the optimal investment (ΘG) was 
fixed at 0.3 and the strength of selection (Γ) was varied, while for D-F the strength of selection was 
fixed at 2 and the optimum was varied. A & D) Predicted Investment (𝐼𝑖∣𝑝𝑖) in the public good (stalk 
investment) as a function of relatedness (frequency). B & E) Predicted relative payoff (fitness) (𝜌𝑖) 
as a function of relatedness (frequency). C & F) Predicted collective investment (𝐼𝐺) for a pair of 
players as a function of the relatedness (frequency) of the focal player to the group. (See SI Appendix, 






Figure 3. Illustration of the predictions of the Collective Investment game for the case where players 
make errors when measuring their relatedness. This corresponds to the scenario where players have 
imperfect information about their relatedness and are estimating their relatedness from some cues. 
The structure of the figure matches that of Figure 2. In all figures the optimal level of investment 
(Θ𝐺) is 0.3 and the strength of selection (Γ) is 2. Lines within each figure correspond to different 
values of error (σ) in measurement of relatedness (frequency in the group) (see SI Appendix, Figure 





Individual and Collective Investment in D. discoideum 
 To test whether organisms are able to deploy the relatedness-dependent (and hence 
frequency-dependent) strategies predicted by the Collective Investment game, we measured 
patterns of investment into a public good in the social amoeba D. discoideum. Free-living D. 
discoideum amoebae initiate a social cycle in response to starvation (Strassmann et al., 2000; 
Kessin, 2001). Thousands of amoebae aggregate to form a multicellular fruiting body with a 
supporting stalk composed of dead cells that holds aloft a sporehead. The stalk structure is 
thought to have evolved to aid spore dispersal, and it has been shown experimentally that an 
intact fruiting body does indeed increase dispersal (although dispersal is not eliminated by 
stalk removal) (Smith et al., 2014). Stalk cell differentiation has typically been viewed as 
altruistic self-sacrifice for the benefit of the cells in the sporehead (Strassmann et al., 2000, 
2011; Foster et al., 2004; Shaulsky & Kessin, 2007). However, this perspective ignores the 
implications of collective investment on the group’s success: if a genotype only produced 
altruists then there would be no spores to reap the benefits of stalk investment and likewise, if 
a genotype only produced spores then they would be unable to reap group benefits of 
producing a stalk (Figure 1A). Consequently, there must be some intermediate level of stalk 
investment that is favored by natural selection that balances these costs and benefits (Figure 
1B). Indeed, laboratory measurements reveal that typically 25-35% of cells are allocated to 
the stalk cell fate (Forman & Garrod, 1977; Chattwood et al., 2013).  
Multicellular aggregations can also be composed of multiple strains (i.e. can be 
chimeric), providing the opportunity for conflict over stalk investment (Strassmann et al., 
2000; Foster et al., 2002). Conflict arises because the different strains within an aggregation 
each contribute to the costs for building the stalk, while all members of the aggregation benefit 
equally. Thus, stalk investment in D. discoideum fits the scenario modelled by the Collective 
Investment game. In our direct fitness accounting, different strains are the relevant fitness-
maximizing strategists, with the proportion of cells sacrificed by the strain to build the stalk 
representing their investment into the public good, and their relative frequency within the 
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aggregation determining their relatedness to the group (Figure 1). Furthermore, D. discoideum 
provides an ideal model social system to experimentally test the predictions made by the 
Collective Investment game because group composition can be manipulated and 
corresponding patterns of investment can be measured quantitatively (Strassmann et al., 
2000). Specifically, the ESS of the Collective Investment game predicts that D. discoideum 
strains should show relatedness-dependent patterns of investment, meaning that their 
investment should change as a function of their frequency in a group. When a strain is at low 
frequency in the aggregation they would be predicted to invest little or nothing into the stalk 
(hence produce mostly spores), while a strain that is at a high frequency in an aggregation 
should invest at a level that is close to their clonal investment (Figure 2A and 2D). This pattern 
of investment results in a return on investment, and hence relative fitness, that is highest when 
a strain is at low frequency in an aggregation and hence has low relatedness (because it 
exploits its partner as a free rider) and is lowest when it is at high frequency and hence has 
high relatedness (because it pays the cost of being exploited). Consequently, the expected 
relative fitness of the lower-frequency player is always higher than that of the higher-
frequency player (Figure 2B and 2E).  
To test these predictions, we measured the behaviour of co-occurring natural D. 
discoideum strains in clonal and chimeric development. We examined the fit to theoretical 
predictions using data from ten naturally co-occurring strains, which represent the spectrum 
of genetic diversity within a natural population (Gruenheit et al., 2017), interacting in 34 
different chimeric pairings. To vary levels of relatedness we combined pairs of strains across 
a range of frequencies (at least five different frequencies per replicate, for a total of 944 
chimeric combinations). On average, strains show patterns of frequency-dependent 
investment in the stalk in pairwise mixes that match the qualitative predictions of the ESS in 
the Collective Investment game (compare Figure 4A with 4D, see also expected values in 
Figures 2A, 2D, and 3A). Strains invest little into the stalk when their relative frequency in a 
group is low and much more when their relative frequency is high (χ2(3) = 181.5, p < 10‒38, see 
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also Figures S5A and S5B for high resolution illustrations of patterns from two pairings). 
Overall, the pattern very closely corresponds to the quantitative predictions of the model 
(Figure 4A and 4D). Strains approach zero investment when they are at a very low frequency 
in a group, whereas their investment is close to the optimal level of investment (assumed to 
be about 30% of their cells into stalk) when their frequency in a group approaches 100%. This 
pattern of investment leads to the pattern of frequency dependent relative fitness predicted by 
the Collective Investment game (Figure 2B, 2E, and 3B) in which strains have a high relative 
fitness when they are at a low frequency in a group and low relative fitness when they are at 
high frequency (χ2(3) = 348, p < 10‒75; compare the illustration of expected values in Figure 4B 
with the experimental results in Figure 4E, see also Figures S5C and S5D). Importantly, these 
results imply that all strains will appear to behave as ‘cheaters’ when at low frequency in 
groups and as ‘cooperators’ when at high frequency.  
 The predictions of the Collective Investment game can also be viewed from the 
perspective of the aggregate behaviour of the strains in terms of total collective investment. 
Experimental measurements of total collective investment as a function of the relative 
frequencies of strains shows the predicted pattern of relative investment in stalk across 
frequencies in a group (Figure 2C, 2F and 3C), where investment is lowest when strains are 
at the same frequency, and increases exponentially as the difference in their frequencies 
increases (i.e. as frequency of the focal strain approaches zero or one) (χ2(2) = 144.3, p < 10‒
32; compare the illustration of expected patterns in Figure 4C with empirical results in Figure 





Figure 4. Patterns of stalk investment, relative fitness, and collective investment as a function of 
strain frequencies in chimeric aggregations. Parts A-C illustrate expected patterns (see Figure 3) 
under parameter values that resemble the empirical results (using the same equations [eqns. 8 to 10]1 
to calculate model expectations as those used for empirical estimation), with the bold line 
corresponding to the case where Θ𝐺=0.3,  = 2, and  =  with the shading spanning a range of 
error in measurement of frequency (relatedness) ( = 0.25 to  = 0.75). Parts D-F show empirical 
results from the set of 34 chimeric pairs (N=944 total chimeric mixes), with the points representing 
the means and the bars their standard errors, estimated from a mixed model (following the model 
structure in the Methods, but with frequency as a categorical factor). D) Individual stalk investment 
by a focal strain as a function of its frequency in a chimeric aggregation., E) Relative fitness for a 
focal strain as a function of its frequency in a chimeric aggregation, F) Collective investment by 
chimeras as a function of the frequency of a randomly assigned focal strain to the chimeric 
aggregation. In parts D and E the bold curve represents the best-fit estimate from the cubic regression 
model (here fitted to the estimated means). For part F, the curve represents the best-fit estimated 
from a quadratic regression model (fitted to the estimated means). For all three figures (parts D to F) 
the shaded region indicates a one standard error interval on either side of the best-fit line. For 
individual (parts A and D) and collective (parts C and F) investment values were re-scaled by 
subtracting 1 − Θ𝐺 from the raw measures, under the assumption that Θ𝐺 = 0.3 (therefore, the value 
labelled as Θ𝐺  corresponds to a value of 0.3 in the figure).  
 
 
1 In the published paper, these equation numbers were incorrectly cited as eqns. 11-13. 
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The Prisoner’s Dilemma and How to Avoid It  
Although the ESS is characterized by continuously variable relatedness-dependent (or 
frequency-dependent) behaviour (Figure 2), to achieve a more intuitive understanding we can 
link the payoff structure at any particular group composition to canonical games. To do so, at 
a given group composition we can compare the relative payoffs to a player that defects by 
making no contribution and the relative payoffs to a player that cooperates by making a 
contribution (see Methods). We consider a scenario to be akin to the Prisoner’s Dilemma when 
defection is the best strategy for both players, regardless of the opponent’s strategy. In the 
Snowdrift game, we expect players to adopt opposite roles, with one cooperating and the other 
defecting. Therefore, we consider two different scenarios to be akin to the Snowdrift game. 
The first scenario follows the structure of the classic symmetrical game, where players are 
better off defecting against a cooperator and cooperating against a defector. The second 
scenario occurs when there is an asymmetry between players that dictates their roles in the 
Snowdrift game, with one player doing best by cooperating while the other does best by 
defecting.  
The exact nature of payoffs depend on the model parameters, but in general, when the 
players’ differ widely in their relatedness to the group, we find that the pattern of joint payoffs 
are akin to the Snowdrift game and when they have similar levels of relatedness to the group 
it is akin to the Prisoner’s Dilemma (Doebeli et al., 2004; Doebeli & Hauert, 2005) (Figure 
5). Under the Snowdrift game, one player adopts the role as the cooperator and the other as 
the defector, which results in relatively high fitness for the group. By adopting different roles, 
the defector receives a higher payoff than the cooperator, but the cooperator is willing to adopt 
that role because it is better off cooperating than defecting when its opponent defects (Doebeli 
& Hauert, 2005). In the context of the Collective Investment game, it is the asymmetry in 
relatedness to the group that drives the players to adopt the two roles (Figure 5), with the 
player that is more related to the group acting as the cooperator while its opponent is able to 
defect (Figure 2A, 2D and 3A), leading to a higher relative payoff to the defector (Figure 2B, 
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2E and 3B). In contrast, under the Prisoner’s Dilemma conditions (Figure 5), both players do 
best by defecting, which leads to low collective investment (Figure 2C, 2F and 3C). These 
game scenarios help explain the pattern of collective investment in stalk that we observe in 
the D. discoideum system (Figure 4F): under the Snowdrift game conditions we see collective 
investment approach the level seen in clonal development (which presumably evolved to 






Figure 5. Payoff structure of the Collective Investment game and relationship to classic games. 
Payoffs are characterized in terms of whether defection or investment is favored, or whether the best 
strategy depends on the investment by the opponent (labeled as ‘Conflict’). The best strategy for the 
focal player is shown in red and that of their opponent in blue. When both players do best by defecting 
the overall payoff structure is akin to the Prisoner’s Dilemma, and we see low levels of total 
investment (see Figure 2). When one player does best by investing while its opponent does best by 
defecting the overall payoff structure is akin to an asymmetric Snowdrift game, where the difference 
in relatedness determines which player takes the role as the cooperator (with the player with higher 
relatedness making the investment in cooperation). Bridging these two regions is a zone of conflict. 
The bold lines correspond to a level of investment of 
1
2




Θ𝐺  to 
3
4
Θ𝐺 . The shaded region illustrates that the zones corresponding to the different games 





 We expect the predicted collective underinvestment under the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
conditions to be detrimental compared to the higher investment under Snowdrift conditions. 
We tested this by measuring the proportion of fruiting bodies that collapsed due to inadequate 
investment in the stalk. Fruiting bodies made by chimeric mixtures (using all pair-wise 50:50 
mixes of ten natural strains) were found to have spontaneously collapsed more often than those 
made by clonal groups (12% versus 1.1%, F(1,52.3) = 10.4, p = 0.002)2. Furthermore, we expect 
the stability of fruiting bodies to reflect the overall level of collective investment in stalk, 
which should be manifested as an inverse relationship between the level of collective 
investment (Figure 4F) and the probability of fruiting body collapse. We tested this prediction 
using data from four pairs of strains measured at seven frequencies and find the expected 
negative correlation between collective investment for a given pair and probability of their 
fruiting bodies collapsing (r = −0.94, p = 0.0009). This relationship between investment and 
fruiting body stability underlies a strongly frequency (and hence relatedness) dependent risk 
of fruiting body collapse, with risk of collapse peaking when is there is no asymmetry in the 
frequency of the strains (i.e. both strains at a frequency of 0.5) and declining exponentially as 
the difference in frequencies increases (i.e. on either size of a frequency of 0.5) (χ2(4) = 403, p 
< 10‒86; Figure 6A, Figures S6 and S7). If we use fruiting body stability (which is simply 1 
minus the probability of fruiting body collapse) as a proxy for the dispersal success of a group 
(𝜙𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑎𝑙(𝐺)) and the estimates for individual stalk investment (see Figure 4D) to estimate 
fitness through spores (as simply 1 minus the proportion of cells invested in stalk; see eqn. 1), 
we can generate an approximate pattern of individual fitness (see eqn. 3). Despite the fact that 
our lab-based measure of fruiting body stability provides only a rough approximation for 
group fitness through dispersal, we find that the pattern of individual fitness closely matches 
the pattern expected under the Collective Investment game (SI Appendix, Figure S2C and 
S2D). The resulting fitness pattern illustrates that individuals will have the lowest possible 
 
2 Note that this description of the statistical test is misleading – refer to commentary for details 
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fitness when at intermediate frequencies and, while individuals always do best at very low 
frequency in a group, individual fitness increases towards both frequency extremes.  
 
 
Figure 6. Empirical measures of fruiting body stability and segregation behaviour. A) The proportion 
of fruiting bodies that spontaneously collapsed as a function of the frequency of the focal strain in 
each mix (estimated from six chimeric pairings; N=324). B) The relative degree of segregation as a 
function of the frequency of the designated focal strain. Measurements are from three different 
chimeric pairings across the nine frequencies (N=692 total sporeheads, with an average of 25.6 
sporeheads measured for each pair at each frequency). In both figures, the points represent the means 
and the bars their standard errors, estimated from a mixed model (following the model structure in 
the Methods, but with frequency as a categorical factor). For part A, the curve gives the best fit cubic 
relationship while for part B the curve gives the best fit quadratic relationship (with the shaded region 





The finding that individuals suffer a much larger cost from conflict when trapped in 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma-like conditions at intermediate levels of relatedness (Figure 5 and 6A) 
raises the question of why strains would engage in cooperative fruiting body formation under 
these conditions. Indeed, widespread (imperfect) strain segregation is a known mechanism in 
D. discoideum for avoiding chimerism when strains are mixed at equal frequencies and 
developed on a natural soil substrate (Benabentos et al., 2009; Gilbert et al., 2012), with two 
rapidly evolving genes being thought to be principally responsible (Benabentos et al., 2009; 
Gruenheit et al., 2017). Although the mechanism by which these genes regulate segregation 
remains to be fully elucidated, there is evidence to suggest that a critical mass of self-self-
interactions are required for the coordinated directional motility that is necessary to form 
independent cooperating groups (Ho & Shaulsky, 2015). We might, therefore, expect strains 
to only show segregation when faced with Prisoner’s Dilemma-like conditions (i.e. low 
asymmetry in relatedness), while remaining in aggregations when in Snowdrift-like conditions 
of high asymmetry in levels of relatedness. Indeed, as predicted, we find that segregation is 
highest when there is little asymmetry in frequencies (relatedness) and declines exponentially 
as the difference in frequencies increases (χ2(2) = 19, p < 10‒4; Figure 6B). The frequency-
dependent nature of segregation suggests that it may not have evolved as a mechanism of 
‘cheater avoidance’, as has previously been suggested (Benabentos et al., 2009; Gilbert et al., 
2012; Gruenheit et al., 2017), but rather, as a mechanism for reshaping group composition to 
generate asymmetry in relative frequencies (resulting in a scenario where there will typically 
be a strain with high relatedness to the group), thereby avoiding the pernicious Prisoner’s 
Dilemma-like conditions and entering into the more favorable Snowdrift-like conditions.  
The Logic of Collective Investment 
The Collective Investment game and the supporting empirical data from the D. 
discoideum system have broad implications for our understanding of cooperative behaviour. 
From the perspective of kin selection theory, an individual’s relatedness to the group governs 
whether the personal cost of contributing to public goods are outweighed by the benefit. 
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Consequently, if individuals can measure their relatedness to group-mates, we would expect 
to see them invest in a way that maximizes inclusive fitness in terms of the balance between 
the benefit to kin in relation to the costs to self (following Hamilton’s rule in the context of 
the ESS, which means that the optimal strategy depends on the behaviour of opponents). 
Applying this logic to the D. discoideum system, an individual cell should modulate its 
‘willingness’ to differentiate into a stalk cell based on its measurement of relatedness to other 
members of its aggregation, with the actual level of investment being determined by the 
benefits of producing a stalk relative to the cost of diminished spore production. From an 
economics perspective, we can view players as investors in some collective venture who are 
out to maximize return on investment, with relatedness representing their level of ‘stake’ or 
‘ownership’ in the venture. When a player has a low relatedness to the group, their personal 
investment can have little effect on the overall performance of the venture (regardless of how 
much they invest), so they are better off withholding their investment. In contrast, when a 
player has high relatedness to the group their investment can have a large impact on the 
performance of the venture. Therefore, they should be willing to invest more heavily. In the 
context of the D. discoideum system, this perspective logically implies that a strain at a low 
frequency in an aggregation cannot impact the performance of the fruiting body regardless of 
how much it invests into stalk, and hence that strain should withhold their investment. Finally, 
we can view the scenario from the perspective of a dynamic game, with individuals as players 
out to maximize their payoff. From this perspective, a player contributes to the public good 
because they directly benefit from their own contribution and the optimal strategy is 
determined by the benefit they receive in relation to the cost paid (see Figure 1A). Players 
with low representation in the group do not contribute much to the public good because their 
contribution is diluted by the group, so they receive back only a small fraction of what they 
invest. In contrast, a player with high representation in the group should invest more because 
they receive back most of the benefit, and consequently they are mostly helping themselves 
through production of the public good. In the context of the D. discoideum system, this 
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perspective implies that a strain with a high frequency in an aggregation should contribute 
heavily to stalk production because most of the benefit goes to their own spores, and lower 
investment would only hurt them. The result is that a strain with a lower frequency, who would 
see little return on their contribution, can be exploitative since it is in the best interests of a 
common strain to build a stalk to their own benefit.  
 Although these different perspectives suggest different logical explanations for why 
and how individuals should invest in public goods, they are ultimately interchangeable since 
all are based on the same underlying framework. All suggest that organisms should adopt 
dynamic strategies in which they modulate their contribution to cooperation through public 
goods in relation to their relatedness to the group. Furthermore, it suggests that approaches 
where organisms are simply classified as ‘cooperators’ and ‘cheaters’ (Maynard Smith, 1982; 
Doebeli et al., 2004; Travisano & Velicer, 2004) will often fail to capture the true nature of 
cooperative behaviour in many systems. Indeed, the same individual or genotype could be 
expected to be cooperative or exploitative depending on their relatedness to the group. This 
scenario is clearly realized in the D. discoideum system. Although strains have typically been 
viewed as cooperators and cheaters (Strassmann et al., 2000; Gilbert et al., 2007; Strassmann 
& Queller, 2011; Santorelli et al., 2013), the striking fit of the observed investment behaviour 
by natural strains to the predictions of the Collective Investment game (Figure 4) provides 
strong evidence they cooperative through the implementation of a dynamic frequency-
dependent strategy. As a result, all strains can appear as cheaters when they are at a relatively 
low frequency in a group and as cooperators when they are at a relatively high frequency. Our 
finding that even simple organisms like a social amoeba can implement the sorts of savvy 
relatedness-dependent investment suggests that these dynamic adaptive strategies may be 





Materials and Methods 
 
The Collective Investment Game 
The Collective Investment game is a two-player game in which each individual makes 
an investment into a public good and receives a payoff as a function of their own investment 
and the collective investment of the pair. The structure of the game is related to economic 
games of public goods (Olson, 1965; Frank, 2010), but differs in that the return on investment 
is a function of a player’s relatedness to the group. The game is described with reference to 
the Dictyostelium discoideum system but the basic structure is easily adapted for other 
systems. The players are different genotypes (strains), but in principle can represent any 
evolutionarily-relevant fitness-maximizing agent. Within an aggregation (which represents 
the group or collective) strains may have varying relative frequencies or proportions (𝑝𝑖). The 
frequency of a strain in a group is equivalent to whole-group relatedness since it represents 
the average relatedness of a randomly selected cell to the entire group (self-included) (Taylor 
& Frank, 1996; Pepper, 2000). We present the model results and insights with regard to 
relatedness in keeping with theory but discuss the results in the context of frequencies of 
strains within a group to provide a clear link to the experimental methods.  
Strains invest a proportion of their cells into stalk (𝐼𝑖∣𝑝𝑖) and the rest (1 − 𝐼𝑖∣𝑝𝑖) into 
spores (with the level of investment potentially depending on their proportion, 𝑝𝑖). Therefore, 
their level of investment represents the proportion of their entire ‘budget’ of cells that are 
allocated towards stalk production (hence 0 ≥ 𝐼𝑖∣𝑝𝑖 ≤ 1). Investment into stalk is costly because 
it reduces the total number of spores a strain can produce and hence the ‘payoff’ (component 
of fitness) to a strain through spores declines (at a rate of 𝛾𝑠) as a function of their investment 
in stalk (see Figure 1A): 
𝜙𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠(𝑖) = 1 − 𝛾𝑠𝐼𝑖∣𝑝𝑖   (1) 
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The payoff is scaled to a value of 1 when no cells are invested into stalk.  
Strains presumably invest in building a stalk to facilitate dispersal of spores 
(Strassmann et al., 2000; Foster et al., 2002; Smith et al., 2014). While the cost of investing 
into the stalk is paid by the individual strain from their total budget of cells, the benefit (payoff) 
gained from dispersal depends on the architecture of the fruiting body, and hence on collective 
investment into the stalk (which is simply the weighted average of the stalk allocation of the 
two players, 𝐼𝐺 = ∑ 𝐼𝑖∣𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑖). We model the performance of the fruiting body for spore dispersal 
as an increasing function of collective investment: 
𝜙𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑎𝑙(𝐺) = 1 + 𝛾𝑑𝐼𝐺   (2) 
where 𝛾𝑑 gives the rate at which the payoff through dispersal increases as a function of 
investment into stalk (Figure 1A). As with the payoff through spores (eqn. 1), the payoff 
through dispersal is scaled to a value of 1 when no investment is made. For both payoff 
functions (eqns. 1 and 2) the qualitative results do not depend on this scaling, so the baseline 
value of 1 is used in both cases for simplicity. Similar cost/benefit relationships underlie a 
wide array of models that consider tradeoffs, such as models for the evolution of life-histories 
(e.g. models of clutch size and parental investment). For example, models for the evolution of 
parental investment assume increasing investment per offspring is costly because it reduces 
fecundity, but beneficial because it increases offspring survival. Although, like many of these 
models, we assume a linear relationship between investment and costs/benefits, the qualitative 
results are robust across an array of relationships (so long as costs and benefits both increase 
with investment).  
The overall success of a strain is determined by its payoff through spores weighted by 
the overall performance of the fruiting body. This is consistent with evolutionary theory, such 
as models that consider trade-offs between components of fitness or episodes of selection, and 
is necessary to properly account for the influence of multiple factors affecting fitness. For 
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example, to calculate total parental fitness in models for the evolution of parental investment, 
it is necessary to multiply an individual’s fecundity (number of offspring produced) by the 
expected survival of the progeny they produce (since the product represents the number of 
surviving offspring). In terms of the D. discoideum system, the expected success of each spore 
depends on its expected dispersal, and hence fitness of a strain is the product of spore number 
and spore dispersal: 
ω𝑖 = 𝜙𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠(𝑖)𝜙𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑎𝑙(𝐺) (3) 
The overall success of a group is simply the average fitness of its members (eqn. 3), 𝜔𝐺 =
∑ 𝜔𝑖𝑝𝑖 which is equivalent to the expected payoff for the group through spores weighted by 
the payoff through dispersal, 𝜔𝐺 = 𝜙𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠(𝐺)𝜙𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑎𝑙(𝐺) (where the group payoff through 
spores is the weighted average of the spore production by group members, 𝜙𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠(𝐺) =
∑ 𝜙𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠(𝑖)𝑝𝑖). The trade-off between spore production and spore dispersal reflected in the 
payoffs (eqns. 1 and 2, see Figure 1A) results in a quadratic relationship between collective 
investment and group success (Figure 1B). From this relationship, we can derive the level of 
collective investment (𝐼𝐺) that maximizes group success (𝐼𝐺 = Θ𝐺), which represents the most 
efficient (welfare optimal) allocation of cells to stalk and spores that is possible given the costs 



















where the condition insures that investment is non-negative. Therefore, the optimal level of 
investment into stalk (in terms of group success) is determined by the relative importance of 
payoffs through spores versus through dispersal. Consequently, under any conditions where 
the benefits of dispersal outweigh the cost to spore production, the collective will have highest 
overall success at some intermediate level of investment into stalk. Because aggregations of 
42 
 
D. discoideum invest into stalk while also producing spores, the pattern of payoffs in nature 
must result in such an intermediate optimum. The strength of selection on fruiting body 
architecture (Γ) is given by the rate at which group success declines as the level of investment 
deviates from the group optimum: 
Γ = −𝛾𝑠𝛾𝑑  (5) 
The value of Γ represents the curvature of the relationship between collective investment and 
group success (i.e. it is the quadratic coefficient for the parabolic relationship between 
collective investment and group success; see Figure 1B). 
While equation (4) represents the optimal investment into stalk for a group, individual 
players (strains) within a group should invest in a way that maximizes their expected 
individual fitness (eqn. 3). The optimal level of investment for a given player (a strain) is a 

























Logically, the optimal level of individual investment corresponds to the value that maximizes 
group success (eqn. 4) when a strain is clonal (𝑝𝑖 = 1). At all other frequencies, the optimal 
level of investment will be lower than the value that maximizes group success (since 0 ≥𝐼𝑗∣𝑝𝑗 
≤ 1 and 0 > 𝑝𝑖 < 1). The level of investment given by equation (6) represent the ESS for a 
strain, but because the optimal level of investment by each strain depends on the level of 
investment by other strains, the actual level of investment will depend on the joint resolution 
of that interdependence. As a result of this interdependence, the constraints on the range of 
investment values (0 ≥ 𝐼𝑖∣𝑝𝑖 ≤ 1), and the constraints on the range of frequencies (0 ≥ 𝑝𝑖 ≤ 1), 
we use numerical solutions from equation (6) to illustrate the patterns of the ESS under 
different conditions (see below).  
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To understand the properties of the ESS consider the case where other strains make 
no investment, such that the ESS is simply 
1
2
(1 𝛾𝑠⁄ − 1 𝛾𝑑𝑝𝑖⁄ ) (or zero when the term is 
negative). This level of investment represents the most economically ‘efficient’ strategy for a 
strain. Under these conditions, when the optimal strategy is to make a non-zero stalk 
investment, the two terms in parentheses must be greater than zero, with the first term (1 𝛾𝑠⁄ ) 
representing the reciprocal of the cost of investing and the second term (1 𝛾𝑑𝑝𝑖⁄ ) the reciprocal 
of the benefit of investing. Thus, at the optimal payoff 𝑝𝑖𝛾𝑑 > 𝛾𝑠, which is a form of 
Hamilton’s rule (Hamilton, 1964b; Charnov, 1977), the kin selection benefits (𝑝𝑖𝛾𝑑) must 
outweigh the costs (𝛾𝑠). The third term in parentheses (𝐼𝑗∣𝑝𝑗𝑝𝑗 𝑝𝑖⁄ ) reflects the dispersal benefit 
to the focal strain arising from investment into stalk made by other strains, with the numerator 
(𝐼𝑗∣𝑝𝑗𝑝𝑗) representing the total investment made by others. The ESS deviates from the most 
efficient strategy because any investment made by other strains increases the value of the focal 
strain’s spores, and hence increases the cost of making their own investment. This term can 
be viewed from an economic perspective as an ‘opportunity cost’, where a strain has the 
opportunity to gain from the dispersal benefit provided by the investment made by others and 
loses that opportunity when those spores are sacrificed to invest into stalk. The kin selection 
consequences of this opportunity cost can be seen by examining the conditions where the ESS 
level of investment is non-zero, which correspond to 𝑝𝑖𝛾𝑑 > 𝛾𝑠 (1 + 𝛾𝑑𝐼𝑗∣𝑝𝑗𝑝𝑗). 
Consequently, if we view these conditions as a form of Hamilton’s rule, we can see that the 
dispersal benefit to kin from investing has to overcome both the direct cost from making an 
investment and the additional cost arising from the missed opportunity to exploit investments 
made by others.  
We can also view the cost of investment into stalk in terms of its effect on the 
representation of a strain in the sporehead of their group (𝑝𝑖
′), which defines their within-group 
fitness. Their representation is determined by their investment in stalk relative to the overall 
investment made by the group: 𝑝𝑖
′ = 𝑝𝑖(1 − 𝐼𝑖∣𝑝𝑖 1 − 𝐼𝐺⁄ ). The within-group fitness can be 
44 
 
calculated as a strain’s representation in the sporehead relative to its frequency in the group: 
?̂?𝑖 = 𝑝𝑖





Therefore, relative fitness within a group is a direct function of the relative investment made 
by strains. The pattern of relative fitness within a group is similar to the pattern of relative 
absolute fitness (𝜔𝑖 𝜔𝑗⁄ ), which is simply ([1 − 𝛾𝑠𝐼𝑖∣𝑝𝑖] [1 − 𝛾𝑠𝐼𝑗∣𝑝𝑗⁄ ]). 
The Nature of the Game 
To understand the properties of the ESS we can characterize the payoffs to players in 
relation to the payoff structures of the Prisoner’s Dilemma and Snowdrift games (Doebeli & 
Hauert, 2005). This analysis allows us to relate the game’s properties to the intuitive 
framework of existing well-understood models. However, to achieve this goal we need to first 
address the fact that the Investment Game differs from the canonical games in three key 
aspects. Firstly, the Investment Game differs in that expected payoffs vary as a function of 
relatedness, so there is no single payoff matrix, but rather, a relatedness-dependent payoff 
function. Therefore, we need to evaluate the properties of the game across levels of 
relatedness, which allows us to understand how the properties of the game change as a player’s 
relatedness to the group changes. Secondly, when the opposing players differ in their 
relatedness to the group, they will also differ in their expected payoffs. Therefore, we need to 
consider a separate payoff matrix for each player at each level of relatedness. Finally, because 
investment into public goods can vary quantitatively, the game does not have discrete 
strategies that correspond to fixed alternative strategies like ‘cooperate’ or ‘defect’. There are 
several logical alternative ways to consider cooperation versus defection and the type of game 
that a scenario corresponds to necessarily depends on the level of investment being made by 
a ‘cooperator’. The higher the investment made by a cooperator the higher the rewards for 
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defection, which changes the optimal response (see eqn. 6). Therefore, we use a simple 
framework where we consider defection as the case where individuals make no contribution 
to the public goods and cooperation as the case where individuals make some non-zero 
contribution (the size of which we vary in our analysis of the game).  
 The game scenario depends on payoffs to a player in terms of their expected fitness 
(𝜔𝑖, eqn. 3) under four scenarios (stating the focal player’s strategy first): cooperate against a 
cooperator (CiCj), cooperate against a defector (CiDj), defect against a cooperator (DiCj), or 
defect against a defector (DiDj). Because we are primarily interested in how payoffs lead to 
‘motivation’ for a player to invest or defect, we consider ‘weak’ forms of the games rather 
than the overall structure of the payoff matrices. That is, we consider whether a player’s fitness 
is increased or decreased by making a contribution to public goods when their opponent either 
cooperates (makes a contribution) or defects (withholds their contribution). Payoffs are 
classified as being Prisoner’s Dilemma-like when a player is better off defecting regardless of 
the strategy of their opponent (DiCj > CiCj and DiDj > CiDj) and Snowdrift like when they are 
better off defecting against a cooperator and cooperating against a defector (DiCj > CiCj and 
CiDj > DiDj). If a player is better off cooperating regardless of the strategy of their opponent 
(CiCj > DiCj and CiDj > DiDj) we consider their strategy as selfish investment, meaning they 
are favored to cooperate because it is in their own selfish interests regardless of what their 
opponent does.  
Both players can ‘agree’ on the game being played or, because of the asymmetry in payoffs, 
they can disagree. When both agree that the game is Prisoner’s Dilemma or Snowdrift we 
classify the scenario as the agreed game. Disagreement over the game being played generally 
arises when one player views the scenario as favoring selfish investment, while the other sees 
the scenario as a Prisoner’s Dilemma. This scenario is analogous to the ESS for an 
asymmetrical Snowdrift game, with one player getting a payoff for cooperating with a defector 
and the other getting the payoff for defecting against a cooperator. In this case, the asymmetry 
in relatedness determines which player will take the role as cooperator and which as defector 
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(with the higher relatedness player being the cooperator). Hence, we describe this scenario as 
being like an asymmetrical Snowdrift game.  
Imperfect Information 
 The derivation of the Investment Game implicitly assumes that players (strains) have 
perfect information about their relatedness to the group and can therefore adjust their 
investment accordingly. In the context of D. discoideum, ‘information’ is the output of any 
mechanism that provide feedback to cells that reflects their frequency in a group, and hence 
can potentially arise from many molecular mechanisms. Of course, if the players have no 
information about their relatedness we would not expect to see any relatedness-dependent 
changes in stalk investment, so any frequency dependent change in behaviour must correspond 
to some information (regardless of whether it is actively or passively acquired). Presumably 
any molecular mechanism or responses to information should have some degree of noise, 
resulting in random error in the measurement of relatedness. In the D. discoideum system, 
random noise could simply represent the variation from cell to cell in their measurement of 
their frequency, so the entire group of cells from a strain measures their frequency with some 
noise. The mean of their measurement could be accurate, but the individual cells would 
respond as if they were at a different frequency, making the response deviate from the perfect 
information case. 
 We modelled error using a Gaussian probability density function (PDF), where the 
mean of the PDF represents the true frequency (relatedness) of the strain and the standard 
deviation the level of noisiness (see SI Appendix, Figure S2). We assume that measurement 
error depends on the complexity of group composition, so the magnitude of the error (i.e. the 
standard deviation of the PDF) was weighted by 4𝑝1𝑝2 (which has a maximum value of 1 
when 𝑝1 = 𝑝2 and declines to zero as either strain nears a frequency of 1). Logically, this 
implies that strains are much more able to measure their frequency (relatedness) when they 
are at extreme frequencies than when they are at intermediate frequencies in a group. For 
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example, a strain would be better able to distinguish between a true frequency of 0.01 and 
0.21 than it would be able to distinguish between 0.4 and 0.6. Analyses were integrated over 
all possible frequencies (from zero to one), with the probability that a strain behaves as if it 
has a particular frequency being given by the PDF weighted by the group complexity term. 
Because each player assesses their own frequency, analyses at a given frequency require 
integration over all possible pairwise frequencies.  
Model Predictions 
To generate predictions for collective investment in D. discoideum, we varied the 
relative cost to spore production (𝛾𝑠) and benefit from dispersal (𝛾𝑑) from stalk investment to 
alter the strength of selection on fruiting body architecture (eqn. 5). For most illustrations in 
the main text we restricted the parameters to values that result in an optimal level of clonal 
investment of 30% of cells to the stalk, which corresponds to the approximate pattern observed 
in naturally derived strains (Forman & Garrod, 1977; Chattwood et al., 2013). However, in 
Figures 2D, 2E and 2F, we hold the strength of selection constant (at Γ = 2) and vary the 
optimal level of clonal investment to illustrate the impact of different optima. We illustrate a 
much wider range of parameter space in SI Appendix, Figure S1, varying both the strength of 
selection and the clonal investment optimum systematically across panels. Within the range 
of values that keep fitness non-negative, the strength of selection on allocation of cells and the 
clonal investment optimum (which are both determined by the values of 𝛾𝑠 and 𝛾𝑑, see eqns. 
4 and 5) do not change the qualitative predictions of the model.  
 At each frequency (relatedness) we solved the ESS level of investment (eqn. 6) for 
the two players. Exact solutions were generated using the Solve function in Mathematica 10.0 
(Wolfram Research, Inc.). Given the ESS level of investment, we calculated absolute and 
relative (within-group) fitness of each player and the level of collective investment. We also 
analyzed the game scenarios under each scenario to link these patterns to the logic of the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma and Snowdrift games. To link the model results to the experimental data 
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we also calculated individual and collective investment following the methods used in the 
experimental work (where all measures are based on spore counts and representation in 
chimeric sporeheads, see below).  
Measurement of Spore Allocation 
We followed well-established D. discoideum protocols (Forman & Garrod, 1977; 
Kessin, 2001; Buttery et al., 2009), which are therefore only briefly outlined here. We used a 
set of ten naturally co-occurring strains of D. discoideum from Little Butt’s Gap, North 
Carolina (NC28.1, NC34.2, NC52.3, NC60.1, NC63.2, NC69.1, NC71.1, NC80.1, NC99.1 
and NC105.1) that have previously been used in several studies of social interactions (Buttery 
et al., 2009; Wolf et al., 2015; Gruenheit et al., 2017). All strains were grown on SM plates 
with Klebsiella aerogenes as a food source. Before aggregation, cells were harvested and 
washed of bacteria by repeated centrifugation in KK2 (16.1mM KH2PO4, 3.7mM K2HPO4). 
To construct experimental chimeras, we reciprocally mixed cells from a strain that was 
fluorescently labelled with 10 mM CellTracker™ Green CMFDA dye with an unlabelled 
partner treated with DMSO to control for any effect of labelling. Clonal sets of labelled and 
unlabelled cells were also created to provide a measure of any counting bias. Cell mixes were 
plated for development on 1.5% KK2 purified agar plates (surface area ~21.3 cm2), at a density 
of 4.7x105 cell/cm2. Relative proportional representation of the focal strain in the sporehead 
was primarily determined by counting the percentage of fluorescent spores using flow 
cytometry. However, for some sets of replicates from two pairs (NC28.1+NC63.2 and 
NC34.2+NC105.1) measurements were done by microscopy (with spores washed into 5ml 
spore buffer and imaged using a fluorescence imaging system). Despite the fact that two 
different methodologies were used to measure relative spore number, the patterns of relative 
representation in the sporehead were indistinguishable. Because of technical limitations 
associated with the labelling process, an average of 0.3% (s.d. = 0. 09%) of unlabelled spores 
are counted as being labelled and an average of 1.4% (s.d. = 0. 9%) of labelled spores are 
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counted as being unlabelled (based on data from clonal populations of labelled and 
unlabelled). Therefore, to correct for any potential counting bias, the raw proportion of 
labelled (𝑝𝑖
∗) cells of strain i in a chimeric mix with an unlabeled strain j was corrected using 
the proportion of labelled cells measured from clonal sets of labelled (𝑝𝑖(𝐶)
∗ ) and unlabelled 
cells (𝑝𝑗(𝐶)) (created using the same pools of cells as in the chimeric mixtures): 
?̂?𝑖
∗ = (𝑝𝑖
∗ − 𝑝𝑗(𝐶)) (𝑝𝑖(𝐶)
∗ − 𝑝𝑗(𝐶))⁄ . To count the total number of spores produced by a set of 
fruiting bodies from a given number of cells plated (107 cells/plate), we harvested the entire 
agar discs from the plates into 5mL of spore buffer (20mM EDTA, 0.05% NP40) and counted 
spores using a hemocytometer. 
The ten strains were used to construct 34 different types of chimeric mixtures, with 
each strain used in at least 4 different pairings. Within each pairing, chimeras were created in 
which strains were mixed in seven different input frequency combinations (0.05, 0.10, 0.25, 
0.50, 0.75, 0.90 and 0.95). For each pair of strains, the set of chimeric mixtures across different 
input frequencies were independently replicated at least twice (with an average of 4 replicates 
per pair) for a total of 944 chimeric mixtures composed from the 34 pairs across the various 
input frequencies. Two of these strain pairings (NC28.1+NC63.2 and NC34.2+NC105.1) were 
replicated a larger number of times (N=18 and N=15 replicates respectively) to provide higher 
resolution examples. Each experimental replicate therefore provides measurements of the 
relative representation of each strain in the sporehead and the total number of spores produced 
by the pair across different input frequencies. Every experimental replicate for a given pair 
also produced an estimate of the clonal spore production for both strains in the pair.  
Estimation of Investment and Relative Fitness 
 
To provide for direct comparison between the model and the experimental data we 
calculated each parameter from the model following the same methods used to process the 
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data. Four types of measurements were used to generate an estimate of stalk investment of a 
strain within a chimera (𝐼𝑖∣𝑝𝑖): the total number of spores produced by chimeric fruiting bodies 
composed from strains i and j (?̂?𝐺(𝑖𝑗)), the total number of spores produced by a strain when 
in clonal fruiting bodies (?̂?𝑖), the input proportion of a strain within a chimeric mix (?̂?𝑖), and 
the output proportion of a strain within chimeric sporeheads (?̂?𝑖
′). From these values we 
calculated the number of spores from a given strain within the chimeric sporeheads as ?̂?𝑖
′?̂?𝐺(𝑖𝑗). 
This measure of spore production was normalized against the clonal spore production of the 
strain to account for any inherent differences in numbers of spores produced by different 
strains (which reflect differences in spore size and fixed differences in allocation of cells to 
spores; Buttery et al., 2009; Wolf et al., 2015) to produce a measure of relative spore 
production: ?̂?𝑖∣𝑝𝑖 = (?̂?𝑖
′?̂?𝐺(𝑖𝑗)) (?̂?𝑖?̂?𝑖)⁄ . The inverse of the relative allocation of cells to spores 








Therefore, an investment value (𝐼𝑖∣𝑝𝑖) of 1 indicates that a strain allocates the same proportion 
of cells to spores when in a chimera as when clonal. Since we expect the allocation pattern of 
clones to correspond to the optimal pattern, a value of 1 indicates that cells in both clones and 
chimeras are allocating a proportion ΘG of their cells into stalk and 1 − ΘG into spores. In the 
case where strains allocate 100% of their cells to spores, the estimate of relative investment 
(𝐼𝑖∣𝑝𝑖) is expected to simply be the ratio of the clonal level of allocation of cells to spores (1 −
ΘG) to 1 (where 1 is the proportion allocated in a chimera). Thus, an investment value 
corresponding to 1 − ΘG is equivalent to a pattern of zero investment of cells into stalk. 
Therefore, when we present the patterns of investment we rescale the estimates that are based 
on relative spore production to a scale that reflects relative investment in stalk by simply 
subtracting a value of 1 − ΘG. As a result, when strains invest at the clonal level we get the 
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expected investment value of ΘG, and when they allocate all cells to spores (i.e. show zero 
investment) we get a value of 0. When applying this method to the analysis of data from the 
natural strains we use an optimal investment value of 30% of cells into the stalk, which is 
supported by a variety of empirical measurements (Forman & Garrod, 1977; Chattwood et al., 
2013). The investment for both strains within each chimeric combination within each 
experimental replicate were calculated separately.  
To calculate relative collective investment for a group (𝐼𝐺) we first calculated the 
number of spores we would expect in a chimera given the clonal spore production for the pair 
and their relative frequencies in the chimera: ?̂?𝐺∣clonal(𝑖𝑗) = (?̂?𝑖𝑇𝑖 + ?̂?𝑗𝑇𝑗). Collective 
investment was calculated following equation (4) by dividing this clonal expectation by the 








Collective investment for each chimeric combination was calculated for each experimental 
replicate using the measures of the component parameters for that replicate. As with the 
measure of individual investment (eqn. 8), the pattern of collective investment reflects the 
relative allocation of cells to spores by strains in a chimera compared to the pattern they shown 
when clonal (but measured for the entire group, rather than for the individual strains 
separately). Hence, the values of collective investment calculated using equation (9) have the 
same scaling as the measure for individual investment (eqn. 8). Therefore, we also subtracted 
a value of 1 − ΘG from all collective investment values, such that optimal investment (i.e. the 
clonal pattern) corresponds to the expected value of ΘG and the scenario where the collective 
produces only spores corresponds to a collective investment value of zero. 
Relative fitness within a group follows the definition in the model and simply reflects 




′ ?̂?𝑖⁄  (10) 
 For simplicity, we compare the fitness of strains using the ratio of their relative fitness values 
(e.g. ?̂?𝑖∣𝑗 ?̂?𝑗∣𝑖⁄  for strain i relative to j). Values of relative fitness were calculated for each 
individual replicate. To test for any potential bias caused by the experimental labeling and 
methods used to calculate relative fitness, we applied the calculation of relative fitness in 
equation (10) to clonal self-mixes of labeled and unlabeled cells across the same set of 
frequencies. We find no significant frequency-dependent pattern of relative fitness in these 
self-mixes (F1, 195 = 1.65, p = 0.2; see SI Appendix, Figure S8). 
Patterns of collective investment, individual investment, and relative fitness across 
frequencies were modelled using a mixed model implemented in SAS (SAS Institute, Cary, 
NC, USA) fitted by maximum likelihood. For collective investment, frequency was modelled 
as a quadratic fixed effect with experimental replicate as a random effect. For individual 
investment and relative fitness, frequency was modelled as a cubic fixed effect. For relative 
fitness, strain-by-block was included as a random grouping variable, while for investment, 
strain was included as a grouping variable (owing to a lack of convergence for a model 
containing a block or replicate effect). Reduced versions of all models were also run without 
any fixed effects (i.e. with only the random effects). Significance was determined by 
calculating twice the difference in the negative log likelihoods of the two models (full model 
and reduced), which is approximately chi-square distributed with degrees of freedom 
determined by the difference in the number of parameters in the models.  
Measurement and Analysis of the Cost of Chimerism 
To measure the risk of fruiting body collapse, we collected two sources of data. First, 
we created 50:50 chimeric and clonal mixes of ten strain pairs (NC28.1, NC34.2, NC52.3, 
NC60.1, NC63.2, NC69.1, NC71.1, NC80.1, NC99.1 and NC105.1), with an average of 10.4 
replicates per chimeric combination (total N = 469) and 13 replicates per clone (total N = 130) 
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(which together represent data from 31,026 fruiting bodies). Differences between clonal and 
chimeric mixes were analyzed using a mixed model with aggregation type (clonal or chimeric) 
as a fixed effect and pair as a random effect. Model degrees of freedom were determined using 
the Kenward-Roger approximation, which corrects the denominator degrees of freedom for 
the fixed effect based on the structure of the random effect to avoid pseudoreplication. Second, 
we created chimeric mixes across a range of focal strain frequencies (0.05, 0.10, 0.25, 0.5, 
0.75, 0.90 and 0.95) for six strain pairs (NC28.1+NC105.1, NC99.1+NC105.1, 
NC99.1+NC60.1, NC34.2.1+NC105.1, NC63.2.1+NC60.1 and NC34.2+NC60.1). Mixes 
were plated as a 10μl droplet onto non-nutrient KK2 agar in a 24-well dish and allowed to 
develop into fruiting bodies. The number of fruiting bodies that had spontaneously collapsed 
was scored as a proportion of the total number of fruiting bodies in the well. Data were 
modelled using a mixed model implemented in SAS (SAS Institute, Cary, NC, USA) fitted by 
maximum likelihood with frequency modelled as a fixed quadratic effect and pair as a random 
grouping variable. Significance was determined by calculating twice the difference in the 
negative log likelihoods of the two models (see above). 
Measurement and Analysis of Segregation 
To measure the degree of segregation between pairs of strains across different 
asymmetry in relatedness, we followed established protocols for measuring segregation for 
pairs at equal frequency and applied these methods to measurements across a range of pair-
wise frequencies (Ostrowski et al., 2008; Benabentos et al., 2009). Briefly, cells were labelled 
with CellTracker Green CMFDA (with DMSO used as a control for unlabelled cells) and 
strains were reciprocally mixed at a range of relative frequencies of the labelled strain (0.05, 
0.10, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.90 and 0.95). Mixes were plated as a 10μl droplet on ~1.25g of sharp 
horticultural sand (Keith Singleton) wetted with 250μl of KK2 in a 24-well dish and allowed 
to develop to form fruiting bodies. Individual fruiting bodies were then harvested into spore 
buffer (KK2 with 20mM EDTA and 0.05% NP40), and the proportion of fluorescent to non-
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flourescent spores in each fruiting body measured by flow cytometery. We measured patterns 
of segregation using three different pairs of strains (NC28.1+NC63.2, NC105.1+NC34.2, and 
NC105.1+NC99.1), with at least 10 sporeheads measured for each pair at each frequency (for 
a total of 692 sporeheads overall).  
A metric of the degree of segregation was calculated following ref. (Gruenheit et al., 
2017). Briefly, this measure is based on the standard deviation of a strain’s proportional 
representation across sporeheads (𝑠𝑡𝑑(?̂?𝑖
′)) at a given input frequency. If there is no 
segregation, then we would expect all variation in the representation of a strain across fruiting 
bodies (composed from the same proportions of strains) to be due to random binomial 
sampling error, and hence 𝑠𝑡𝑑(?̂?𝑖
′) should be very small given the number of spores counted. 
However, when there is segregation, we expect to see much more variation in the 
representation of a strain across fruiting bodies as strains preferentially aggregate with 
themselves. Because the maximum value of this standard deviation depends on the relative 
frequencies of the strains, it is standardized to the maximum possible value, which is 
determined by the geometric mean of the average representation of the two strains across all 
sporeheads (?̂?𝑖
′̅), which is √?̂?𝑖
′̅(1 − ?̂?𝑖
′̅ ). This yields a standardized measure of segregation: 







which goes from 0 (no segregation) to 1 (the maximum possible degree of segregation, which 
would necessarily correspond to all fruiting bodies being clonal, with the relative frequency 
of each type of clonal fruiting body depending on the relative frequencies of the strains). In 
the statistical analysis, segregation data were modelled using a quadratic model following the 
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Commentary - The 
genetics of self-






This commentary is broken down into several sections. First, I provide a few technical 
notes and clarifications on the content of the paper. The chapter is presented exactly how it is 
in the published form in PNAS (Madgwick et al., 2018), so these clarifications are made here, 
rather than in the main body of text. I further discuss some of the issues arising from the paper 
– such as the nuance of the classification of the game as a Prisoners Dilemma or Snowdrift 
game, and present some data to address the questions of how a social microbe can assess its 
relative frequency within a group by discussing a candidate locus for self-recognition in D. 
discoideum. Finally, I have added a note at the end about the notation of the model, some of 
which changes in further chapters.  
Clarification - Fruiting body collapse analysis  
On page 34, the analysis of how fruiting body collapse compares between clonal and chimeric 
fruiting bodies reads; 
“Fruiting bodies made by chimeric mixtures (using all pair-wise 50:50 mixes of ten natural 
strains) were found to have spontaneously collapsed more often than those made by clonal 
groups (12% versus 1.1%, F(1,52.3) = 10.4, p = 0.002).” 
The data used in this analysis is shown in Figure 6, which clearly shows that fruiting body 
collapse for pairs of players at 50:50 is ~30% (not 12%, as suggested by the statistic). The 
reason for this discrepancy is that the statistical test has been conducted by comparing clonal 
fruiting bodies to chimeric fruiting bodies of all frequencies (not just 50:50). The text 
incorrectly asserts that the statistic is referring to 50:50 mixes, so I would correct it to read as 
follows; 
“Fruiting bodies made by chimeric mixtures (using all non-clonal pair-wise mixes of ten 
natural strains) were found to have spontaneously collapsed more often than those made by 
clonal groups (12% versus 1.1%, F(1,52.3) = 10.4, p = 0.002).” 
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Clarification – How is relatedness used in this versus other studies 
In the Introduction (p 19) there is a sentence about previous work looking at cooperation with 
variation in relatedness; 
“There is evidence that investment into siderophore production is flexible (West & Buckling, 
2003; Diggle et al., 2007) and varies between broad-scale differences of ‘high’ versus ‘low’ 
relatedness (Griffin et al., 2004).” 
This description is misleading because it doesn’t clarify how the use of relatedness here differs 
from some of these other studies. In particular, the study by Griffin and colleagues (2004) uses 
relatedness in the classical sense of relatedness between social partners with respect to the 
allele for cooperation (Grafen, 1985). As such, there are mixtures of individuals of two types 
– those who possess the cooperative allele (r=1 to each other) and those who don’t (r=0 to 
cooperators) – with high relatedness meaning that individuals either all possess the allele or 
all don’t possess the allele, and low relatedness created by a 50:50 mix of those with and 
without the allele. This is different to the way that we are using relatedness – as all individuals 
in our experiments possess the allele(s) to cooperate (produce the stalk) – so r=1 in the sense 
that Griffin et al. use it. This distinction is important for clarifying what strategies players can 
use, and comparing result with other studies.  
Clarification - Intermediate level of collective investment maximises group success  
In the results and discussion section (p 20) there is a section about how success is maximized 
from the perspective of the group; 
“From the perspective of the group, this antagonistic relationship between costs and benefits 
results in a scenario where group success is maximized at some intermediate level of collective 
investment whenever public good production is favored by natural selection (Figure 1B).” 
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The reasons for this, and the significance of it, warrant further clarification and explanation. 
The model that we are using is multiplicative, rather than additive, in terms of how payoffs 
are accrued. In its basic form, this means that the model gives a payoff of 𝑏𝑐 rather than 𝑏 − 𝑐 
as might be expected from an additive model (where b and c are benefits and costs 
respectively). The multiplicative approach is favoured by some authors (see Frank, 1995 for 
an example) because it creates the trade-off between costs and benefits that makes sense for 
public goods. In D. discoideum cells can form stalk or spores, and the fitness of spores should 
be weighed (i.e. multiplicatively) by the performance of the stalk. This approach provides the 
desired feature of group fitness being maximised by intermediate investment, which makes 
sense because if all cells produced stalk (i.e. maximal public goods), there would be no cells 
left in the next generation to reap the benefits. This feature of the model could have been 
highlighted more to explain why it is the best approach for the type of scenario (public goods) 
considered here. 
The nature of the game – Prisoner’s Dilemma and Snowdrift with relatedness and 
quantitative strategies 
Evolutionary game theory has been extremely useful in the study of cooperation (Maynard 
Smith, 1982; Doebeli & Hauert, 2005), both in models to predict optimal behaviour (Turner 
& Chao, 1999; Bshary et al., 2008), and also as a framework in a looser sense to highlight the 
strategic nature of behavioural choices (Packer & Pusey, 1982; Milinski, 1987). Much of the 
analysis has focussed on a few key ‘games’, mainly the ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’ and ‘Snowdrift 
game’ (Doebeli & Hauert, 2005), the payoffs of which are shown below, with ‘C’ referring to 
cooperation, and ‘D’ to defection.  
Prisoner’s Dilemma C D 
C 2, 2 0, 3 




Snowdrift Game C D 
C 2, 2 1, 3 
D 3, 1 0, 0 
 
The games are distinguished by the order of the payoffs. If we designate ‘DC’ as the payoff 
for a Defector against a Cooperator, the order of the payoffs for two games is as follows; 
Prisoner’s Dilemma: DC > CC > DD > CD 
Snowdrift game: DC > CC > CD > DD 
The crucial distinction between these games is that in the Prisoners Dilemma if a social partner 
reduces its investment in the public good (defects), a focal player does best by reducing its 
investment (defecting) in response. This is different to the Snowdrift game, where if a social 
partner defects, a focal player does best by increasing its investment (cooperating).  
 
Both of these games are simple, capturing the basis logic that underlies many 
biological scenarios. However, despite their widespread use and with many extensions 
(reviewed in Doebeli and Hauert 2005), the majority of analysis has focussed on discrete 
strategies of ‘cooperate’ or ‘defect’, with a fixed payoff matrix. As such, framing our model 
in terms of these simple canonical games is tricky, as there are many ways in which it can be 
done. Defection could mean zero contribution to public goods, or it could mean a marginal 
decrease in contribution from some equilibrium. Cooperation could mean any contribution 
greater than zero, or the contribution that maximises group success, or a marginal increase in 
contribution from some equilibrium. Further, if we add variation in relatedness then the payoff 
matrix is not fixed, but rather a different payoff matrix exists for any relatedness value, and 
any chosen level of contribution that we designate as ‘cooperate’ or ‘defect’. A further 
consideration is that the payoffs are not symmetric in the sense that the payoff for player 1 of 
defecting against a co-operator need not be the same as the payoff for player 2 of defecting 
against a co-operator (𝐷𝐶𝑖 ≠ 𝐷𝐶𝑗). For these reasons, we were careful in the paper to talk 
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about the game as ‘akin’ to the Prisoner’s Dilemma, but we didn’t highlight how a different 
approach could have led to a different classification of the model. 
 
In the main text, we used an approach where defection was zero investment, and 
cooperation was some non-zero contribution. In this way, when two players are both at equal 
relatedness to the group, and a social partner is defecting (investing 0) the focal player does 
better by investing 0 itself (‘defecting’) compared to investing the level that maximises group 
success (θ: ‘cooperating’). There is however a level between 0 and θ that is the optimal 
response to a social partner investing zero, meaning that the best response to defection is 
somewhere in-between cooperation and defection, not easily characterised as one or the other. 
An alternative approach would be to look at marginal effects. We could set the baseline 
strategy as the ESS (see main text) and look at cooperation and defection as some small 
increase or decrease in investment by a social partner. The game would then be assessed by 
whether a focal player does better by a marginally increasing or decreasing their investment 
in response to this change by the social partner, with fitness assessed in the same way as it is 
in the main text. Such an approach however leads to a different answer to the main text, as a 
focal player at intermediate frequency does best by increasing its response to a decline in 
investment of its social partner (across a range of realistic parameter values). Therefore, the 
payoff of CD > payoff of DD, and the game can be characterised as a snowdrift game. That is 
not to say that any characterisation is pointless. Rather, I would argue that the categorisation 
of a model such as ours as a Prisoner’s Dilemma or Snowdrift game is helpful as a metaphor, 
but too problematic as any kind of formal model comparison. The Prisoner’s Dilemma logic 
is that regardless of whether your opponents is going to defect or cooperate, it’s better for you 
to defect, even though you both do worse than if you had both cooperated. This captures the 
problem of public goods, and illustrates the reasons why we see underinvestment when two 
strains are at intermediate frequency. An exact comparison of models is however too open to 
interpretation to be of much use. In future chapters of this thesis I examine other ways of 
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explaining why individuals invest the way they do, focussing less on compacting the model 
into a simple model such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma or Snowdrift game. 
 
The tgr locus and the acquisition of information 
An obvious question that arises when discussing fine-scale strategic responses such 
as those we observed in Chapter 1 is how do strains acquire the information about their 
frequency/relatedness in the group in order to enact the optimal strategy. This is not something 
that is discussed much in the main text, so I will briefly highlight a few known facts about D. 
discoideum here. 
In natural populations of D. disocideum a large array of strains can be found together 
in close proximity (Fortunato et al., 2003), however relatedness in sporeheads is generally 
quite high (Gilbert et al., 2007). This implies that some recognition or discrimination likely 
occurs. Studies of recognition have focussed on two cell-adhesion genes tgrB1 and tgrC1, 
which are highly polymorphic (Benabentos et al., 2009) and correlate with strains separating 
into separate aggregates (i.e. segregation; Ostrowski et al., 2008; Benabentos et al., 2009; 
Hirose et al., 2011; Gruenheit et al., 2017), giving them a clear and important role in 
recognition. However, it is important to note that recognition is not perfect; very rare 
recognition groups are also able to still join aggregations despite a mismatch at the tgr locus 
(Ho & Shaulsky, 2015), and segregation is not a perfect response (i.e. chimerism still occurs). 
As it stands, the tgr locus is therefore a strong candidate for providing the recognition 
information that strains require to inform their optimal strategy. 
To test for a possible role of tgr we can use the data from the main text, where we 
have 33 distinct pairs (from a total of 10 strains). Using mixed models, we were able to fit 
separate estimates of the behaviour and fitness of each strain pair (Figure 1), allowing further 
analysis of the reason why certain strain pairs showed stronger or weaker strategic responses 
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to each other. As Figure 1 shows, the overall pattern was for stalk investment increasing as 
frequency increases (Fig 1A), relative fitness decreasing as frequency increases (Fig 1B), and 
collective investment lowest at intermediate frequency (Fig 1C). However, there is substantial 
variation across strain pairs. 
 
Figure 1: Illustration of replicated patterns of relative investment, fitness, and collective investment. 
Each panel shows the estimated pattern for each of the 34 pairs of strains generated by the same mixed 
model structure described in the Methods, but modified to generate the individual slope and intercept 
estimates for each strain. The thickness of each curve was determined by the relative value of t 
associated with the regression estimate for that pair (to account for error variation). A) Estimated 
patterns of investment by strains as a function of their frequency in a particular chimeric pairing, B) 
Estimated patterns of relative fitness for strains as a function of their frequency in a particular chimeric 
pairing. Relative fitness here is calculated from within-group fitness (?̂?𝑖) of each strain, calculated as 
a strain’s representation in spores relative to its initial frequency within the group. Relative fitness is a 
measure of a strains representation in spores relative to its frequency in the starting group. The relative 
fitness for strain i is; 
𝑠𝑖/𝑟𝑖
(𝑠𝑖/𝑟𝑖)+(𝑠𝑗/𝑟𝑗)
 where 𝑠𝑖 is a strain’s representation in the sporehead, and 𝑟𝑖 is a 
strain’s starting frequency (relatedness) in the group. C) Estimated patterns of collective investment by 
each of the chimeric pairings as a function of the frequency of the designated focal strain. In panels A 
and B, only values for the designated ‘focal’ strain are plotted so that each pair is represented once. 
Note that, because most individual pairs were only replicated a few times, these individual estimates 
reflect the expected experimental noise, and therefore the best estimates for these relationships are 




To link the behaviour of strain pairs to differences in the tgr locus, we need a single 
measure of behaviour. For this, we have defined a measure of ‘frequency-dependence’ to 
provide a robust proxy for the degree to which a strain pair conforms to the patterns in the 
main text. One of the fundamental patterns is that of relative fitness. When at low frequency 
a strain should invest little in the stalk, and achieve a high relative fitness. When at high 
frequency, a strain should invest substantially in the stalk, and achieve low relative fitness due 
to the social partner at low frequency not contributing. As such, we use the outcome of a mixed 
model of relative fitness for each strain pair across frequencies. Obviously a strain pair doesn’t 
have a relative fitness, so the measure for each pair combines the estimate for each strain 
individually within the pair. From the model we obtain a separate intercept and slope for the 
relationship between frequency and relative fitness for each pair. We take the gradient of this 
measure between the frequencies of 0.25 and 0.75 as our measure of frequency dependence.   
Analysis of the correlation between measures of tgr distance and measures of 
frequency dependence show no significant correlation (Figure 2). The analysis can be repeated 
for alternative measures of strain behaviour (i.e. using collective investment or individual 
investment instead of relative fitness), and alternative measures of tgr distance (i.e. protein 
identity instead of SNP differences), but the qualitative result of no correlation is consistent, 






Figure 2: Correlation between SNP differences at the TgrB1 (A), TgrC1 (B) loci, and both combined 
(C) for a pair of strains and a measure of the degree of frequency dependence which pairs of strains 
exhibit. Frequency dependence is calculated from a mixed model of the relative fitness of strains across 
frequencies, with ‘strain pair’ as a random variable. Higher values of frequency dependence correspond 
to negative frequency dependence, where the relative fitness of a strain is higher when at low frequency 
than at low frequency. As such, if strains are using the Tgr locus to respond strategically to their 
frequency, we would expect a positive correlation between tgr distance and frequency dependence (i.e. 
the strategic response is stronger when a social partner is less similar at the tgr locus). None of the three 
correlations are significant. (TgrB1 𝑡32 = −1.07, 𝑃 = 0.29; TgrC1 𝑡32 = −1.86, 𝑃 = 0.07; 
TgrB1+TgrC1 𝑡32 = −1.49, 𝑃 = 0.15). 
 
From this analysis, I am not convinced that tgr definitely doesn’t play a role in 
providing the information about self that strains obtain. There are several reasons for this; first, 
the effect could be masked by the many other reasons why strains show stronger or weaker 
responses to each other, such as inherent differences in investment and incompatibilities 
caused by other loci. Furthermore, if tgr distance could be measured at the causal sites only 
(i.e. amino acid changes that actually alter recognition) then effect of tgr may become clear. 
As a further consideration, the tgr genes are part of a large family of genes with many paralogs 
that also exhibit polymorphism and could play a key role in recognition (Ostrowski et al., 
2015; Gruenheit et al., 2017). The jury is still out on how D. discoideum strains detect their 
relative frequency, but future experiments using allele swaps or recombinant strains will likely 
shed more light on the problem. 
A note on notation 
Throughout this thesis, I make use of the ‘Collective Investment game’ that we 
devised to model strategic contributions to public goods. The first publication using this model 
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was the preceding chapter (Madgwick et al., 2018). In response to feedback on the complexity 
of the notation, and to highlight the links to Hamilton’s rule, I decided to simplify the notation 
for the following chapters. In the interest of aiding readability, I present here a table showing 
the notation used in Chapter 1, alongside the notation that replaces it in the following chapters. 
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Table 1: Notation used in Chapter 1 alongside replacement notation for Chapters 2-3 
Parameter Chapter 1 Chapters 2 & 3 
Model parameters 
Public good (stalk) investment 𝐼𝑖∣𝑝𝑖 𝑥𝑖 
Residual (spore) allocation 1 − 𝐼𝑖∣𝑝𝑖 1 − 𝑥𝑖 
Relatedness / Frequency 𝑝𝑖 𝑟𝑖 
Cost of Investment 𝛾𝑠 𝑐 
Benefit of Investment 𝛾𝑑 𝑏 
Collective Investment 𝐼𝐺 𝑥𝐺 
Fitness from residual budget (spores) 𝜙𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠(𝑖) 𝐶𝑖 
Fitness from public good (stalk) 𝜙𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑎𝑙(𝐺) 𝐵𝐺 
Fitness of a player ω𝑖 ω𝑖 
Fitness of group 𝜔𝐺 𝜔𝐺 
Optimal investment for group ΘG 𝜃 
Strength of selection Γ 𝑆 
ESS Investment Θ𝑖 𝑥𝑖 
Empirical measures 
Group spore allocation ?̂?𝐺(𝑖𝑗) 𝑇𝐺 
Clonal spore allocation ?̂?𝑖 𝑇𝑖 
Input proportion ?̂?𝑖 𝑟𝑖 
Expected group spore allocation ?̂?𝐺∣clonal(𝑖𝑗) 𝐸𝐺  








In Chapter 1 I provided a demonstration of the strategic behaviour of D. discoideum. 
Strains are able to estimate their relatedness to the group, and adjust their contribution to the 
public good accordingly. Our combination of theoretical and empirical work provides a 
compelling example of conditional cooperation, demonstrating that even simple microbes are 
capable of utilising these kinds of strategies. This raises all kinds of questions, as it counters 
the simple ‘cheater’ narrative that dominates the literature, and this species in particular 
(Strassmann et al., 2000; Khare & Shaulsky, 2010; Ostrowski, 2019). One obvious avenue for 
future research was to look at the consequences of such strategic behaviour for more complex 
groups, reflecting more realistic scenarios of what might occur in nature. Specifically, we may 
expect that as we add more strains to the group, the average relatedness to the group 
necessarily declines such that no strain would have the incentive to invest in producing the 
stalk. This question forms the central motivation of the following chapter; can we use the same 
framework that predicted individual behaviour in simple two-strain games to predict the 
degree to which groups suffer from a tragedy of the commons, and will this shed light on why 

















Chapter 2: The not-so-
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Individuals across the tree of life make costly contributions that benefit their group. Such 
cooperation through ‘public goods’ presents a dilemma as all individuals can benefit from 
being ‘selfish’ by withholding contributions whilst benefitting from the contributions of others 
– leading to the breakdown of cooperation known as the ‘Tragedy of the Commons’. Whilst 
the threat of the tragedy is well understood, studies are largely limited to qualitative 
descriptions of how ‘cooperators’ adaptively avoid exploitative ‘cheaters’, rather than on how 
all individuals face strategic trade-offs governing how much they should contribute to public 
goods. Here, we address these limitations with a combination of quantitative theoretical 
predictions and experimental tests in natural strains of Dictyostelium discoideum. Our model 
broadly predicts that strains invest more in the group when their relatedness to the group is 
high, as their fitness interests are closer aligned with that of the group, suggesting that groups 
with few strains likely avoid the tragedy due to enough strains having sufficient motivation to 
contribute to the group. However, the model also predicts that groups with low average 
relatedness should show catastrophic failure due to insufficient contributions. Experimental 
measures support these predictions, with strains reducing contributions as a function of 
relatedness to the group. However, despite a close quantitative match between predicted and 
measured contributions, we surprisingly find that strains avoid the worst of the tragedy. This 
is mostly likely due to non-adaptive constraints in information and strategy preventing strains 
from fully withholding contributions and expressing their selfishness. By viewing the tragedy 
of the commons as the consequence of the rational behaviour of all individuals, rather than 
‘exploitation’ by rouge cheaters, we highlight how non-adaptive constraints on strategy and 






Individuals often act in ways that benefit their group (West et al., 2007b; Bourke, 
2011). These cooperative acts are typically costly to the actor, yet the benefits are often 
available to all, regardless of individual contributions. Such cooperation through ‘public 
goods’ is therefore vulnerable to selfish individuals who restrict their contributions to public 
goods, while reaping the benefits from contributions made by others (Olson, 1965; Rankin et 
al., 2007). This lack of motivation to contribute to public goods underlies the ‘Tragedy of the 
Commons’ (Hardin, 1968), where selfish behaviours that maximise personal interests lead to 
suboptimal group success (Olson, 1965). The potential risk from such tragedies is well-
documented in both economics (Gordon, 1954; Ostrom, 1990) and biology (Wenseleers & 
Ratnieks, 2004; Rankin et al., 2007; Strassmann & Queller, 2014). Furthermore, the persistent 
threat of the tragedy of the commons can play a critical role in shaping the evolution of 
cooperation and group organization in nature (Rankin et al., 2007); cooperation can be lost 
when the costs imposed by exploitation outweigh the potential rewards from contributing, 
group membership can be restricted to avert the most tragic outcomes, or groups can collapse 
entirely. Understanding ‘why’ and ‘how much’ the tragedy occurs (and how it can be avoided) 
is therefore of great importance in understanding the evolution of the diversity of cooperative 
behaviour found in nature. 
Our current understanding of the properties of the tragedy in natural systems is largely 
limited to qualitative descriptions; whether the outcome is catastrophic where no individuals 
contribute to cooperation, or merely sub-optimal, where contributions to cooperation are 
simply lower than the level that maximises group success (Wenseleers & Ratnieks, 2004; 
Rankin et al., 2007). Consequently, whilst we have some understanding of the broad-scale, 
qualitative conditions that lead to ‘tragic’ outcomes for groups, we have limited understanding 
of the processes governing the finer-scale variation in public goods production that is 
important for the evolution of social traits. Whilst there has been discussion of how the tragedy 
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can be avoided (Frank, 1995; West et al., 2002a; Foster et al., 2004, 2006; Rankin et al., 2007), 
the focus is often on how groups avoid obligate ‘cheaters’ who impose a ‘cheater-load’ 
(Velicer, 2003; Travisano & Velicer, 2004; Van Dyken et al., 2011) on group fitness. Such a 
perspective masks the fact that contributing to a public good is a strategic choice for all 
individuals, subject to trade-offs between costs and benefits. Furthermore, in many public 
goods strategies are not limited to discrete ‘cooperate’ or ‘cheat’ strategies. Instead, selection 
can favour continuous strategies that adaptively adjust contributions to public goods in 
different social contexts. Studies in microbes have indicated that even simple organisms can 
strategically adjust their contributions to public goods (Madgwick et al., 2018), suggesting 
that the manifestation of the tragedy of the commons in nature might be quantitative and 
depend on social context. Therefore, to understand to extent to which individuals in groups 
will suffer from the tragedy of the commons and what factors allow groups to collectively 
avoid the worst of these conditions, we need to consider the strategic selfish behaviour of all 
members, not just how the group resists those who cheat by not contributing their ‘fair share’. 
To achieve this goal, we need to connect empirical studies to a theoretical framework that 
considers how and why individuals strategically vary their contributions to public goods in 
response to social setting.  
The most obvious feature of groups that will drive variation in the contributions 
individuals make to public goods is their relatedness to group members. Individuals should 
presumably be more willing to contribute to public goods when benefits go to relatives. In this 
way, relatedness aligns the fitness interests of an individual with those of the group, because 
genes in the individual ultimately benefit when the group as a whole prospers (Foster et al., 
2006; Taylor et al., 2007; West et al., 2007b; Gardner & West, 2014). Hence, individuals 
should contribute to public goods in proportion to their relatedness to their group – a logic 
captured by Hamilton’s rule (𝑟𝑏 − 𝑐 > 0, where 𝑏 and 𝑐 capture the benefits to recipients and 
costs to actors of some cooperative act and 𝑟 captures the relatedness of the actor to the 
recipients) (Hamilton, 1964b; Charnov, 1977). The importance of this economic balance for 
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the evolution of cooperative strategies can be overlooked by a perspective that focuses on 
cheating.  
Here, we apply a model of quantitative variation in ‘investment’ (i.e. contribution) 
into public goods (Madgwick et al., 2018) to experimental analyses of cooperation in the 
social amoeba Dictyostelium discoideum. In this system, individual cells aggregate to 
collectively form a fruiting body constructed of a stalk (the public good) that facilitates 
dispersal of spores (the benefit from public goods) (Strassmann et al., 2000; Kessin, 2001; 
Smith et al., 2014). Because different strains can co-aggregate to form a chimeric fruiting 
body, the relatedness of a strain to the group can vary (depending on their relative frequency 
within, or relatedness to, the group), which can shift the balance of costs and benefits 
determining whether to contribute to public goods. Indeed, previous work examining simple 
two-strain groups demonstrated that strains can strategically alter their contribution to the stalk 
in response to relatedness (Madgwick et al., 2018). However, it is unclear how collective 
contributions to stalk production vary across groups with more complex social compositions, 
and hence how the tragedy of the commons is manifested in this system. Here, we show 
theoretically that groups containing few strains are likely to have sufficiently high relatedness 
to the group to maintain a level of stalk production that avoids the collapsing tragedy of the 
commons (where there are no public goods produced). However, the model also robustly 
predicts that groups in which relatedness drops below a critical threshold should show 
catastrophic failure due to a collapsing tragedy of the commons. Experimental measurements 
of stalk production across a broad range of levels of relatedness support the model predictions, 
with groups reducing collective contributions to stalk production as relatedness declines in 
groups, leading to the quantitative manifestation of the tragedy of the commons. Surprisingly, 
however, despite a close match to model predictions that indicate that groups should show 
zero contribution to public goods and experience a collapsing tragedy, they avoid the most 
catastrophic outcomes (where all fruiting bodies fail to support spores). We suggest that this 
is most likely due to biological constraints in strategies and information that prevents strains 
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from showing zero contribution to the stalk. Therefore, while groups clearly suffer from the 
tragedy of the commons, the outcomes are not nearly as tragic as predicted by theory because 





Theory predicts groups avoid tragic collapse across a range of relatedness 
To make predictions about how the contributions by members of a group contribute 
to public goods we model cooperation as an evolutionary game, where the players are 
genotypes (strains) that can make costly quantitative ‘investments’ (i.e. contributions) to 
public goods, and receive returns on those investments though the benefits to the group as a 
whole (see Methods). We build on a simple form of the game that was developed to model 
pairwise interactions between players (Madgwick et al., 2018), and hence cannot be used to 
analyse of patterns in more complex groups composed of multiple strains (where the tragedy 
of the commons is most likely to play out). As expected, the model predicts that motivation to 
invest into public goods increases with relatedness. More importantly, the model provides 
clear predictions about specific patterns of investment that are qualitatively robust to a large 
range of benefits and costs of investment and non-linearity of benefits (see Methods). More 
specifically, the model predicts that groups with a small number of strains (where at least one 
strains will have high enough relatedness to the group to motivate investment) will typically 
make sufficient collective investment to avoid a collapsing tragedy of the commons (where 
collective investment is at or very close to zero). As such, groups with many strains that all 
have low relatedness to the group are predicted to show very low investment that reaches zero 
investment and a catastrophic ‘collapsing’ tragedy of the commons when relatedness drops 
below a critical lower threshold.  
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To facilitate the application of the model to empirical patterns we allow for error in 
the measurement of relatedness (meaning individuals do not have access to perfect 
information about their relatedness, rather they estimate their relatedness to the group with 
some degree of stochastic error or ‘noise’) Furthermore, we allow error to be frequency-
dependant, such that strains make the largest errors in relatedness estimation when at 
intermediate relative frequency within the group. In this way, specific quantitative patterns of 
the tragedy of the commons depend on the exact costs (𝑐) and benefits (𝑏) of production of 
public goods (i.e. the stalk), as well as the magnitude of stochastic of error (𝑒), and how 
frequency-dependant (f) errors in the estimation of relatedness are. Hence, for any given level 
of relatedness the model provides a predicted level of investment that can be evaluated 
empirically. 
Data best fit a model with high benefits relative to costs and intermediate error 
 To understand patterns of collective investment and the threat of the tragedy of the 
commons, we first examine how investment changes across variation in relatedness in groups 
each composed of three different strains of D. discoideum (replicated across several different 
sets of strains). Relatedness to the group can easily be manipulated in D. discoideum because 
it is equivalent to the frequency of a strain in a group. Because relatedness of three strains can 
vary across a huge array of possible combinations, we assess patterns of investment by varying 
relatedness along several ‘transects’, where we hold the relatedness of one strain constant 
while varying the relatedness of the others (see Figure 1). We fit these data to the predictions 
from the model to identify the best fit estimates for the costs (𝑐), benefits (𝑏), and the total 
level of (𝑒) and degree of frequency-dependence (𝑓) of the error in the strains’ estimation of 
their relatedness to the group. We find that the best fit occurs when the benefits from stalk 
investment far exceed the costs 𝑐 = 1 and 𝑏 = 8) and strains make fairly large errors in 
measurement of relatedness (𝑒 = 0.4) that are moderately frequency-dependant (𝑓 = 0.175). 
This set of parameters is independently verified by a further experiment with a larger number 
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of players, for which the same set of parameters emerges independently as the best fit to the 
data. Furthermore, we find that experimental measures of collective investment in groups of 
three strains are not significantly different from the values predicted by the model (Paired t-
test: 𝑡(19) = −1.463, 𝑝 = 0.160) (Figure 1), indicating a close match between the predicted 
and observed values. The relatively high benefit to cost ratio suggests that individuals will be 
incentivised to invest into public goods across a large range of relatedness values, while the 
presence of a relatively large estimated error in measurement of relatedness means that we 
expect a slower decline in collective investment as relatedness declines than the perfect 





Figure 1: Predicted (A) and measured (B) Collective Investment in the three-player game for transects 
through the available game-space of possible group compositions. Two transects are used, where a focal 
strain has a fixed relatedness to the group (=0.2 or 0.8), and the relative whole-group relatedness of the 
other two players varies. The colour represents Collective Investment (see scale), with red representing 
low collective Investment, and yellow high Collective Investment. Predictions are shown for the 
parameter set estimated from an independent experiment on Collective Investment in groups with N 





Theory predicts groups collapse with many strains at low relatedness 
 The close match between values of collective investment predicted by the model and 
the experimentally observed values indicates that our model can be utilised to make accurate 
quantitative predictions of public goods investment across social contexts. Therefore, to 
understand how and when the pattern of collective investment is expected to lead to the 
tragedy of the commons, including the potential for the collapsing tragedy, we created an array 
of groups with declining levels of relatedness. For this we mixed sets of N strains in equal 
proportions, such that relatedness equals 1/N for each group (and declines as more strains are 
added to the group). The model predicts that these N-player groups should show a decline in 
collective investment down to a relatedness of about 0.1, below which relatedness will be too 
low to incentivise any level of investment, and hence collective investment should plateau, 
with no strain contributing any cells towards the stalk (Figure 2A). In agreement with model 
predictions, we find that collective investment shows the expected deterioration as relatedness 
declines (mixed model: 𝜒1
2 = 69.1, N=228, 𝑝 < 10−15), eventually reaching a plateau at the 
level of relatedness where collective investment should collapse (Figure 2A). The observed 
pattern shows a close fit to that predicted based on the parameter estimates from the three-
strain experiments, where the observed values are not significantly different from those 
predicted by the collective investment game (paired t-test: 𝑡(9) = 0.4034, 𝑝 = 0.403). To 
confirm the agreement between predictions from the three-strain experiments and the 
observations in the N-strain experiment we conducted an independent analysis where we fit 
the data from the N-strain experiments to predictions from the Collective Investment game. 
Remarkably, we find that that the best fit parameter estimates are identical to those yielded by 
the model fit to the three-strain data (𝑐 = 1, 𝑏 = 8, 𝑒 = 0.4, and 𝑓 = 0.175) which strongly 





Figure 2: (A) Measured Collective Investment (blue points) and predicted Collective Investment 
(black line) from the best-fit model for groups varying in size from 3-20 strains with all strains having 
the same relatedness to the group (=1/N). Investments are presented as relative to clonal behaviour, 
such that lower values correspond to lower collective investment. Grey shading represents 
confidence intervals around the estimate of the best-fit parameters to the data. (B) Fruiting body 
collapse (blue points) for groups varying in size from 3-20 strains with all strains having the same 
relatedness to the group (=1/N). The grey line shows the fit from a mixed model of fruiting body 
collapse varying with average relatedness. (C) Relationship between Collective Investment and 
fruiting body collapse (blue points). Error bars represent standard errors in Collective Investment 






Groups suffer when public goods decline, but not as badly as expected 
The close fit between model predictions of collective investment and empirical data 
suggests that groups with low relatedness should experience the catastrophic consequences of 
the collapsing tragedy of the commons, where there is no stalk produced and groups are unable 
to take advantage of stalk facilitated dispersal (Figure 2A). However, because our measure of 
investment is in relation to how strains shift allocation of cells away from stalk and towards 
production of spores (Madgwick et al., 2018), the pattern represents relative rather than 
absolute investment. We therefore directly measured the impact of collective investment on 
groups by evaluating the structural integrity of the stalk produced. To this end, we measured 
the proportion of fruiting bodies that spontaneously collapsed. We find that the proportion of 
failed fruiting bodies increases significantly as relatedness declines (mixed model: 𝜒1
2 = 68.0, 
N=175, 𝑝 < 10−15) (Figure 2B) and is significantly correlated with the level of collective 
investment (Pearson correlation: 𝑡(9) = −10.2, 𝑝 < 10
−5, 𝑟 = −0.97) (Figure 2C). However, 
despite the fact that patterns of collective investment closely match those predicted by the 
model, the groups in which we expect to see zero stalk investment remarkably still built 
complete fruiting bodies (with stalks), though they suffer from a relatively high rate of fruiting 
body collapse. This result suggests that, whilst investment is plateauing at low relatedness as 
predicted, the plateau occurs not at zero investment, but at some limit that potentially reflects 




Our theoretical analysis of cooperation through production of public goods indicates 
that groups are expected to make relatively large collective contributions to stalk production 
across a large range of relatedness values, but these contributions should decline sharply when 
relatedness within groups falls below a critical threshold. This pattern occurs because strains 
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with low relatedness to a group are necessarily at low frequency in the group and hence their 
individual contribution can only have a small impact on the success of the group. For example, 
even if a strain at low frequency in a group were to make a very large relative contribution to 
stalk formation (e.g. sacrifice half of their cells to produce the stalk), their sacrifice would 
produce little if any group level benefit because it would represent an insignificant absolute 
contribution to the stalk. Thus, the potential rewards from contributing simply cannot 
compensate for the costs. We find a strong quantitative match between model predictions and 
empirical data for groups containing three strains, with total contribution (‘collective 
investment’) to the stalk declining with relatedness because strains lack sufficient motivation 
to invest (Figure 1). This leads to a robust prediction that contributions to stalk should 
eventually decline to zero when relatedness falls below a critical lower limit (which generally 
corresponds to groups containing an increasing number of strains). We find that measured 
contributions to stalk production matches this prediction (Figure 2A). However, we 
surprisingly show that even in these most tragic scenarios, groups still produce some stable 
fruiting bodies (Figure 2B). Whilst groups clearly suffer increasingly from the tragedy of the 
commons as contributions to stalk production decline, contributions are not falling to zero as 
predicted by theory. To understand these enigmatic findings, we focus on how groups might 
avoid the tragedy of the commons, and why the biology of the system may violate the 
assumptions of the theory in a way that essentially spares groups from the worst of the tragedy. 
There are many mechanisms that could lead groups to avoid the worst of the tragedy 
of the commons, including mechanisms that enforce contributing to public goods (Ågren et 
al., 2019), such as coercion (Frank, 1995; Wenseleers et al., 2004b), rewards (Trivers, 1971; 
Sasaki & Uchida, 2014), punishment (Gardner & West, 2004a; Bshary & Grutter, 2005; Boyd 
et al., 2010), and sanctions (Pellmyr & Huth, 1994; Wang & Shaulsky, 2015). However, 
although such enforcement measures are well-studied across species (Clutton-Brock & Parker, 
1995; Frank, 1995, 1996; Rankin et al., 2007), including in microbes (Manhes & Velicer, 
2011; Wechsler et al., 2019) they arguably have more limited relevance in microbes due to 
90 
 
the presence of clonal growth that structure microbial populations (Nadell et al., 2010; Ågren 
et al., 2019) and limited ability for microbes to identify non-cooperators whose contributions 
must be ‘enforced’. Successful cooperation and the avoidance of the tragedy of the commons 
in microbes is therefore more likely to rely on high relatedness in groups, which restricts 
within-group competition and aligns the fitness interests of individuals with the group. Such 
outcomes can be achieved by excluding non-kin, or preferentially interacting with kin 
(Dionisio & Gordo, 2006, 2007). In D. discoideum, strains have been shown to be able to 
implement a mechanism that allows them to partially segregate away from other strains they 
encounter in aggregations (Ostrowski et al., 2008; Benabentos et al., 2009; Gruenheit et al., 
2017), resulting in preferential interactions with partners who match at a polymorphic 
recognition locus (Gruenheit et al., 2017). It appears likely that this mechanism evolved as a 
way to avoid the most tragic conditions (which occur at intermediate levels of relatedness) 
given that segregation is frequency dependent, with strains segregating most when they are at 
intermediate relatedness to the group (Madgwick et al., 2018). However, while segregation 
can help groups avoid the most tragic conditions, it is an imperfect mechanism that does not 
result in perfectly clonal fruiting bodies but rather, is quantitative and increases the variance 
in relatedness across fruiting bodies, which thereby inflates the average relatedness within 
fruiting bodies. Therefore, strains are still likely to experience the full range of relatedness in 
nature, which leaves groups vulnerable to the tragedy of the commons, even with a mechanism 
in place to reduce its impact (Gruenheit et al., 2017). 
Although much consideration has been given to adaptive mechanisms for avoiding 
the tragedy, there are many non-adaptive constraints that can preserve cooperation. One such 
constraint in D. discoideum could be an inability to down-regulate stalk cell fate to zero. 
Strains produce and respond to a various factors that regulate cell fate (Morris et al., 1987), 
which affect allocation of cells to stalk production (Parkinson et al., 2011). Such factors may 
present an opportunity for coercion of others to invest in the stalk, and may combine with 
pleiotropic constraints (e.g. Foster et al. 2004) in restricting how low a strain can invest. A 
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further constraint is the inability of strains to perfectly assess their relatedness to the group 
(Madgwick et al., 2018), leading a strain to contribute more to the stalk than may be optimal 
when at low relatedness to the group (Supplementary Figure 1A). Whilst a perfectly adapted 
individual would have information about its relatedness to all social partners, and choose its 
strategy accordingly (Hamilton, 2001), such information could generate substantial conflict 
between social partners (Ratnieks & Reeve, 1992). In this way, informational constraints can 
be an important non-adaptive mechanism for avoiding the tragedy of the commons, benefitting 
the group by restricting a strain’s ability to express its optimal selfishness. Imperfect 
information of this kind plays an important role in alleviating potential tragedies in many taxa, 
such as polyandrous social insect workers failing to favour their own patriline (Breed et al., 
1994; Keller, 1997; Nonacs, 2011), and cooperatively breeding birds failing to recognise 
extra-pair young (Dickinson, 2004; Komdeur et al., 2004) despite the obvious inclusive fitness 
advantagea. A lack of information can change the optimal strategy in favour of cooperation, 
as occurs in meerkats where errors in relatedness estimation can select for indiscriminate 
altruism (Duncan et al., 2019), and mice where communally nesting mothers contribute milk 
according to total group size, rather than strategically investing according to their own 
relatedness (litter size) to the group (Konig, 1994; Ferrari et al., 2015; Ferrari & König, 2017). 
Overall, the types of constraints on selfishness we observe here, driven by imperfections and 
constraints in information, strategies, and enforcement measures may be important 
determinants of the degree to which groups avoid an expected tragedy of the commons 




A model of cooperation through public goods 
To understand individual and group contributions to public goods we generalise the 
‘Collective Investment game’ (Madgwick et al., 2018), which was originally developed to 
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model pairwise interactions between strains of Dictyostylium discoideum. Using the model, 
we evaluate how strains should quantitatively adjust their contributions to stalk production as 
a function of their relatedness to their group. Therefore, the model considers the stalk to be a 
public good that benefits the group by holding reproduce spores aloft for dispersal (Strassmann 
et al., 2000; Smith et al., 2014). Groups are composed of 𝑁 strains that each have a relative 
frequency of 𝑟𝑖 within a group. Here, frequency within a group is equivalent to a strain’s 
whole-group relatedness to the group (i.e. relatedness to the group, including self). This allows 
us to link theoretical predictions (of behaviour with respect to relatedness) directly with 
empirical results (from manipulations of frequency). To allow a broader discussion of the 
implications of the model, we use relatedness throughout, whilst noting the equivalence with 
frequency. Each strain makes an ‘investment’ by contributing a proportion 𝑥𝑖 of its cells into 
the stalk, with the residual proportion (1 − 𝑥𝑖) going into reproductive spores. Contributions 
to the stalk (𝑥𝑖) can therefore vary between 0 and 1 (see Figure 3 for a schematic representation 
of the model). The benefits of the stalk depend on the total contribute of all strains (i.e. the 
level of ‘collective investment’) in the group (𝑥𝐺), which is simply the sum of the proportional 
contributions of all strains weighted by their frequency in (and hence relatedness to) the group: 




The fitness benefit to the group (𝐵𝐺) from the stalk is modelled as a linear function in which 
fitness increases from a baseline value of 1 at a rate of b per unit of group contribution to stalk: 
𝐵𝐺 = 1 + 𝑏𝑥𝐺  [2] 
Because all members of a group get the same benefit from the stalk regardless contribution, 
𝐵𝐺 can also be interpreted as the ‘between-group’ component of fitness. Contributing to the 
stalk comes as a personal ‘opportunity cost’ (see Figure 3) to a strain because the cells it 
sacrifices to produce the stalk lose out on the opportunity to benefit from the stalk produced. 
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This fitness cost to a strain arising from their contribution to the stalk (𝐶𝑖) is modelled as a 
linear function, where fitness declines from a baseline value of 1 by c units for each unit of 
cells contributed to the stalk (which is a proportion of all of the cells from that strain): 
𝐶𝑖 = 1 − 𝑐𝑥𝑖  
[3] 
Because a strain sacrifices a proportion of its cells (that could have been allocated to spores) 
to produce the stalk, the fitness cost component (𝐶𝑖) can also be considered as a strain’s 
‘within-group’ component of fitness. The total fitness of a strain (𝜔𝑖) is the product of the 
fitness cost from contributing to the stalk and the fitness benefit from the total stalk produced 
by the group: 
 𝜔𝑖 = 𝐶𝑖𝐵𝐺 = (1 − 𝑐𝑥𝑖)(1 + 𝑏𝑥𝐺) [4] 
Because a given strain does not have control over the total amount of stalk produced by their 
group (𝑥𝐺), the benefit they get from their own contribution to the stalk (𝐵𝑖) will depend on 
their frequency in (i.e. relatedness to) the group, which determines how much their 
contribution can impact the total stalk production, i.e. 𝐵𝑖 = 1 + 𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑥𝑖. Therefore, we can 
evaluate the fitness of a strain in relation to the costs and benefits arising from their personal 
contribution to stalk production: 
?̃?𝑖 = 𝐶𝑖𝐵𝑖 = (1 − 𝑐𝑥𝑖)(1 + 𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑥𝑖) [5] 
which emphasises the fact that the relevant benefit from contributing to the stalk is that which 
arises from the strain’s own contribution (and hence, it is the benefit from their own 





Figure 3: Schematic representation of the ‘Collective Investment game’ for two strains. Each strain 
has a total budget (e.g. number of cells) based on their relative frequency within the group. Strains 
invest a proportion of their budget into the public good, with the remainder representing the residual 
budget which is available to reap benefits.  The benefits of investment come through a multiplication 
b of the investments of both players to form the public good. The costs of investment come through 
a personal ‘opportunity cost’ of reducing the size of the residual budget of a strain (through which 
payoffs can be accrued) by investment multiplied by c. The payoff that each player receives is the 
product of the size of the group’s public good and the relative representation of a player in the fitness 
accruing cells, which depends on both their relative frequency within the group to start with, and the 




The optimal proportion of its cells that a strain should contribute (𝑥𝑖) to the stalk (in 
terms of the marginal effect its contribution has on its own fitness) as a function of its 
relatedness to a group can be solved by finding the level of contribution that maximises fitness 











The relationship between equation (6) and Hamilton’s rule (Hamilton, 1964b) can be seen by 
examining the threshold between contributing and not-contributing to stalk formation (i.e. the 
threshold above which ?̃?𝑖 > 0), which occurs when 𝑟𝑖𝑏 − 𝑐 > 0. The patterns of investment 
predicted by equation (6) are illustrated in Figure 4, which indicates that strains are expected 
to show zero investment when their relatedness to the group drops below some critical 
threshold and is expected to approach the level shown by clonal groups (which is taken as the 





Figure 4: Investment into public goods when the strength of selection on collective investment 
varies. (A) Optimal investment for one strain as a function of relatedness to the group. (B) Collective 
Investment of two strain as a function of a focal strain’s relatedness to the group. In both panels, the 
red line represents the weakest selection on public goods investment (S=3), and the blue line 





To understand how clonal groups should contribute to the stalk, we can evaluate 
equation (5) for the case where 𝑟𝑖 = 1 (or identify the value 𝑥𝐺 of that maximises equation 4), 






The sum of the contributions made by a group of strains contributing at the level given by 
equation (6) in a chimeric group will always be less than the value in equation (7) (i.e. 𝑥𝐺 < 𝜃 
for all chimeric groups). Therefore, we can evaluate the extent of the tragedy of the commons 
by considering how far groups are from the level of stalk production that maximises group 
success (eqn. 7). 
Imperfect information 
For strains to be able to make the optimal contribution to the stalk predicted in 
equation (6), they need perfect information of their relatedness to the group (𝑟𝑖). In real 
biological systems, individuals are likely to use cues that provide information about 
relatedness, and therefore we do not expect them to have access to perfect information (i.e. 
they make errors in estimation). There are two levels of error that we account for in our 
analysis; the overall level of error or ‘noise’ in estimating relatedness, and the shape of the 
frequency-dependant error, where strains make smaller errors in estimating their relatedness 
to the group when they are at either very low or very high relatedness to the group. 
To allow for error in estimating relatedness, we assume that cells within strains make 
unbiased normally distributed errors in their measurement of relatedness, with the mean of 
this distribution being their true relatedness to the group and the standard deviation 
corresponding to the degree of error in the measurement of relatedness (which reflects cells 
over- or under-estimating their relatedness to the group). We model the standard error of this 
function by combining two processes, the inherent level of error in the measurement of 
relatedness (𝑒) and the degree to which error is frequency dependent (f). For this we assign a 
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level of error or ‘noise’, which ranges from 0 to 1, and then weight this value by a frequency 
dependent parameter (f), to give the standard deviation of the error function. Therefore, for 
any given level of inherent measurement error or noise (𝑒), the realised level of error will 
depend on a strain’s frequency in a group and the degree of frequency dependence of the error 
(f). The degree of frequency-dependence accounts for the fact that within-group heterogeneity 
(i.e. the variance in the genetic identity of the cells encountered within a group) depends on a 
strain’s frequency, where the same level of inherent error (which reflects the biology of how 
relatedness is measured) is likely to realised errors of a larger magnitude in more 
heterogeneous groups. Therefore, we expect error to be highest when a strain is at a frequency 
of 0.5 and declines as they become either common or rare in groups. To allow for a range of 
shapes in this error function, we model it as a normal distribution with a mean of 0.5 and a 
standard deviation of f. In this way, the frequency dependent error parameter f captures the 
rate at which error drops as the frequency of a strain moves away from 0.5, with error dropping 
more rapidly with smaller values of f (see Supplementary Figure 2). To predict how a strain 
will behave given the level of error, we assume individual cells invest at a level given by the 
ESS strategy based on their measured relatedness to the group (rather than based on their true 
relatedness). As such, the level of investment by a strain at a given frequency reflects the 
averaging of the ESS strategy over the distribution of relatedness values measured by cells 
that are members of that strain.  
Robustness to model assumptions 
To provide a model that captures the most general scenario, we modelled benefits 
from the stalk as a linear function of investment. However, benefits could potentially be non-
linear. Therefore, we evaluate the robustness of the main model predictions to non-linearity 
of benefits using two general shapes of non-linear benefit functions: diminishing and 
accelerating returns. For each, we derive a new function for 𝐵𝐺 (equation 2) and solve the 
ESS ?̃?𝑖 (equation 6). The non-linear equations for 𝐵𝐺 are as follows: diminishing returns 𝐵𝐺 =
1 + 𝑏(1 − (1 − 𝑥𝐺)
1.3 and accelerating returns 𝐵𝐺 = 1 + 𝑏𝑥𝐺
1.3 (see Figure 5A). 
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Importantly, these different functions do not alter the qualitative pattern of investment by 
strains, but rather, they shift the expected level of investment above or below that expected 
from the linear function (see Figure 5). However, because these patterns are nearly identical 
to those expected from the linear benefits function with a different value of benefits and costs 
(shown by comparing the patterns in Figures 4&5), the model based on the assumption of 





Figure 5: Linear and non-linear benefits of investment into public goods. (A): Benefits of investment 
(black line) increase as investment increases. (B) Optimal investment (black line) for one strain 
across the range of relatedness to the group. For both panels, the red and blue lines show data for 






We tested model predictions using a set of 24 naturally occurring strains of D. 
discoideum from North Carolina (NC), which have previously been used in many studies 
(Buttery et al., 2009; Wolf et al., 2015; Madgwick et al., 2018): NC28.1, NC34.1, NC34.2, 
NC39.1, NC43.1, NC52.3, NC54.2, NC58.1, NC60.1, NC60.2, NC63.2, NC67.2, NC69.1, 
NC71.1, NC73.1, NC76.1, NC78.2, NC80.1, NC85.2, NC87.1, NC88.2, NC96.1, NC99.1, 
NC105.1. 
Manipulation of group composition 
In the first set of experiments we created groups containing three different strains. 
Because there is a huge array of possible frequency combinations that can be constructed from 
sets of three strains, we explored frequency space by varying frequencies along ‘transects’ 
through this space, where each strain was held constant at a frequency 𝑟𝑖 of either 0.2 or 0.8 
while the frequencies of two other strains in the group were varied across a set of ten frequency 
combinations (See Table 1). This yielded a total of 60 unique frequency combinations for a 
set of three strains (which represent 20 different frequency combinations, with each of three 
strains in a ‘triplet’ being treated as the focal strain in turn). These frequency combinations 
are indicated by the positions of the data points in Figure 1 across the three-strain frequency 
space. A total of three distinct triplets of strains were used, with each triplet replicated three 
times in each of the combinations, giving a total of 𝑛 = 540 chimeric combinations. Each 
strain was also measured clonally three times in each replicate giving a total of 𝑛 = 540 clonal 
measurements. In the second set of experiments we explored a wider range of relatedness 
values by increasing the number of strains in each group. For this we created groups of N 
strains (where N was 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 15, or 20) in which all strains were at a frequency 
of 1/𝑁 in the group, which means that the average relatedness in each group is 1/𝑁. Each of 




Table 1: Combinations of frequencies used in three-player experiments. Each column represents one 
of ten combinations for the two treatments, where one strain was held at a relatedness 𝑟1 = 0.2 or 0.8 
Transect 1: 𝑟1 = 0.2 
𝑟2 = 0.79 0.03 0.06 0.71 0.67 0.63 0.20 0.24 0.49 0.40 
𝑟3 = 0.01 0.77 0.74 0.09 0.13 0.17 0.60 0.56 0.31 0.40 
Transect 2: 𝑟1 = 0.8 
𝑟2 = 0.01 0.18 0.17 0.04 0.05 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.09 0.10 
𝑟3 = 0.19 0.02 0.03 0.16 0.15 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.10 
 
Measurement of spore allocation 
The protocols for quantifying spore allocation in D. discoideum are well-documented 
(e.g. see Kessin, 2001; Buttery et al., 2009) and so described only briefly here. Strains were 
grown on Klebsiella aerogenes as a food source. After growth, amoebae were harvested and 
washed by centrifugation in KK2 buffer (16.1 mM KH2PO4 & 3.7 mM K2HPO4). Amoebae 
were then counted on a haemocytometer and resuspended in KK2 at a density of 108 cells per 
ml. Chimeric or clonal groups were created by adding cells from each strain at the relevant 
relative frequency in a 1.5ml Eppendorf and mixing thoroughly. 107 cells of each mix were 
then spread evenly on a 6cm petri dish containing 1.5% nutrient-free agar in KK2 and left to 
develop for 24 hours in an incubator at 22ºC. For collective investment measures (see below), 
all fruiting bodies were harvested in 5ml of spore buffer and counted on a haemocytometer. 
The total number of spores gave a measure of 𝑇𝐺 (chimeric groups) or 𝑇𝑖 (clonal groups) to be 
used for quantifying investment. 
Measurement of fruiting body stability 
To measure fruiting body stability we created groups of N strains following the same 
approach as described above in which all strains were at a frequency of 1/𝑁 in the group, with 
N = 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, or 20). For fruiting body collapse we simply counted the total number 
of fruiting bodies on a plate, and the number of fruiting bodies that had collapsed after 24 
hours. The percentage of total fruiting bodies that had collapsed was the measure of fruiting 
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body collapse used. Each of the ten conditions were replicated an average of 4.4 times, for a 
total of 𝑛 = 440 chimeric combinations. 
Estimating contribution to public goods 
The total level of collective investment by a group was estimated from the production 
of spores by the group, 𝑇𝐺, which reflects the inverse of allocation to the stalk (since cells not 
allocated to the stalk are necessarily allocated as spores). Because strains vary in their clonal 
level of investment in stalk, we normalized the behaviour of a strain in chimera to its behaviour 
when clonal. For this, we measure spore production by a strain in clonal groups (𝑇𝑖) and used 
this to calculate the expected spore production of a group as the weighted average of the clonal 
behaviour of each strain (where the clonal spore production by strains is weighted by their 
frequency in the group):  




Because we expect strains to be investing at a level that corresponds to the optimum (θ), the 
value of 𝐸𝐺  is expected to reflect the level of spore production when strains are investing at 
their optimal levels and hence provides an estimate of 1 − 𝜃 in the model. A measure of the 
spore production was then calculated by comparing the measured spore production of the 
group, 𝑇𝐺, with the expectation if all strains were acting the same as they do when they develop 






Therefore, 𝑆𝐺 will be greater than one if a chimeric group produces more spores than clones, 
which reflects a shift of cells away from stalk production into spore production. Because spore 
production is the inverse of allocation to stalk, this measure can be linked to the collective 









This expression implies that, when 𝐼𝐺 = 1 strains are showing the optimal level of investment 
(θ), and values less than one represent a reduction in stalk investment compared to the clonal 
expectation 𝐸𝐺 . 
Comparing empirical data to model predictions 
To allow a direct comparison between model predictions and empirical data, we calculated 
collective investment from the model using the same method which is used to estimate the 
measure from empirical data. For this we need to express collective investment in terms of 
spore allocation scaled to the clonal expectation (equation 10). Therefore, the predicted 
collective investment from the model (𝑥𝐺; eqn. 1) has an expected value (denoted 𝑋𝐺) when 
rescaled to match the empirical methods: 
𝑋𝐺 =
1 − 𝜃




Collective investment and fruiting body collapse across different number of strains 
(with all strains at equal relatedness) was modelled using mixed models fitted by maximum 
likelihood. In each model, group (which identified each unique combination of strains) was 
fitted as a random effect to control for variation in the collective behaviour of different strain 
combinations, and significance was assessed from an ANOVA of two models that differed 
only in the presence of absence of the ‘number of strains’ effect. 
To test the robustness of the general patterns of decreased contribution to public goods 
as a function of relatedness, we test the effects of changing model parameters. One such key 
parameter is the ‘strength of selection’ 𝑆 on the public good, which can be derived as the rate 
at which group fitness (equation 4) declines as a function of collective investment: 𝑆 = 𝑏𝑐. In 
order to vary the strength of selection while holding the optimal level of collective investment 
105 
 
constant we simply rearranged equation (5) to solve either for b or c, and then solved the ESS 
(equation 9). We derived model predictions for a total of twelve different combinations of 
costs and benefits (with corresponding variation in the strength of selection S=2.98, 3.56, 4.27, 
5.14, 6.25, 7.68, 9.59, 12.25, 16.17, 22.5, 34.32, 64). 
In order to test the ability of the model to make quantitative predictions of collective 
investment (and therefore the tragedy of the commons) we searched for the set of parameters 
(b, c, e, and f) that provided the best fit between the given model’s prediction of collective 
investment, and the empirical data for collective investment. When fitting models, we 
accounted for overall scale issues by allowing a small intercept (I) in the model, that is added 
to all empirical datapoints. The best-fit model has a small intercept (I =0.03) that improves the 
fit compared to a model with no intercept. 
To find the best fit model, we firstly defined a large search-space of the four variables, 
b, c, e, and f (2 ≤ 𝑏 ≤ 10; 1 ≤ 𝑐 < 2; 0 ≤ 𝑒 ≤ 1;  0 < 𝑓 ≤ 1) with 20 values chosen for each 
parameter. For each unique combination of b, c, e, and f, we then derived the optimal strategy 
(equation 6) for each combination of b, c, e, and f. We then used our approach to modelling 
error (see ‘Imperfect Information’ section) to calculate the optimal strategy with error. 
Individual investment was converted to predicted collective investment (equation 11) 
corresponding to each of the unique social scenarios (relative relatedness of all players) for 
which we had empirical data. The fit between the prediction and the empirical data was 
assessed using a least-squares approach. To test the quality of the model fit to data, we used a 
paired t-test of each pair of empirical data and corresponding model prediction. 
To calculate confidence intervals around the best-fit model we use a resampling 
approach. Briefly, we took samples of each datapoint from distributions corresponding to the 
empirical data, and calculated the best-fit parameters using the same approach as above. We 
then repeated this approach for 𝑛 = 100 iterations. To calculate confidence intervals for each 
parameter, we used the range between the 5th and 95th percentiles of the deviations between 
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the parameter value of the overall best-fit model and the parameter value of each iteration. For 
plotting, we calculate a single confidence interval around the overall best fit as the 
combination of upper and lower confidence intervals of all three parameters that gives the 
greatest deviation in predicted investment from the overall best-fit model. As such, our 
confidence interval is a conservative estimate of confidence in the true values of the 
parameters.  
To assess the utility of adding another variable, error in relatedness estimation, to the 
model fit, we first used a broad search-space of parameters 𝑏 and 𝑐 and a least-squares 
approach to fit the perfect information model with the 𝑏 and 𝑐 values that best matched the 
data. Next, we added another parameter, 𝑒, to make an imperfect information model, where 𝑒 
is the standard deviation of the error in measuring relatedness (see ‘Imperfect information’ 
section). To test for the significant of difference in fit between perfect and imperfect 
information models, we used an F-test.  
All statistical analysis and data processing was conducted in the statistical program 
R. Ternary plots for the three-player game were plotted using the ‘ggtern’ package in R 
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In this appendix to the main text, we analyse the nature of error that strains have in estimating 
their relatedness to the group. In particular, we examine (1) consistent overestimation of 
relatedness by stains, and (2) bet-hedging strategies in response to error in estimating 
relatedness. The ESS for the error function used in the main-text is shown in Supplementary 
Figure 1A for comparison to the different forms of error analysed here. 
Overestimation of relatedness 
In the main text we present an analysis of the game where players have imperfect 
information about their relatedness to the group. Here we analyse the game where players 
have a one-sided bias in their information, always over-estimating relatedness. This is 
achieved by modelling a population of players, each of which make a systematic 
overrepresentation of magnitude 𝑆𝑖 of their relatedness to the group 𝑟𝑖. Relatedness is therefore 
defined as 𝑟𝑖 + 𝑆𝑖 , and truncated such that 𝑟𝑖 is ≤ 1. This has the effect of making deviations 
from the true value for relatedness greatest when at intermediate relatedness (as any deviation 
is less likely to be truncated). In any one instance, each player plays the perfect information 
ESS for the relatedness it estimates. 
We created a population of players, each with a value of 𝑆𝑖 drawn from a biased 
distribution such that smaller biases were more likely than larger biases. For any value of 𝑟𝑖 
each strain has an ESS level of investment 𝑥𝑖. The average across a large population of strain 
was used as the population-wide ESS for systematic overestimation of relatedness. 
The ESS for the average player with overestimation in relatedness is shown in 
Supplementary Figure 1B. The obvious finding is that overestimation of relatedness leads to 
an increase in investment for any value of 𝑟𝑖, and investment is greater than 0 even when a 
player is very rare. Investment is also much more linear than the perfect information game, 
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with no evidence for the threshold switch between 0 investment and intermediate investment 
characteristic of the perfect information models.  
Overestimation of relatedness is a plausible mechanism for the tragedy of the 
commons to be avoided, but seems unlikely to be relevant in D. discoideum based on several 
lines of evidence. Firstly, the signature of overestimation is that strains invest at the optimal 
level even when their true relatedness to the group is less than one, a fact that is inconsistent 
with empirical data (Madgwick et al., 2018). A second defining feature of overestimation is 
that strains never reach a plateau of zero investment at low relatedness to the group, which is 
also inconsistent with the data. Further, whilst all errors in relatedness estimation for 
individuals are non-adaptive, consistent overestimations seems likely to be the easiest to ‘fix’ 
evolutionarily, as it could require a simple re-tuning of a gene that governs the response to 
information, rather than having to respond to substantial stochastic noise. For these reasons, 
we can reject a consistent overestimation of relatedness as being a relevant factor in the 
patterns of investment we observe in D. discoideum, and suggest that it’s wider importance is 





Supplementary Figure 1: Predictions for optimal investment with different kinds of imperfect 
information over a strains relatedness to the group. (A) Noise: strains make stochastic, normally 
distributed errors in their estimation of relatedness to the group. (B) Overestimation: strains 
consistently overestimate their relatedness to the group at all relatedness values. (C) Bet-hedging: 
strains play the strategy that maximises their expected return given normally distributed probabilities 
of differences between their measured relatedness to the group and their true relatedness to the group. 
For all panels coloured lines represent variation in the magnitude of the errors, with blue representing 






In biology bet-hedging is characterised through variation in the fitness of traits in 
different environments. If the environment is not known or predictable, then there is a trade-
off between the fitness of different strategies in the different environments. The optimal 
strategy in this scenario can be bet-hedging – choosing a strategy that maximises fitness given 
the range of possible environments and their relative likelihood (Cohen, 1966). Bet-hedging 
can have important consequences on the evolution of cooperation (Kennedy et al., 2018), and 
can be one of two main types of (1) maximise expected fitness across all environments, or (2) 
minimise variance in fitness (Philippi & Seger, 1989; Olofsson et al., 2009). 
In the main text, we present an analysis of imperfect information through players 
measuring their relatedness as a deviation from ‘true’ relatedness. For every value of ‘true’ 
relatedness, players used the average fixed ESS for ‘measured’ relatedness across a probability 
distribution of measured relatedness. As such, this is simply error in measurement, rather than 
a bet-hedging strategy. 
We implement a bet-hedging strategy here by taking each value of measured 
relatedness 𝑟𝑖 and creating a Gaussian probability distribution with a mean ?̅? equal to the 
player’s measured relatedness to the group, and a standard deviation 𝑠 that represents the error 
in estimating relatedness. Each value on this distribution therefore represents a possible ‘true’ 
relatedness that a player could have, with the probability distribution representing the relative 
likelihood of having each value of ‘true’ relatedness. We can then ask what strategy maximises 
expected fitness for any value of measured relatedness, given the possibility of true relatedness 
being at each different value. This is achieved for any value of measured relatedness 𝑟𝑖 by 
finding the strategy 𝑥𝑖 that has highest fitness on average given the probability distribution of 
possible ‘true’ relatedness. As such, we use a bet-hedging strategy that maximises expected 
fitness. A ‘conservative’ bet-hedging strategy that minimises the variance in fitness rather than 
expected fitness is not appropriate here, because the strategy that minimises the variance in 
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fitness often has consistent extremely low fitness. The ESS solution is found using the ‘brute-
force’ iterative approach of calculating average fitness of each possible strategy, with Nelder-
Mead optimisation to decrease computational time. As with imperfect information within the 
main text, we assume that players are best at estimating their relatedness when at the extremes 
of relatedness within the group. 
The ESS for varying level of error in estimating relatedness is shown in 
Supplementary Figure 1C. Lower errors are shown in blue, with the highest errors shown in 
red. The size of the error changes the range and relative likelihood of ‘true’ relatedness that a 
player could have for any measured relatedness. The general pattern is somewhat similar to 
stochastic errors in relatedness shown in the main text; players tend to overinvest compared 
to the perfect information model when rare and underinvest when common. Further, this effect 
is stronger when error is larger. The effect isn’t however nearly as pronounced as stochastic 
error (Supplementary Figure 1A). In this way, a bet hedging strategy gives only marginally 
different predictions to perfect information, which fit significantly worse to the data than the 
error model presented in the main text. 
The players in the Collective Investment game are genetically distinct genotypes that 
invest a portion of their cells into the stalk (the public good). In practise, each individual cell 
becomes either a spore or a stalk cell. With information received from cell-cell contact, it is 
easy to see that any noise in the system will change the probability of each cell becoming 
either a spore or a stalk cell. In this way, the strategy is a function of the random noise in 
information experienced by each cell – which is the basic logic we used to model imperfect 
information in the main text. For bet-hedging to occur, the error that each cell experiences 
through variation in the probability of interacting with self would have to be centrally 
processed to produce an ‘optimal’ probability for a cell to become a stalk vs spore, something 




Frequency-dependant error in relatedness estimation 
In the main text, we model imperfect information through a Gaussian error function 
based on the simple logic of the variance in probability of a cell meeting self across a range 
of frequencies leading to the greatest error in estimating relatedness when 𝒓𝒊=0.5, with the 
magnitude of the error decreasing as 𝒓𝒊 approaches either 0 or 1. However, given that there 
was no shape of the possible error function between these three points that should be 
prioritised a priori, we modelled a range of options, based on normal distributions that had 
been normalised to peak at 1. The range of shapes we modelled are shown in Supplementary 





Supplementary Figure 2: Distribution of frequency dependant noise. Strains are assumed to make 
frequency (whole-group relatedness) dependant errors in estimating their relatedness. Errors in 
identifying self vs non-self will always be greatest when one strain is at intermediate frequency. If 
interactions between types (self vs non-self) are random, error will scale with p(1-p) (black line). If 
interactions between types are non-random, the shape of the magnitude of error with frequency will 
change, modelled here by a normal deviation with increasing standard deviation as the lines move 





















One of the major themes of the main text is constraints in information, and how they 
can alleviate a predicted tragedy of the commons by causing overinvestment by rare strains. 
In this commentary I aim to elaborate on these ideas, and point to different types of 
information that strategic investors may be unable to acquire. Furthermore, I provide more 
discussion of another constraint that is briefly mentioned in the manuscript – mainly 
constraints in information. 
Veil of ignorance 
The idea of imperfect information providing benefits to groups has been around for a 
long time. In political economics there is the idea of individuals making decisions about how 
resources are distributed without knowing their own position in the social order (Harsanyi, 
1953, 1955). Given this ‘veil of ignorance’ (Rawls, 1971), the best an individual can do is 
maximise the combined success of all individuals, as this is the only way of maximising their 
own expected payoff. The veil of ignorance is easily applicable to evolution; selfish genes 
have ‘interests’ and ‘preferences’ that natural selection evaluates based on expected fitness 
(Okasha, 2012). When meiosis is fair, an allele is under a veil of ignorance over whether it is 
in any gamete, equalising the interests of genes (Leigh, 1971). Recombination also creates 
ignorance over which alleles are at other loci, preventing selfish cabals from forming (Haig & 
Grafen, 1991; Ridley, 2000). Parents are behind a veil of ignorance about alleles present in 
each offspring, but offspring emerge from behind the veil and cause conflict by competing for 
larger shares of maternal resources (Okasha, 2012; Haig, 2014). Communal breeders such as 
the banded mongoose face a veil of ignorance by synchronised birth stopping mothers from 
identifying their own offspring in the group, and having to respond by maximising the 
combined success of the group (Cant, 2000; Vitikainen et al., 2017). Whilst such ignorance is 
different from the noise in estimating relatedness discussed in the main text, the principle is 
the same – the uncertainty caused by informational constraints restrict genes and organisms 
from expressing their true selfishness.   
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Information in D. discoideum 
In D. discoideum we can make some assumptions about what information strains are 
likely to have from knowledge of their ecology, specific recognition genes, and theories of 
genetic recognition. Studies of self-recognition have largely focussed on two cell-adhesion 
genes tgrB1 and tgrC1. These genes are highly polymorphic (Benabentos et al., 2009), require 
a ‘match’ for coaggregation (Hirose et al., 2011), and correlate with partner-specific 
segregation (Gruenheit et al., 2017), giving them a clear and important role in recognition. 
However, rare recognition groups are still capable of joining aggregations despite a mismatch 
at the tgr locus (Ho & Shaulsky, 2015), even though they are not expected to contribute to the 
stalk (Madgwick et al., 2018), suggesting that constraints exist. Furthermore, variation in 
public goods investment between strain pairs is uncorrelated with genetic distance at the tgr 
locus (See Chapter 1 Commentary) or whole-genome distance (unpublished data), which may 
reflect the fact that segregation occurs through simple binding, whereas coordinating an 
investment strategy requires more complex information acquisition. 
In natural populations of D. disocideum we know that whilst a large array of strains 
can be found together in close proximity (Fortunato et al., 2003), relatedness in spore-heads 
is generally quite high (Gilbert et al., 2007), implying that recognition is somewhat successful. 
We also know, however, that frequency interactions and chimerism will likely occur, given 
the imperfection of segregation (Gruenheit et al., 2017), and prevalence of sexual reproduction 
(Flowers et al., 2010; Ostrowski et al., 2015).  
When analysing strategic investment into public goods, there are two main ways that 
imperfect information can occur, only one of which was discussed in the main text. Strains 
can experience ‘noise’ in that they are unable to accurately assess their own relatedness to the 
group. We modelled noise through strains making error in assessing their relatedness, and then 
using the optimal strategy (ESS) for the relatedness which they estimate to have. In this way, 
the effect of noise depends on the baseline optimal strategy, which will change depending on 
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the information strains have about the composition of the group they are in. If a strain has 
information only about self, we can derive an ESS, but if the strain has information about the 
exact number of social partners, and the relative relatedness of all social partners, the optimal 
strategy may be different. As such, only being able to detect self (as opposed to different levels 
of non-self) is a further information constraint. Such a constraint could however we 
circumvented somewhat if strains can evolve to play a strategy that reflects the game scenario 
(presence of any other strains) they most often encounter. In the D. disocideum system the 
difference between the self-referential and complex strategies is difficult to test statistically, 
because the strategies aren’t that different for most of the realistic parameter space. Further, 
the empirical evidence from the work in this thesis, alongside the finding that the tgr system 
works from matching of self rather than exclusion of non-self (Hirose et al., 2015), suggests 
that such complex information is unlikely to be relevant here. This probably makes sense, 
given the biological complexity that is likely required to simultaneously assess different 
classes of non-self. We can further make a theoretical argument about this not being likely in 
D. discoideum as the non-social life stage (which is the dominant stage) would likely restrict 
the ability for such a system to evolve, especially given the minimal benefit that it would bring. 
The effects of the non-social stage have been shown to be a likely explanation for the relaxed 
selection on social genes in D. discoideum (de Oliveira et al., 2019). Whether such constraints 
are relevant in other systems, particularly vertebrates where cognition could solve the problem 
of assessment of multiple non-self types, remains to be seen. 
Polymorphism in recognition 
Whilst much of the animal kingdom can rely on phenotype matching and 
environmentally acquired cues that correlate strongly with self/kin recognition (Mateo, 2010), 
microbes rely on genetic recognition cues (Strassmann et al., 2011; Wall, 2016). For fine-
scale genetic recognition of social partners, the recognition locus needs to be polymorphic. 
This generates the problem of the maintenance of genetic variation in recognition loci; which 
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is eroded by the advantage of common types in receiving more help (Crozier, 1986), but 
favoured by the disadvantage of trusting common types that are more readily ‘cheated’ 
(Grafen, 1990). The balance of these opposing forces most often results in the erosion of 
genetic variation at recognition loci, unless some extrinsic process such co-evolving parasites 
maintains diversity (Gardner & West, 2007; Rousset & Roze, 2007). Of course all kinds of 
genetic recognition occur in microbes (Strassmann et al., 2011; Wall, 2016), including through 
greenbeards (discussed here in Chapter 4). A general pattern is that there is often substantial 
polymorphism at recognition loci, which raises the question of how diversity is maintained. 
One common solution may be the rare-type advantage that can occur in public goods scenarios 
(Madgwick et al., 2018), where there is a relative fitness advantage to rare alleles, as these 
allow a player to recognise themselves as rare and exploit the investments of other players. In 
this way, Crozier’s paradox can be resolved, and the relative success of rare recognition types 




A further important constraint in D. discoideum that can help prevent a collapsing 
tragedy of the commons could be the inability to down-regulate stalk cell fate to zero. 
Alongside the strategic changes in stalk allocation modelled here, the relative proportion of 
stalk:spores in the fruiting body will ultimately depend on the outcomes of cell-fate changes 
(trans-differentiation) that can occur late into development (Kay et al., 1999; Kay & 
Thompson, 2001). Strains produce and respond to a various stalk-inducing factors (StIFs) that 
regulate cell fate (Morris et al., 1987), with natural strains exhibiting variation in production 
of and response to these factors (Parkinson et al., 2011). One key differentiation factor is DIF-
1, which causes differentiation of cells to the pre-stalk (Morris et al., 1987). Such stalk-
inducing factors are highly diffusible, and therefore likely to create a signalling environment 
that effects all cells in the group equally (Kay et al., 1999). Strains cannot simply ignore the 
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signal, as the gene dimA that is required to receive DIF-1 signalling is known to have 
pleiotropic effects, such that strains without dimA (which ignore the differentiation signal) are 
competitively excluded from spores (Foster et al., 2004). 
 
Key to trans-differentiation may be the ALC cells that are scattered among the 
prespore region, which have many properties of prestalk cells and sit in the middle of a trans-
differentiation pathway from prespores to prestalk (Ràfols et al., 2001). Trans-differentiation 
between prespore and prestalk cells is likely important for clonal groups, giving cell-fate 
flexibility against the loss of prespore cells from the migrating slug (Abe et al., 1994). Notably 
there is surprising tolerance of final spore:stalk proportions following trans-differentiation, as 
demonstrated by studies of partial or complete removal of either the prespore or prestalk 
regions (Ràfols et al., 2001).  
 
In chimeric groups, the production of DIF-1 and other StIFs likely becomes a system 
for coercion of other strains to gain a competitive advantage by inducing other strains to 
produce more of the stalk (Parkinson et al., 2011). DIF-1 is produced by prespores, and broken 
down by prestalk (Kay et al., 1999; Kay & Thompson, 2001). As such, there is a negative 
feedback loop. A slug with substantial prespores will produce a lot of DIF-1, which will 
promote trans-differentiation of prespore cells to prestalk cells. Eventually, this process is 
slowed by the breakdown of DIF-1 by prestalk cells. In groups with large numbers of strains 
at low relatedness (as in this paper) each strain wants to produce as little stalk as possible, so 
the slug is likely formed of mainly prespores. The feedback loop commences and trans-
differentiation of prespore to prestalk cells occurs. Ultimately, whilst each strain allocates little 
or nothing to the stalk, each strain also produces substantial DIF-1. Consequently, the shared 
signalling environment of substantial DIF-1 promotes some prespore cells to trans-
differentiate into stalk, thereby rescuing the group from the tragedy of the commons. In this 
way, DIF-1 acts as a kind of by-product enforcement (Ågren et al., 2019). The production of 
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DIF has the effect of preserving cooperation, making it act like an enforcement mechanism, 
but it evolves due to strains selfishly trying to gain a competitive advantage, rather than to 
reduce selfish behaviour within the group per se. In this way, DIF signalling is analogous to 
worker policing in the form of consuming worker laid eggs in social insects (Ratnieks et al., 
2006; Griffin, 2019). Policing has an enforcement effect in terms of reducing selfish behaviour 
in the group, but likely occurs due to selfish competition as policers are more closely related 
to the queen’s offspring than those of other workers (Wenseleers & Ratnieks, 2006b). In this 
way, policing, like DIF signalling, is an enforcement mechanism that protects groups from the 
tragedy of the commons, but is unlikely to have evolved for this reason. Such by-product 
enforcement measures may be more common than previously anticipated. 
Next steps 
In Chapter 2 I provided a demonstration of the ability to make accurate quantitative 
predictions of the degree to which groups of D. discoideum suffer from the tragedy of the 
commons. However, I surprisingly found that groups largely avoid the worst of the tragedy, 
and that this may be due to constraints, and in particular constraints in their ability to 
accurately measure the group. In the course of forming the model that underpinned this paper 
I was struck by the pervasiveness of the cheater narrative, with most attempts at quantifying 
the tragedy of the commons focussing on the burden caused by cheaters. My first two chapters 
had already suggested some of the flaws of this approach, which is consistently used to frame 
the idea of ‘conflict’ between individuals. Looking at the maths of our model, this idea didn’t 
fit with the way our approach framed the problem. Specifically, in a perspective focussing on 
the adaptive strategy of conditional and continuous investment into cooperation, strains often 
fail to invest not because of cheating, but because of the presence of other strains demotivating 
them from investing. In other words, the returns of investment often aren’t worth the costs, 
and this can be exacerbated by another individual making a contribution, often more so than 
by another individual cheating and not making any contribution. The standard perspective of 
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what causes conflict in public goods seemed to miss this, so I saw an opportunity to clarify 
these issues in a shorter, ‘perspectives’ style piece. Drawing comparisons with intragenomic 
conflict (which hadn’t been considered in earlier chapters) allowed further clarity, and 
expanded the scope of the piece to cover some of the issues with the way that people discuss 
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Throughout nature individuals make costly contributions towards cooperative traits 
that benefit their group. Such ‘public goods’ create the potential for conflict, because the level 
of contribution that maximises the fitness of the group is often not the same as the contribution 
that maximises an individual’s own fitness – as individuals can benefit from exploiting the 
contributions of others. The potential for exploitation favours reduced contributions than that 
which maximises group success, leading to sub-optimal group fitness. This diminution of 
group fitness is often quantified as ‘conflict load’, but we argue that much of this load is not 
due to conflict per se, but is due instead to other factors. Individuals will often selfishly lack 
the motivation to make contributions because the benefits can’t compensate for the costs, 
irrespective of the behaviour of others. In particular, an individual’s motivation to contribute 
is affected by variation in an individual’s relatedness to the group, which determines the share 
of the group’s benefits that an individual can reap. Here, we argue that such variation in 
relatedness creates a ‘load’ on groups fitness that is distinct from ‘true’ conflict – which occurs 
when an individual’s motivation to make contributions is specifically undermined by the 
behaviour of others. To understand why groups suffer from sub-optimal contributions to 
public goods, and the specific role conflict plays, we therefore use a model of public goods 
cooperation to decompose conflict load into components that reflect the separate factors 
shaping individual contributions. We further propose a set of alternative terms to capture the 
different reasons why groups suffer from suboptimal contributions to public goods, allowing 
us to better predict the outcomes for groups and providing clearer insights into the true nature 





Throughout nature we find individuals contributing to ‘public goods’, which incur a 
personal cost while providing benefits that are accessible to all members of a group (West et 
al., 2007b; Bourke, 2011). Such public goods arise from traits as diverse as evading host 
immunity (Domingo-Calap et al., 2019), production of biofilms (Nadell et al., 2009), policing 
of worker reproduction (Wenseleers & Ratnieks, 2006a), communal offspring care (König, 
1993), and anti-predator vigilance (Santema & Clutton-Brock, 2013). Yet, wherever we find 
cooperation, we also find conflict (Hamilton, 1996). Such conflict arises because selfish 
individuals could potentially benefit by withholding their own contributions and exploiting 
those made by others. In this way, conflict and cooperation are two sides of the same coin, 
together determining the outcome of social interactions between individuals (West & Ghoul, 
2019). In other words, whilst shared interests can promote cooperation by putting individuals 
‘in the same boat’ (Ågren et al., 2019), there may still be conflict over which direction it 
should be heading.  
Why is conflict important? 
The concept of conflict is widely used in evolutionary biology to describe interactions 
between organisms, or between genes (Maynard Smith, 1974; Herre et al., 1999; Rainey & 
Rainey, 2003; Burt & Trivers, 2006; Brockhurst et al., 2014; Queller & Strassmann, 2018), 
although there is much disagreement about how the term is correctly used (see Box 1). The 
unifying factor in these diverse treatments of conflict is maladaptation. Whether talking about 
sets of genes of different origin (i.e. maternal vs paternal derived) or competing strains in a 
coinfection, we are interested in conflict because it causes maladaptation in the sense of 
individuals or groups being pulled away from their fitness optima. In public goods, conflict 
captures how the fundamental discord between individuals acting for their own self-interests 
and individuals acting for the good of the group displaces the group away from its maximum 
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possible fitness. This is analogous to intragenomic conflict (see Box 2), whereby the ‘selfish’ 
actions of genes cause maladaptation of individuals, as occurs with the fertility costs of meiotic 
drive (Zanders & Unckless, 2019). With a view of conflict as a cause of maladaptation (and 
potential breakdown of cooperation) we prefer to restrict our attention to within species, where 
relatedness between interactants is meaningful and, importantly, there is some possibility of 
cooperation. In this way, we view conflict as an important idea because it captures the 
maladaptation that groups or individuals suffer, which could be avoided (potentially to the 
benefit of all).  
What causes conflict? 
In general terms, conflict arises because individuals or genes “disagree over what 
should happen” (Burt & Trivers, 2006). Such conflict is commonly generated by asymmetries 
in relatedness (Hamilton, 1972; Trivers & Hare, 1976; Ratnieks & Reeve, 1992; Haig, 1997a). 
For example, in social insects relatedness asymmetries generate conflict occur over decisions 
such as the optimal sex ratio (Trivers & Hare, 1976; Ratnieks et al., 2006), which offspring 
are favoured (Nonacs, 2011; Moritz & Crewe, 2018), and which individuals will develop as a 
queen (Bourke & Ratnieks, 1999; Wenseleers & Ratnieks, 2004). To understand the 
consequences of conflict we can utilise the ‘joint phenotype’ approach (Queller, 2014), which 
considers whether different parties gain (i.e. receive a selective advantage) from pulling a 
group phenotype in different directions. In this context, the fact that the ‘gain’ is measured in 
terms of inclusive fitness accounts for the role of relatedness of the actors to each other 
(Queller, 2014). This approach has been hugely successful in explaining the patterns of 
cooperation and conflict between individuals (Ratnieks et al., 2006) and ‘intragenomic 
conflict’ between genes within the same genome (Burt & Trivers, 2006; Gardner & Úbeda, 
2017). However, the joint phenotype logic doesn’t neatly capture all forms of conflict. Whilst 
conflict over traits such as sex ratios involve a disagreement over the group’s phenotype, they 
differ from the case of public goods in a critical regard: for public goods, individuals will often 
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agree on the optimal value of the joint phenotype (i.e. the amount of public goods produced), 
but crucially disagree on who should pay the associated costs. In other words, all parties agree 
on the direction in which the boat should be heading, but disagree about who does the rowing 
(i.e. each would prefer the other to pay the cost). This form of conflict will be important in 
many public goods (see Box 3), such as who cares for offspring (Houston et al., 2005; Kölliker 
et al., 2015), which genotype builds a stalk for dispersal (Strassmann et al., 2011; Madgwick 
et al., 2018), who supresses the host immune system (Landsberger et al., 2018; Domingo-
Calap et al., 2019) or who scavenges for nutrients (West & Buckling, 2003; Griffin et al., 
2004). Importantly, conflict occurs in these types of scenarios despite all parties ‘agreeing’ 
that there should be an optimal public good, and all parties suffer from the collapse of the 
public good. In this way, the idea that conflict occurs when individuals pull group traits in 
different directions misses the level at which conflict occurs (who pays the cost, not what the 
optimal trait should be), which could have large impacts on how we interpret patterns of 
cooperation we see in nature. To understand this phenomenon, we first need to differentiate 
between two forms of conflict that reflect the two factors that impact individuals’ contributions 
to public goods. 
Two forms of conflict 
Groups generally benefit from increasing levels of public goods, but because they 
come at a cost to the group members, we expect group fitness to be maximal at some 
intermediate level of public goods production that balances benefits against costs (Parker & 
Smith, 1990; Foster, 2004; Doebeli & Hauert, 2005). However, individuals act to maximise 
their own fitness, which often means that they should contribute to public goods at a level that 
is lower than that which is best for the group - resulting in suboptimal group fitness. The 
diminution of group fitness owing to suboptimal contributions to public goods has been 
termed ‘conflict load’ (Foster, 2004), which implies that the suboptimal contributions are 
caused by within-group conflict. However, contributions to public goods reflect the balance 
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of a variety of factors, not all of which are driven by conflict within groups. Consequently, 
assuming that all of these factors reflect conflict by gathering them under the single term of 
‘conflict load’ clouds the nature of public goods cooperation and can mislead our 
interpretation of the motivation behind cooperation (and a lack thereof). To understand the 
role that conflict and non-conflict driven processes play in shaping cooperation through public 
goods, and how these lead to the presence of conflict load, we clarify the meaning of conflict 
over cooperation in groups, partition the sources of conflict load, and develop an alternative 
nomenclature that captures the different causes of conflict load.  
At the most fundamental level, contributing (or not) to a public good is a strategic 
choice for an individual, governed by the trade-off between the costs and benefits. The degree 
to which the strategic decision made by an individual corresponds to that which maximises 
the success of the group will depend on the degree to which the individual’s self-interests are 
aligned with the interests of the group. The degree of alignment will generally depend on the 
relatedness of the individual to the group and, consequently, when the group contains multiple 
competing parties (e.g. coinfecting strains) there will be some degree of lack of alignment 
between individual and group interests (i.e. relatedness to the group <1). This lack of 
alignment demotivates the individual from contributing because the potential benefits can’t 
compensate for the costs. In the simplest case, this can be understood in terms of the dilution 
of benefits. An individual pays the full cost of their contribution to public goods, but the 
benefits go to the entire group, and consequently the potential benefits to the individual’s 
genes arising from their contribution is diluted in proportion to their relatedness to the group. 
For example, if an individual has a relatedness of 0.1 to their group, only 10% of the benefits 
are returned to copies of their genes (so most of the benefits go to nonrelatives). Importantly, 
this form of whole-group (i.e. including self) relatedness (which determines the level of benefit 
an individual can reap from its contributions) is distinct from relatedness in terms of sharing 
of an allele for a cooperative trait (Grafen, 1985; Frank, 1998). For many public goods all 
individuals possess the allele in question, so relatedness at the cooperative allele is 1, and 
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doesn’t determine the amount of benefits that can be accrued or drive an individual’s strategy. 
Instead, it is variation in relatedness of an individual to a social group (often equivalent to an 
individual’s relative representation in the group) that is important – because it determines how 
much an individual can benefit from its own contribution to public goods. Such logic is 
captured by Hamilton’s rule 𝑟𝑏 − 𝑐 > 0 (Hamilton, 1964a; Charnov, 1977), where benefits 
(b) are returned in proportion to relatedness (r), which sets a threshold for when net benefits 
(rb) outweigh the costs (c) and hence when contributions to public goods will be favoured. 
Importantly, the inequality of Hamilton’s rule reflects the fact that an individual’s incentive 
to contribute to public goods comes from the potential benefits that can be accrued from their 
own contribution (Figure 1), which are determined by variation in relatedness to the group. 
Such strategic self-interest can cause maladaptation of groups (i.e. a tragedy of the commons), 
but individuals are simply making an economic decision based on costs and benefits (given 
their relatedness to the group), irrespective of the behaviour of others, which implies a lack of 
realised conflict. We can also consider this situation from the perspective of group members 
disagreeing over the level at which a given individual should contribute. The individual is 
motivated to contribute at a level that maximises their fitness (which is governed by the cost-
benefit analysis captured by Hamilton’s rule), while other (unrelated) group members would 
prefer that they contribute at a higher level. If others are powerless to affect the contribution 
made by the individual, then the individual’s decision has not been impacted by the potential 
for conflict, but the group suffers as a consequence of their lower than optimal contribution to 
the public good. We can consider the impact of this phenomenon on the fitness of the group 
as representing ‘tragedy load’, which is a component of the total conflict load that reflects a 
lack of personal motivation to contribute to public goods, which does not require actual 
conflict. Rather, it reflects the classic tragedy of the commons where individuals lack 
sufficient motivation to contribute to the good of the group. Making the comparison to 
relatedness in the sense of kinship, tragedy load is analogous to an individual not helping 
another because relatedness is too low (given the costs and benefits) for Hamilton’s rule to be 
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satisfied and selection to favour helping. In this scenario, it is hard to see that there is true 
conflict between the actor who didn’t provide help and the recipient who didn’t receive help 
(although of course the recipient would rather receive help). This kind of perspective on what 
causes groups to suffer is lacking in the view of conflict that views all sub-optimality in groups 
as conflict (Queller & Strassmann, 2018). 
When considering the costs and benefits of contributing to public goods above we 
assumed that an individual’s motivation to contribute was independent of the actions of others. 
However, the optimal strategy of how much to contribute to a public good will depend on the 
strategies of other individuals in the group. In general, contributions by other’s in a group will 
demotivate an individual from contributing (Figure 2) because of the opportunity it offers for 
them to exploit those contributions. Logically, the more others are willing to contribute the 
less an individual should be motivated to contribute. This phenomenon is reciprocal, such that 
all individuals in a group are demotivated by the contributions being made by others, which 
can therefore escalate and cause substantial maladaptation. Because contributions being made 
by other individuals can lead to an individual contributing less than they would have made 
based on the purely economic decision of how variation in relatedness determines the balance 
of costs and benefits, the group can end up with a lower level of public goods (and hence lower 
average fitness) than they would if all individuals acted independent of the decisions made by 
others. Therefore, this phenomenon captures the critical aspect of conflict, where individuals 
modify their behaviour to exploit one another, which leads to lower average fitness for all 
individuals. We refer to this as ‘escalation load’ to capture the fact that groups suffer because 
its members are motivated to exploit one another, and this escalates to damage the group as a 
whole.  
 The tragedy load and escalation load together account for the total load associated 
with maladaptation of groups (Figure 4). Together they account for the factors shaping an 
individual’s internal motivation to contribute: the motivation to contribute based on the simple 
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costs-benefits analysis and a change in their motivation to contribute based on the opportunity 
to exploit contributions made by others. In the supplementary material, we present a 
mathematical model of the public goods dilemma to illustrate the two forms of conflict. In 
addition to these motivational factors, an individual’s contribution can be affected by the direct 
actions of others, such as the occurrence of coercion, enforcement, and policing.  
 
Figure 1: The payoffs of contributing to public goods. (A) Contributing to public goods 
carries a personal cost, which depends on the magnitude of the contribution. (B) 
Contributing to public goods brings benefits that increase with the magnitude of the 
contribution, and depend on the relatedness of the player to the group. If a player has low 
relatedness to the group then their contribution makes little difference to the group, so the 
benefit doesn’t vary much with the magnitude of contribution (red line). If a player has high 
relatedness to the group then their contribution has a much larger effect, so their personal 
benefit is highly dependent on the magnitude of contribution (blue line). Intermediate values 
of relatedness are shown with the other colours. (C) Players receive an overall payoff that 
considers both the costs and benefits of a given level of contribution. Whilst the costs are 
the same regardless of relatedness (A), the benefits vary with relatedness (B) such that a 
low relatedness player (red line) does best by not contributing (because the benefits aren’t 
worth the cost), whilst a high relatedness player (blue line) does best with an intermediate 
contribution. In this way, variation in relatedness to the group is the fundamental factor 
determining an individual’s motivation to contribute to the group. Full details of the 





Figure 2: The payoffs of contributing to public goods when other players make 
contributions. (A) Contributing to public goods brings benefits that increase with the 
magnitude of the contribution, and depend on the relatedness of the player to the group and 
the contribution of the other players. The contributions of other players increase the benefit 
that can be achieved from the focal player contributing little to the public good. (B) Players 
receive an overall payoff that considers both the costs and benefits of a given level of 
contribution. The contributions of other players can increase the overall payoff from 
contributing little or nothing to the public good, with the effect largest for intermediate 







Figure 3: Optimal contribution to public goods for a player varying in its relatedness to the 
group (x-axis). When players receive payoffs based on only their own contributions (black 
line) the optimal strategy is to withhold contributions when at low relatedness, and make a 
contribution when Hamilton’s rule (𝑟𝑏 − 𝑐 > 0) is satisfied, with increasing contributions 
as relatedness increases. When players can change their strategy dependant on the 
contributions of another player (red line) there is a region when the contributions of others 
decreases the optimal contribution of the focal player (shown by blue shading). In this 
region, the motivation for another player to contribute demotivates the focal player from 







Figure 4: Types of ‘load’ on the success of groups. Full load (green) is the difference 
between maximal group fitness and the fitness of a group where all players make decisions 
based on their own relatedness to the group and the expected contributions of other players. 
Tragedy load (blue) is the difference between maximal group fitness and a group where all 
players make decisions based on their own relatedness to the group only (and the costs and 
benefits). Escalation load (red) is the difference between groups where all players make 
decisions based on their own relatedness to the group and the expected contributions of 
other players and groups where players only make decisions based on their own relatedness 
to the group. As such, ‘escalation load’ represents the group load caused by social partners 




Conflict and cheater avoidance 
The concept of conflict in public goods is conventionally understood through a 
perspective that focuses on cheaters (Strassmann et al., 2000; Travisano & Velicer, 2004; 
Ghoul et al., 2014; Ostrowski, 2019; Smith & Schuster, 2019; Smith et al., 2019) who impose 
a cost to groups as a ‘cheater load’ (Velicer, 2003; Travisano & Velicer, 2004; Velicer & Vos, 
2009; Van Dyken et al., 2011). As such, the problem of cooperation becomes that of ‘cheater 
avoidance’ - avoiding the burden of selfish cheaters who cause groups to collectively suffer, 
a phenomenon commonly framed as the ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin, 1968). However, 
whilst cheating is obviously an important part of conflict, characterising the problem of 
conflict in public goods as arising generally through cheating tends to conflate sources of 
conflict under one banner. In many scenarios, players readily take on roles analogous to 
‘cooperators’ or ‘cheaters’ due to variation in their relatedness to the group. Whilst this 
contributes to the tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968), individuals may ‘agree’ on the role 
that they will fulfil, in the sense that the behaviour of others causes no change in strategy (see 
Supplementary Material) though there may be selection for enforcement. The cooperator will 
cooperate because it is in its best interests to do so, and the cheater likewise. In this way, the 
‘exploited’ partner would not change their strategy if the cheater wasn’t present, and hence 
whilst there may be motivational conflict, there is none of the especially damaging ‘escalation’ 
conflict that arises over who pays the cost of contributing. In general, much of the reason why 
groups suffer from the tragedy of the commons is due to this ‘motivational’ conflict. However, 
the worst of the tragedy of the commons likely occurs due to ‘escalatory’ conflict, where 
individuals are disincentivised by the actions of others (even if those actions are nominally 
‘cooperative’). Neither party ‘agrees’ on the role they will fulfil, so they both defect – causing 
a significant cost to the group. Whilst both types of conflict could be considered as cheating 
(under the right definition), the relative importance of motivational vs escalatory conflict is 
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missed under this framework. As such, we argue that the cheater avoidance perspective 
conceptually clouds the importance of escalatory conflict.  
Beyond the issue of the conflation of two distinct forms of conflict, contributions to 
public goods will also often be withheld because the benefits don’t compensate for the costs, 
without there being any kind of ‘cheating’ in the sense of cooperation being directed away 
from its intended recipients (Ghoul et al., 2014). In this way, the cheater avoidance paradigm 
can mask the reasons for conflict, as well as conflating different types of conflict. Cheating is 
often used to refer to obligate cheaters (Velicer, 2003; Travisano & Velicer, 2004; Van Dyken 
et al., 2011), despite the obvious advantages of, and evidence for, conditional strategies 
(Doebeli & Hauert, 2005; Madgwick et al., 2018). As such, it is hard to determine which 
individuals even are the cheaters, and what a ‘fair share’ of contribution (West et al., 2007a; 
Ghoul et al., 2014), or ‘disproportionate rewards’ (Travisano & Velicer, 2004) would be. How 
much of an individual’s own potential rewards are they expected to sacrifice for the good of 
the group? Further, whilst cheating may be defined as contributing a negligible amount to 
public goods (Özkaya et al., 2018; Ostrowski, 2019; Smith & Schuster, 2019), in the 
conditions where this is favoured (i.e. low relatedness) the cooperators would not be expected 
to change their strategy regardless of the behaviour of the ‘cheater’ (see Supplementary 
Material). In these scenarios it is debatable whether ‘cheating’ itself (as opposed to 
‘motivation’) can be blamed for any costs the group suffers. In general, whilst the ‘cheater 
avoidance’ paradigm captures the inherent vulnerability to exploitation of public goods, we 
argue that by combining a lack of motivation and conflicts of interest under a ‘cheater 
avoidance’ paradigm, we mask much of the reasons why groups suffer from the tragedy of the 
commons. Cooperation is inherently an uneasy coalition of strategic individuals trying to 
optimise their rewards. Individuals fail to contribute due to a lack of motivation, which may 
occur solely due to variation in relatedness diluting potential rewards making it not worth 




Constraints on conflict 
 Our perspective on conflict decomposes ‘conflict load’ into two distinct types – one 
of which is caused by true conflict of interests when individuals undermine each other’s 
motivation to contribute, and one caused by a lack of motivation to contribute due to variation 
in relatedness diluting the benefits that an individual can reap from their contributions. The 
way that we use relatedness here is different to how it is often used, in the sense of relatedness 
with respect to an allele for cooperation (Grafen, 1985; Griffin et al., 2004; Diggle et al., 2007) 
– which has important implications for how conflicts can be constrained and resolved.  
With factors such as limited dispersal, population structure can be generated that 
causes positive relatedness on average between actors and their social partners (with respect 
to the allele for cooperation), and can lead to selection for cooperation (Frank, 1998; West et 
al., 2002b). Here, we are considering variation in whole-group relatedness – which requires 
individuals to have conditional strategies. In order to respond to relatedness and enact a 
conditional strategy, an individual needs to be able to detect its relatedness to the group – so 
obtaining information is a crucial part of being able to respond adaptively to variation in 
relatedness. Furthermore, many of the constraints that are relevant in preventing conflict load 
as discussed here involve restricting an individual’s information, or ability to exhibit a 
conditional strategy. This is quite different to selection in responses to average relatedness 
(with respect to the allele for cooperation), where we are mostly interested in fixed strategies 
and how the factors that cause relatedness structure generate selection on such strategies.  
In general, the outcomes of all conflict are hard to predict, and will depend on a range of 
factors such as power, control, coercion, and information (Hurst et al., 1996; Ratnieks et al., 
2006; Gardner & Úbeda, 2017) - the relative importance of which will depend on the genetics 
and biology of the system in question. In public goods in general, an individual requires 
information (e.g. about its own relatedness and the presence of others within the group) to 
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enact conflict, either through direct (measured) information, or information about the 
expected/average social context. In many animal species information can be obtained visually 
and olfactorily (Fletcher & Michener, 1987), although there are many examples of individuals 
failing to identify relatedness of social partners, despite the potential benefits (Dickinson, 
2004; Komdeur et al., 2004; Duncan et al., 2019). Even microbes have many well known 
ways of recognising kin (Strassmann et al., 2011; Wall, 2016), although these are also error-
prone (e.g. Madgwick et al., 2018). In general, a lack of information is likely an important 
non-adaptive constraint on conflict; imperfect information can stop an individual from 
expressing their true selfish desires such that the only option is to reduce selfishness or 
maximise the success of the group as a whole. Such constraints may explain the puzzling 
presence of indiscriminate altruism in species such as meerkats, mongooses, and mice (Ferrari 
et al., 2015; Vitikainen et al., 2017; Duncan et al., 2019). 
Constraints in strategy are also likely important in restricting the manifestation of 
conflict. One such example occurs in the social microbe D. discoideum, which collectively 
invests in a stalk (a public good) to hold aloft reproductive spores for dispersal (Strassmann 
et al., 2000). Conflict occurs over who builds the stalk, but there may be constraints in 
reducing the stalk investment strategy close to zero, even when it would be adaptive to do so 
(Belcher et al., 2019). Such constraints likely occur due to signalling factors that have a role 
in regulating cell fate and stalk production (Morris et al., 1987; Parkinson et al., 2011), which 
exhibit pleiotropic effects stopping a strain from ‘ignoring’ these signals (Foster et al. 2004). 
Such pleiotropy is a further potential constraints – altering whether modification of conflict 
traits is possible – and may occur through ‘cheating’ traits become linked to essential functions 
(Dandekar et al., 2012; Dos Santos et al., 2018). 
House mice provide an interesting example of how constraints in information and 
strategy may interact. Mothers nest communally, producing milk as a public good that is 
provided to a group of offspring pooled from different mothers (Konig, 1994). Selfish 
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individuals could increase their litter size and exploit the investments of others, whilst 
strategically investing in nursing according to their own relatedness to the group (their own 
litter size). Doing so requires flexibility in strategy (milk investment and litter size), and 
accurate information (which offspring are mine). Whilst there is some evidence of information 
and strategy in that females preferentially nest with relatives (Green et al., 2015), and choose 
to nest alone when large asymmetries in litter size occur (Ferrari et al., 2016), females appear 
to invest according to the size of the group as a whole rather than their own relatedness to the 
group (Konig, 1994; Ferrari et al., 2015; Ferrari & König, 2017). Alongside these 
informational constraints, there may also be constrains in altering the milk investment strategy 
(Ferrari & König, 2017) and litter size strategy. The same constraints may also apply in other 
communally nursing mammals, such as the banded mongoose. In this species, females also 
appear unable to recognise their own offspring in the group (due in part to synchronised birth: 
Cant, 2000), and respond to an increase in food availability by allocating more resources to 
the weakest pups (Vitikainen et al., 2017) thereby maximising the average expected success 
of all pups. As such, the constraints in information combined with the threat of enforcement 
remove conflict and promote cooperation.  
Conflict resolution 
The perspective we take on conflict and the tragedy of the commons will naturally 
guide our ideas about how conflicts can be resolved. A perspective centred around the 
principle of ‘cheater avoidance’ is already explicit about how conflict can be resolved – avoid 
those who will cheat you (or coerce them into cooperating). Such a perspective follows neatly 
from an idea of relatedness as simply sharing of an allele for cooperation – rather than as 
whole-group relatedness determining the share of the benefits that an individual can receive – 
in that it encourages thinking about the individuals that cause conflict, rather than the 
situations that cause all individuals to lack motivation to cooperate. In contrast, a perspective 
centred on how variation in relatedness drives the strategic decision to contribute to public 
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goods that all individuals face gives rise to a different idea about how the tragedy is really 
avoided. As such, we believe that conflict resolution is more about avoiding the social 
scenarios that govern where conflict most strongly occur. An example of this perspective 
comes from the social amoeba D. discoideum where strains can segregate according to 
polymorphic cell-receptors that govern self-recognition (Ostrowski et al., 2008; Hirose et al., 
2011; Gruenheit et al., 2017). Segregation can act to avoid non-self who may exploit the public 
good, and also avoid social scenarios that motivate strains to exploit in the first place. 
Supporting this interpretation is the fact that segregation is frequency dependant (Madgwick 
et al., 2018), and imperfect (Gruenheit et al., 2017), meaning that strains still interact with 
non-self regularly. Therefore, whilst segregation has most commonly been thought of as a 
‘cheater avoidance’ behaviour (Ostrowski, 2019), it may be more helpful to think of how 
strains are avoiding the conditions that remove the incentive for cooperation, rather than 
cheaters per se. Strains can have beneficial interactions with non-self, and no strain is a true 
‘cheater’, so it makes much more sense to base the decision on whether to interact or not on 
the conditions that shape strategies. 
An important thing to note about conflict resolution is that when one conflict is 
resolved, another is often created. Social insects in general provide a good example of this. 
Conflict over caste fate can be resolved by mutual dependence and irreversible caste fate 
(Beekman & Oldroyd, 2019), but this only creates new conflict because multiple mating 
creates new relatedness asymmetries between workers and their own vs the queen’s offspring, 
such that workers favour producing sons at a cost to colony productivity as a whole (Ratnieks 
et al., 2006). In this sense, much of the cooperation we see in nature is likely an ‘uneasy 
coalition’ of selfish individuals. Even microbes have shown the ability to be ‘savvy investors’ 
in public goods (Madgwick et al., 2018), so it is likely that across nature groups battle the 
temptation for strategic exploitation, much more broadly than they battle simple ‘cheaters’. A 
perspective on conflict that includes both the motivational and escalatory types of conflict 
discussed here, alongside important constraints in information and strategy, may therefore 
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prove useful for explaining the true nature of the conflict that can undermine all cooperative 
groups. 
 
Box 1: Conflict about what is conflict 
With the advent of the ‘gene’s eye’ view of evolution (Hamilton, 1964b; Williams, 
1966; Dawkins, 1976), the study of ‘intragenomic conflict’ began (Cosmides & Tooby, 1981; 
Werren et al., 1988). Since then, there has been disagreement over how the concept should be 
applied, and what examples should count as ‘true’ intragenomic conflict. Whilst in general 
terms conflict arises because genes “disagree over what should happen” (Burt & Trivers, 
2006), some argue that genes come into conflict when the spread of one genes creates selection 
for another gene that opposes the effect (Hurst et al., 1996), whilst others prefer to define 
conflict based on a difference in fitness interests (Gardner & Úbeda, 2017). This difference in 
perspective arises from an important distinction between ‘potential’ and ‘actual’ conflict 
(Ratnieks & Reeve, 1992). A difference of inclusive fitness interests between two parties 
(often caused by relatedness asymmetries) will generate the ‘potential’ for conflict between 
them (e.g. between different patrilines in social insect colonies), which may or may not 
manifest as ‘actual’ conflict (e.g. selective rearing of queens that are full sisters: Ratnieks & 
Reeve, 1992; Ratnieks et al., 2006). Factors that determine whether or not potential conflict 
manifests as actual conflict include enforcement measures such as coercion (Ratnieks & 
Wenseleers, 2005), and various constraints on (1) information (Nonacs & Carlin, 1990), (2) 
the power an individual has to express their optimal fitness interest (Beekman & Ratnieks, 
2003), or (3) genetic constraints on the conflict behaviour (Aumer et al., 2019). Taking the 
example of caste fate in social insects; there is almost always potential conflict (i.e. fitness 
benefits of being the one who develops as a queen), but only in a subset of cases do larvae 




The distinction between potential and actual conflict is critical to the disagreement 
over how the term should be applied. A perspective that believes potential conflict is true 
conflict considers definitions of actual conflict (e.g. Hurst et al., 1996) as too permissive, 
given that they include organismal ‘fine-tuning’ where genes may oppose each other due to 
one overshooting their shared optima, despite there being no conflict of interests (Gardner & 
Úbeda, 2017). An alternative perspective focussing on actual conflict takes no issue with 
including such fine-tuning as conflict, because the conditions are created for the spread of a 
gene which opposes the effect (Hurst et al., 1996). The distinction is prominent in intra-locus 
sexual conflict, where a gene may be beneficial if residing in one sex, but detrimental if it 
resides in the other (Bonduriansky & Chenoweth, 2009; Hosken et al., 2019). There is no 
difference in fitness interests between genes (i.e. the gene doesn’t benefit from causing harm 
in one sex) so a potential conflict approach considers this as not conflict (Gardner & Úbeda, 
2017; Queller & Strassmann, 2018). However, intralocus sexual conflict occurs widely in 
nature (Merila et al., 1997; Foerster et al., 2007; Morrow et al., 2008; Smith et al., 2011), and 
can cause substantial maladaptation (Bonduriansky & Chenoweth, 2009) generating selection 
for modifiers that oppose the gene in question (Lande, 1980; Kopp et al., 2003; Williams et 
al., 2008). In this way, actual conflict can and does occur without potential conflict. If we are 
aiming to explain the way that selfishness at one level (e.g. genes) can cause maladaptation at 
another level (e.g. individuals) then a perspective that only includes potential conflict won’t 
suffice. In much the same way that intragenomic conflicts driven by the selfishness of genes 
can cause maladaptation of individuals (Burt & Trivers, 2006; Haig, 2015), public goods 
conflict can underly the tragedy of the commons at the group level (Wenseleers & Ratnieks, 
2004; Rankin et al., 2007). Similarly, if we want to understand the tragedy of the commons in 
public goods, we must consider both types of conflict, and understand the relative importance 
of each in determining the outcomes we observe. Crucially, we have to also be mindful of the 
constraints that can both put a brake on potential conflict, and create actual conflict where no 
potential conflict exists.  
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Box 2: Comparing intragenomic and public goods conflict 
In both intragenomic and public goods conflict the conflicting parties are genetic 
variants (Werren, 2011). For example a maternal-origin gene may be in conflict with a 
paternal-origin gene (Haig, 1997a), or a recognition allele residing in one individual may 
conflict with the recognition allele in a different individual about the production of a public 
good (Madgwick et al., 2018). Both types of conflict also feature a ‘joint phenotype’ (Queller, 
2014), such as expression of a certain gene or production of a public good. All parties have 
influence over the joint phenotype, and each party has an ‘opinion’ about the optimal value. 
Furthermore, in the same way that selfish genetic elements spread because they increase their 
own representation rather than the fitness of their carriers, ‘selfish’ variants in public goods 
can increase in frequency because they increase their own fitness rather than the fitness of 
their group. The key difference is that with intragenomic conflict, the cost of the joint 
phenotype has to be shared amongst all parties (all genes in the genome), so the trait value 
(e.g. ‘how much should we help this individual’) is the most important consideration. By 
contrast, public goods involve personal costs for each party. As such, both parties often agree 
on the trait value of their joint phenotype, but crucially disagree about who pays the cost. 
Consequently, the two conflicts can’t necessarily be analysed in the same way, and an 
approach born in intragenomic conflict doesn’t capture the severe tragedy of the commons 
that occurs in public goods when no party wants to pay the cost to produce the trait. 
 
Box 3: Examples of potential Public Goods conflict 
There are many group scenarios in nature that could be subject to conflict. Here, we 
focus on ‘public goods’ - costly resources that provides benefits to all individuals in the group 
(Frank, 1998; West et al., 2006), and highlight a few particularly interesting examples. 
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Many interesting examples come from microbes, where an increasing group of studies 
have shown strategic behaviour through responses to factor including relatedness to the group 
(Kümmerli et al., 2015; Pollak et al., 2016; Bruce et al., 2017; Madgwick et al., 2018). One 
such example is extracellular iron-scavenging molecules such as pyoverdin produced by many 
pathogenic bacteria including Pseudomonas aeruginosa (West & Buckling, 2003). These 
compounds are costly to produce yet provide benefits to all nearby cells, creating a trade-off 
between level of investment and returns that can favour low investment (Griffin et al., 2004). 
There is therefore much potential conflict in the sense of investment of one strain demotivating 
another strain from contributing to the public good. These effects may be particularly likely 
in co-infections, where strains may be present at varying relatedness (Read & Taylor, 2001). 
Strains have a broad arsenal of strategic response to this conflict, including switching to 
alternative public goods (Inglis et al., 2016; Butaite et al., 2017; O’Brien et al., 2017), 
privatisation of public goods (Nguyen et al., 2014; Jin et al., 2018; Bruce et al., 2019), and 
modulations of investment (Kümmerli et al., 2015; O’Brien et al., 2017).  
The public goods scenarios that can be understood using our conflict perspective are 
by no means unique to microbes. Taking an example from social insects, all females of the 
parthenogenetic ant Pristomyrmex punctatus can both reproduce and perform cooperative 
tasks (Dobata & Tsuji, 2013). As such, colonies can consist of potential reproductives of 
multiple lineages of varied frequencies (Satow et al., 2013). Workers alter their cooperative 
behaviour with varied frequency of naturally occurring ‘selfish’ individuals that rarely engage 
in cooperative tasks (Dobata & Tsuji, 2013). As such, individuals face a trade-off between 
investment in group beneficial tasks (e.g. brood care and foraging) optimising group fitness, 
and reproduction to maximise their ‘within group’ component of fitness. The outcomes of 
these decisions may best be understood from a ‘strategic investment’ perspective highlighting 
the conditions where savvy individuals would be expected to defect and exploit the group. 
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Public goods also occur in many cooperatively breeding vertebrates, such as the 
meerkat Suricata suricatta. Cooperatively breeding is a public good that has group and 
offspring survival advantages that increase with group size (Clutton-Brock & Parker, 1995; 
Clutton-Brock et al., 2008) but only dominants are usually able to breed. Dominant individuals 
punish weak individuals and subordinates who attempt to breed (Clutton-Brock & Parker, 
1995; Clutton-Brock et al., 2001). As such, subordinates and dominants are in conflict over 
who reproduces, with subordinates are most likely to breed when control by dominant female 
is weak (Clutton-Brock et al., 2001). Furthermore, investment by subordinates into litter care 
is known to vary, with only one or two individuals sometimes conducting 80% of group care 
(Clutton-Brock, 1998). Investment in punishment preserves the reproductive monopoly of 
dominants, but too much punishment could drive subordinates to leave, or lower their 
condition and ability to provide help (Clutton-Brock et al., 2001). Cooperative breeding and 
punishment in meerkats is a well characterised system, yet could benefit from being framed 
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Supplement 1: Model of public goods 
There are many models of the public goods dilemma that capture the essential balance 
between personal costs and group benefits of investment driving the decision of whether to 
contribute or not (Frank, 1998; Dionisio & Gordo, 2006; Kümmerli & Ross-Gillespie, 2014). 
To capture the reality of many public goods in nature, the model needs to allow players to 
make quantitative contributions into the public good that are conditional upon the social 
scenario in question. Here, we used the ‘Collective Investment game’ – a simple framework 
which has proven utility in a natural system, as demonstrated by its ability to make quantitative 
predictions of patterns of investment in natural strains of the social microbe Dictyostelium 
discoideum (Madgwick et al., 2018). The Collective Investment game involves players 
making quantitative ‘investments’ (contributions) to public goods, and sharing the benefits 
with the group as a whole, whilst paying personal costs of investment. Players vary in 
motivation to invest due to variation in their relatedness to the group.  
The Collective Investment game 
The details of the Collective Investment game are provided elsewhere (Madgwick et 
al., 2018) and so are only briefly outlined here. The game considers groups of N players, which 
are competing evolutionary units (i.e. strains or genotypes). All players have an equal 
‘budget’, a portion (𝑥𝑖) of which is invested into the public good, with the remaining portion 
(1 − 𝑥𝑖) withheld and allocated toward other fitness traits. The relatedness of each player to 
the group (𝑟𝑖) is equivalent to its frequency within the group. A group of players which each 
vary in their relatedness to the group will therefore collectively invest 𝑥𝐺 = ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑟𝑖. The benefit 
fitness component of the group (𝐵𝐺) increases linearly with the level of collective investment 
𝑥𝐺 at a rate given by the benefit term b, such that 𝐵𝐺 = 1 + 𝑏𝑥𝐺. Each unit of investment into 
public goods by a player comes at a cost given by c, such that the cost component of fitness 
(𝐶𝑖) is simply 𝐶𝑖 = 1 − 𝑐𝑥𝑖. In this way, the cost component represents the residual budget 
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through which fitness benefits can be accrued. The total fitness of a player 𝜔𝑖 is determined 
by the product of these two fitness components. 
𝜔𝑖 = 𝐵𝐺𝐶𝑖 = (1 + 𝑏𝑥𝐺)(1 − 𝑐𝑥𝑖) [1] 
We can also consider the total fitness of the group as a whole, which is simply the 
sum of the fitness of group members: 
𝜔𝐺 = ∑ 𝜔𝑖𝑟𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
= (1 + 𝑏𝑥𝐺)(1 − 𝑐𝑥𝐺) [2] 





𝜔𝜃 describes the case for the optimal group, where the average fitness of all players is highest. 
As such, we can use it as a baseline against which we evaluate the ‘load’ on the group (i.e. 
how much the group suffers compared to its potential optima). When relatedness is 1 (which 
occurs when a group is composed of a single player), we expect that investment will be at the 
level that optimises group success (i.e. 𝑥𝑖= 𝜃), giving individual and group fitness 𝜔𝑖 = 𝜔𝜃. 





The optimal investment strategy for a player will change according to their relatedness 
to the group, regardless of the behaviour of other players. This is simply because whilst the 
relative costs of investment are fixed, the impact that a player’s investment can have on the 
group declines as that player’s relatedness declines. As such, a player with low relatedness 
can make little difference to the benefit that the group shares, regardless of their contribution, 
but will still pay the same costs of investing. In general, this effect will demotivate a low 
relatedness player from investing in the group. To under this phenomenon we can define the 
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impact that a player’s own investment has on their fitness: 𝐵𝑖 = 1 + 𝑏𝑥𝑖, which we can use to 
evaluate a player’s fitness with respect to their own investment (rather than with respect to the 
collective investment by the group as in eqn. 1. Based on how a player’s investment impacts 
their total fitness, we can derive their optimal level of investment (?̃?𝑖) with respect to the effect 











?̃?𝑖 increases with relatedness, with exactly how much depending on the inherent costs and 
benefits of the public good. Note that logically ?̃?𝑖 must be constrained between 0-1, such that 
values less than zero are scaled to equal 0. The value in equation (5) gives a quantitative level 
of investment, but can be understood in terms of a simple Hamilton’s rule by finding the 
threshold for which investment will be greater than zero, which is when 𝑟𝑖𝑏 − 𝑐 > 0.  
When groups are composed multiple player who may make investments, a focal 
player can obtain payoffs from not just their own contributions, but from the contributions of 
others too. This adds an extra term to the optimal strategy in equation (5), accounting for how 















In this way, 𝑥𝑖 represents the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), where 𝑥−𝑖 and 𝑟−𝑖 are the 
levels of investment and relatedness values of all players in the group other than the focal 
player i. As with equation (5), the expression in equation (6) logically needs to be constrained 
to be between 0-1, by making negative values =0.  
The final term of the ESS, which defines the difference between the ESS level of 
investment (eqn. 6) and the value that maximises a player’s fitness with respect to their own 
investment (eqn. 5), is negative, meaning that when other players investment into public 
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goods, the focal player has less incentive to invest itself. Furthermore, the threshold of when 
to invest (described for equation 5 by a simple Hamilton’s rule) will be higher, with investment 
favoured only if 𝑟𝑖𝑏 − 𝑐 >  𝑟−𝑖𝑥−𝑖𝑏𝑐. This can be interpreted as players disagreeing over who 
will make the investment when multiple players would otherwise be motivated to invest based 
solely on the costs and benefits (as given by eqn. 5). 
Conflict 
The maximum payoff that a group can collectively achieve is defined as 𝜔𝜃 (eqn. 3). 
However, for any group of players where the interests of players aren’t fully aligned (i.e. if 
?̅? < 1), the total fitness of a group will be lower than 𝜔𝜃. Measures of deviation from the 
optima are often termed ‘conflict load’ and used as a measure of the tragedy of the commons 
(Foster, 2004; Rankin et al., 2007), but the deviation will depend crucially on whether the 
players are investing with respect only to the benefits from their own investment (?̃?𝑖 in 
equation 5), or investing the lower amount due to the investments of other player demotivating 
them (𝑥𝑖 in equation 6). To understand these different types of load, we can define three 
measures with relation to group fitness (Table 1). Firstly, we have already defined the fitness 
of a group, 𝜔𝜃, where everyone invests 𝜃, the level that maximises group fitness. Second, we 
can also define the fitness of a group, 𝜔𝐻𝑅, in which all members invest at a level (given by 
?̃?𝑖) that is determined solely by the costs and benefits (i.e. according to the simple form of 
Hamilton’s rule). Finally, we can define the fitness of a group, 𝜔𝐸𝑆𝑆, in which all members 








Table 1. Measures of group fitness for different strategies used by all members of the group. 
We define three measures of group fitness; 𝜔𝜃 where all members invest at the level given by 
𝜃 (eqn. 4), 𝜔𝐻𝑅 where all members invest at the level given by ?̃?𝑖 (eqn. 5), and 𝜔𝐸𝑆𝑆 where 
all members invest at the level given by 𝑥𝑖 (eqn. 6). 






























Using the three measures of fitness in Table 1, we can define three types of load that groups 
suffer, which are given in Table 2. 
Table 2. Types of load on group fitness associated with investment in public goods. We define 
three types of load that are based on the differences between the fitness that a group would 
have if all members invest at one of three different levels: at the level that maximises group 
fitness (where all members invest at the level given by 𝜃 and the group has fitness 𝜔𝜃, see 
eqn. 3), at the level that maximises the costs and benefits (where all members invest at the 
level given by ?̃?𝑖 and the group has fitness 𝜔𝐻𝑅), or at the ESS level (where all members invest 
at the level given by 𝑥𝑖 and the group has fitness 𝜔𝐸𝑆𝑆). 
Type of load Definition 
Conflict load 𝑪 𝐶 =  𝜔𝐻𝑅 − 𝜔𝐸𝑆𝑆 
Tragedy load 𝑻 𝑇 =  𝜔𝜃 − 𝜔𝐻𝑅 
Full load 𝑳 𝐿 =  𝜔𝜃 − 𝜔𝐸𝑆𝑆 
A group of players investing according to the ESS (eqn. 6) suffer a full load (L) from 
players acting according to their own self-interest, rather than maximising the success of the 
group as a whole. The full load can be decomposed into two components, tragedy load (T) and 
conflict load (C), such that 𝐿 = 𝑇 + 𝐶. Tragedy load reflects the fact that players will typically 
invest at a level that is lower than the value that maximises group fitness because their 
relatedness to the group (𝑟𝑖) is less than one, which reduces the potential benefits (𝑏𝑟𝑖) relative 
to costs (𝑐), regardless of the behaviour of other players. We term this the tragedy load because 
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it reflects the primary reason why groups suffer from the tragedy of the commons – a lack of 
individual motivation to contribute to public goods. Conflict load reflects the fact that groups 
will suffer from even lower investment (than expected based solely on the costs and benefits) 
because investment by other players represents an opportunity for exploitation by a focal 
player, which reduces their motivation to invest their own resources. This situation represents 
true conflict in that it means that players will modify their behaviour to exploit the investment 
by others. 
We can examine the impact of each type of load by evaluating group fitness under 
three different scenarios (𝜔𝜃, 𝜔𝐻𝑅, and 𝜔𝐸𝑆𝑆) using the Collective Investment game. Firstly, 
we can derive tragedy load (𝑇 =  𝜔𝜃 − 𝜔𝐻𝑅) by substituting ?̃?𝑖 (eqn. 5) into 𝜔𝐺 (eqn. 1) and 





T provides the maximum ‘tragedy load’ on group fitness – a measure of how the ratio between 
the costs and benefits of investment into the public good influence the degree to which groups 
will suffer due to a lack of incentive for strains to invest. T is a measure of one aspect of the 
tragedy of the commons, a decline in group fitness from a theoretical optimum. However, T 
alone doesn’t capture the full load that groups will suffer, as it effectively focuses on the load 
caused by not investing (i.e. is a ‘cheater load’ (Velicer, 2003; Van Dyken et al., 2011). This 
is undoubtably an important part of the tragedy of the commons, but can crucially miss the 
conditions where load is likely to be greatest, and mask the reasons why such a load (and 
therefore the tragedy of the commons) occurs. Indeed, it is likely that conflict load (i.e. true 
conflict) underlies the worst of the tragedy of the commons that groups suffer (Figure 4). 
Model predictions 
We can use the Collective Investment game (see Methods) to make some general 
predictions about where we expect conflict and tragedy loads to exist, and the relative 
importance of each type of load on group success. The general susceptibility of a group to the 
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tragedy of the commons can be calculated from the tragedy load 𝑇 = 𝑏/4𝑐. This gives a 
measure of how susceptible a public good is to a tragedy of the commons in the sense of 
deviations from optimal fitness caused by the inherent costs and benefits of the group (i.e. 
motivational conflict), rather than by escalatory conflict. Importantly however, a high value 
of T doesn’t necessarily imply a severe tragedy of the commons, as the full load could be large 
even when T is small (due to conflict). Therefore, we examine the conditions where we expect 
escalatory conflict to have the greatest impact, as these may be the situations where we expect 
the most benefit to selfish individuals of overcoming the constraints and gaining the 
information required to express their conflicting fitness interests. 
For any combination of b and c we can calculate the optimal strategies of self-
interested investment according to a simple Hamilton’s rule (eqn. 5) and the ESS (eqn. 6), 
allowing a calculation of the fitness of groups investing optimally (𝜔𝜃), according only to 
their own relatedness (𝜔𝐻𝑅) or according to the ESS with respect to the expected behaviour 
of others (𝜔𝐸𝑆𝑆). This can then be used to calculate the full load in the system, and what 
proportion of it is caused by true conflict load versus simply the benefits not being worth the 
cost (tragedy load). We find that as the benefit of a public good increases, the proportion of 
load that is due to conflict increases (Figure S1). Further, as the cost of a public good increases, 
the proportion of load that is due to conflict decreases (Figure S2). Considering these factors 
together, as the strength of selection on a public good (= 𝑏𝑐) increases, the amount of load 
that is due to conflict increases (Figure S3). This is partly due to the fact that as the strength 
of selection increase, the ‘battleground’ region of conflict increases in size (Figure 3). When 
there is only weak selection, all parties can ‘agree’ on who will contribute and who won’t 
across a large range of the relative relatedness of players. When selection is strong however, 
much of the relatedness game-space is driven by conflict where players motivation to invest 





Supplementary Figure 1: Magnitude of Tragedy (A) conflict (B) and full (C) loads on group success 
as the benefit of contributions increases. Colour shows the magnitude of the benefit, with red 
representing low benefit, and blue high benefit. Panel (D) shows the proportion of full load that is 






Supplementary Figure 2: Magnitude of Tragedy (A) conflict (B) and full (C) loads on group success 
as the cost of contributions increases. Colour shows the magnitude of the cost, with red representing 






Supplementary Figure 3: Magnitude of Tragedy (A) conflict (B) and full (C) loads on group success 
as the strength of selection on public goods increases. Colour shows the magnitude of selection, with 
red representing low selection, and blue strong selection. Panel (D) shows the proportion of full load 






We note that a simple Hamilton’s rule won’t capture conflict load, because it cannot 
capture the de-incentivisation to invest that arises when another player makes an investment. 
That is not to say that Hamilton’s rule is wrong, as a marginal Hamilton’s rule (Taylor & 
Frank, 1996) with costs and benefits defined dynamically according to the costs and benefits 
of investment given a player’s relatedness to the group and the investments of others would 
still produce the correct answer. Instead, we are highlighting that the distinction between the 
simple rule and the rule incorporating the strategies of others can be used to define where 














































In the main text, I argue for a perspective on conflict in public goods that includes the 
important conflict caused by disagreement over who will pay the cost of a mutually beneficial 
joint phenotype. Further, I argue that a ‘cheater avoidance’ perspective on public goods masks 
this form of conflict, at least in some biological systems. I also touch on issues with the 
‘conflict over what is conflict’, highlighting some of the divides between different schools of 
thought about what conflict truly is, and why anyone should care.  
In this commentary I will first discuss how my perspective on conflict fits in with 
simpler models of cooperation (namely those built on the Prisoners Dilemma and Snowdrift 
game) which apply to some biological scenarios. Furthermore, I discuss the issues that arise 
around how conflict is viewed with respect to two conflict scenarios – the ‘Mother’s curse’ of 
mitochondrial conflict, and meiotic drive in lemmings. Finally, I briefly discuss the 
disagreement that arises over the use of metaphors such as conflict in evolutionary biology. 
 
Conflict in simple matrix games 
In the main text I present an analysis of conflict using the Collective Investment game 
as the theoretical framework to underpin the analysis. The Collective Investment game was 
used throughout this thesis as the basis for work modelling cooperation in Dictyostelium 
discoideum in particular, with potential use in a broad range of other public goods in nature. 
We chose this model for our analysis of conflict for its relative simplicity, easy relation to a 
simple Hamilton’s rule governing when to invest, and proven ability to make accurate 
quantitative predictions of contributions to public goods in nature (Madgwick et al., 2018). 
However, there are of course many other models of the public goods dilemma (Frank, 1998; 
Dionisio & Gordo, 2006; Kümmerli & Ross-Gillespie, 2014). Here, I analyse how the 
perspective on conflict that I produced works with much simpler models of public goods - in 
particular those for which cooperation or defection is a binary choice. These general models 




Simple matrix games 
The simplest form of game for social interactions is those between two players, each 
of whom can chose to either cooperate (C) or defect (D). The games which have received the 
most attention are the Prisoners Dilemma and Snowdrift game (reviewed in Doebeli & Hauert, 
2005) with the payoffs shown below: 
 
Snowdrift Game C D 
C 2, 2 1, 3 
D 3, 1 0, 0 
 
The two games are distinguished by the order of the payoffs:  
Prisoner’s Dilemma: DC > CC > DD > CD 
Snowdrift game: DC > CC > CD > DD 
Where ‘DC’ is the payoff for a Defector against a Cooperator, ‘CC’ for a Cooperator against 
a Defector, ‘CD’ is the payoff for a Cooperator against a Defector, and ‘DD’ is the payoff for 
a Defector against a Defector. We use a special form of the Prisoners Dilemma (from Axelrod 
& Hamilton, 1981) such that DC < 2CC, meaning that a pair of cooperators does better on 
average than a defector and a cooperator (which isn’t the case in many versions of the 
Prisoners Dilemma, but is important to make the game more realistic). In the Prisoners 
Dilemma, a focal player is better defecting regardless of the strategy of the other player 
(DD>CD & DC>CC), so the ESS is for both players to defect. In contrast, in the Snowdrift 
Prisoner’s Dilemma C D 
C 3, 3 0, 5 
D 5, 0 1, 1 
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game a player does best by defecting if the other player cooperates, but cooperating if the 
other player defects DC>CC & CD>DD.  
 
Additive and multiplicative games 
A simple matrix game like those presented above can be defined in terms of costs and 
benefits (rather than fixed numerical payoffs). There are two differing approaches to this, 
which relate to how the model that forms the basis of the thesis is presented. One approach is 
to use an additive game as shown below; 
An alternative approach is to use a multiplicative game (similar to the ‘Collective Investment 
game’) where costs and benefits trade-off against each other. Such an approach is favoured by 




These two games are likely to have different dynamics-  in particular in relation to how optimal 





Additive game C D 
C 2𝑏 − 𝑐, 2𝑏 − 𝑐 𝑏 − 𝑐, 𝑏 
D 𝑏, 𝑏 − 𝑐 0, 0 
   
Multiplicative game C D 
C (1 + 2𝑏)(1 − 𝑐), (1 + 2𝑏)(1 − 𝑐) (1 + 𝑏)(1 − 𝑐), 1 + 𝑏 
D 1 + 𝑏, (1 + 𝑏)(1 − 𝑐) 1, 1 
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Games with relatedness 
Simple matrix games such as those presented here are usually independent of 
relatedness, in that two players are essentially assumed to have the same relatedness to the 
group. This manifests as the payoffs being symmetrical in that the payoff to player one of 
defecting if player two cooperates is the same as that for player two defecting if player one 
cooperates. This of course won’t be the case if players can vary in relatedness. For both of 
these games we can add relatedness using variables 𝑟𝑖 and 𝑟𝑗 for a pair of players (𝑟𝑖 + 𝑟𝑗 = 1) 
that define relatedness to the group, such that if player i contributes to the group, the benefit 
will be scaled by 𝑟𝑖. The resulting games are shown below, with respect to the payoff that a 
focal player receives; 
 
Two types of load 
 In the main text we define two types of conflict ‘load’ that groups may suffer. First, 
there is ‘tragedy load’ which occurs when players have no motivation to contribute to public 
goods, demonstrated from the Collective Investment game as occurring when a simple 
Hamilton’s rule (𝑟𝑏 − 𝑐 > 0) is not satisfied – and players aren’t cooperating simply because 
the benefits aren’t worth the costs. Second, there is ‘conflict load’ which occurs when 
Hamilton’s rule is satisfied and a player does have incentive to cooperate, but does better by 
defecting because of the cooperative behaviour of the other player. In these simple games, 
Additive game C D 
C 𝑏 − 𝑐 𝑟𝑖𝑏 − 𝑐 
D 𝑟𝑗𝑏 0 
   
Multiplicative game C D 
C (1 + 𝑏)(1 − 𝑐) (1 + 𝑟𝑖𝑏)(1 − 𝑐) 
D 1 + 𝑟𝑗𝑏 1 
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tragedy load occurs whenever CD > DD, and conflict load occurs whenever CD > DD & DC 
> CC. In these simple games with variation in relatedness, conflict load translates to a scenario 
where a player has motivation to invest based on their own relatedness to the group, and the 
benefits that can be accrued from an individuals own cooperation, but they may still defect 
due to the cooperation of others generating selection to defect. This effect is likely to be a key 
aspect of the tragedy of the commons (see Chapters 2 & 3). 
 
Load in additive and multiplicative games 
In the additive game, the link to a simple Hamilton’s rule is clear – an individual is 
motivated to cooperate when CD > DD, which occurs whenever 𝑟𝑖𝑏 − 𝑐 > 0. In this way, 
tragedy load can occur whenever Hamilton’s rule is not satisfied for both players. However, 
if Hamilton’s rule is satisfied (CD > DD) then it necessarily follows that cooperation is the 
best strategy for the player in all scenarios (CC > DC) because if 𝑟𝑖𝑏 − 𝑐 > 0 then 𝑏 − 𝑐 is 
always > 𝑟𝑗𝑏. Because of this aspect, conflict load is impossible in the additive game (Figure 
1). In simple terms, additive games are incapable of leading to conflict, because there is a hard 
threshold below which cooperation is never favoured, and above which cooperation is always 
favoured – there is no region where cooperation is favoured, but defection is the best strategy 














Figure 1: Strategies and conflict in an additive game where players vary in relatedness and can choose to 
cooperate (C) or defect (D). (A) shows the optimal strategy for a focal player (green) and social partner 
(orange) in terms of whether to cooperate or defect at a given relatedness. The threshold between C and D 
shows the point at which Hamilton’s rule is satisfied and it becomes better to cooperate with a defecting 
social partner than defect on that partner (CD>DD) which also means that it is always better to cooperate 
(CC>DC). (B) shows the resulting group investment (cooperation of each player weighted by their 
relatedness) of a pair of players investing according to the optimal strategy of relatedness-dependant 
cooperation. (C) shows tragedy load (red) and conflict load (blue) for the group. Tragedy load occurs when 
players lack motivation to contribute to the group (DD>CD), and conflict load occurs when players have 
motivation to contribute to the group, but do better by defecting on their social partner (CD>DD & DC>CC). 
In the additive game, conflict load (blue) never occurs. Data is shown for the case where 𝑏 = 1 and 𝑐 = 0.5. 
 
In the multiplicative game, the link to a simple Hamilton’s rule is less clear (at least 
in this simple matrix form), but we can still define the conditions under which a player is 
motivated to contribute (and tragedy load will be avoided: CD > DD); 
𝑟𝑖𝑏 − 𝑐 − 𝑟𝑏𝑐 > 0.  
We can similarly define the conditions under which a player will be better defecting on a 
cooperator than defecting on a cooperator (DC > CC);  
𝑟𝑖𝑏 − 𝑐 < 𝑏𝑐 
We can combine these conditions to define the region in which conflict will occur, which is 
when CD > DD & DC > CC; 
178 
 
𝑟𝑏𝑐 < 𝑟𝑖𝑏 − 𝑐 < 𝑏𝑐 
It is clear therefore that conflict load is a possibility in the multiplicative game – as there will 
be parameter combinations for which 𝑟𝑏 − 𝑐 falls between bc, and 𝑏𝑐 multiplied by 𝑟 - and 
we can define the region of cost/benefit space where it occurs for a given relatedness of a focal 
player. Interestingly, whilst both tragedy load and conflict can occur in the multiplicative 
game, they never occur simultaneously (as they do in the Collective Investment game). This 
is because in the region in which conflict occurs, Hamilton’s rule is necessarily satisfied, and 
no tragedy load occurs (Figure 2). The reason for this is that in binary choice games, if 
Hamilton’s rule is satisfied then cooperation occurs at its maximal (and only) level 
(‘cooperate’), whereas in more complex games Hamilton’s rule simply defines the threshold 
at which some (i.e. >0) level of cooperation occurs, which may be substantially less than the 
















Figure 2: Strategies and conflict in a multiplicative game where players vary in relatedness and can choose 
to cooperate (C) or defect (D). (A) shows the optimal (ESS) strategy for a focal player (solid green line) and 
social partner (solid orange line) in terms of whether to cooperate or defect at a given relatedness. The dashed 
lines show the threshold between C and D in terms of when Hamilton’s rule is satisfied and it becomes better 
to cooperate with a defecting social partner than defect on that partner (CD>DD). This is however not the 
ESS, because there is a region where although Hamilton’s rule is satisfied and a focal player should 
cooperate against a defector (CD>DD), the best strategy is to defect if the other player cooperates (DC>CC) 
– leading to a higher threshold for cooperation to be favoured. (B) the dark blue line shows the resulting 
group investment (cooperation of each player weighted by their relatedness) of a pair of players investing 
according to the optimal strategy of relatedness-dependant cooperation. The light blue line shows group 
investment when both players invest only according to whether Hamilton’s rule is satisfied. (C) shows 
tragedy load (red) and conflict load (blue) for the group. Tragedy load occurs when players lack motivation 
to contribute to the group (DD>CD), and conflict load occurs when players have motivation to contribute to 
the group, but do better by defecting on their social partner (CD>DD & DC>CC). In the multiplicative game, 
both tragedy and conflict loads occur – but never simultaneously. This is because in the binary (cooperate 
or defect) games conflict load can only occur when Hamilton’s rule is satisfied – and hence where there is 
no tragedy load. Data is shown for the case where 𝑏 = 1 and 𝑐 = 0.5. 
In summary, the simple games presented here capture all of the elements of the more 
complex Collective Investment game, but not the details and nuance allowing tragedy and 
conflict load to coexist. From this, we can conclude that biological scenarios that are 
constrained to binary choices (e.g. do I help or not help this individual – with no quantitative 
variation in help) likely experience different types and magnitude of conflict. Furthermore, 
whilst simple matrix games are useful in understanding the mechanics of a model and its 
underlying properties, they can lack the ability to recreate some interesting effects that are 
likely to be widely important in nature. 
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Mother’s curse: conflict and constraints 
In most sexually reproducing organisms mitochondrial DNA is solely maternally 
inherited, meaning that mutations that are harmful to males are selectively neutral (Frank & 
Hurst, 1996), or even positively selected if they are beneficial to females (Beekman et al., 
2014). This ‘Mother’s curse’ (Gemmell et al., 2004) can have substantial negative impacts on 
males (Chase, 2007; Clancy et al., 2011), generating selection for modification by other genes 
in the genome (Schnable & Wise, 1998; Rand et al., 2004). However, mutations that cause the 
mother’s curse have no agenda to harm males. In this way, mother’s curse mutations aren’t 
necessarily in ‘potential’ conflict (Ratnieks & Reeve, 1992) with the rest of the genome, in 
the sense that harming males gives no inclusive fitness advantage. Consequently, the mother’s 
curse doesn’t fall under the definition of intragenomic conflict preferred by some authors 
(Gardner & Úbeda, 2017) if the trait in question is ‘harming males’ (although there may be 
potential conflict over the optimal sex ratio Werren, 1998). We may therefore ‘write-off’ the 
mother’s curse as a quirk of genetics, a simple trade-off that is uninteresting to the study of 
conflict. However, if we wish to explain individual maladaptation, to which mitochondrial 
disease makes a considerable contribution (Taylor & Turnbull, 2007; Milot et al., 2017), the 
actual conflict caused by the mother’s curse is important. The mother’s curse presents a further 
problem about how we think about conflict; the concept of modification. When conflict is 
defined as occurring when the spread of one gene generates selection for the spread of a gene 
with opposing effect (Hurst et al., 1996), the gene with opposing effect is a modifier. Modifier 
theory (Leigh, 1971; Karlin & McGregor, 1974; Hartl, 1975) can then be used to assess if a 
modifier will spread. The issue that arises is what the modifier is assumed to be capable of. 
Some authors believe that true conflict only occurs in the ‘strong’ form of the Mother’s curse 
where the male-harmful trait is positively selected in females (Havird et al., 2019), whereas 
in the ‘weak’ form (i.e. where the trait is neutral in females) the gene ‘wouldn’t care’ about 
being modified. However, such an analysis assumes that a modifier can only fully (rather than 
partially) suppress the trait. If a modifier could use sex-specific effects to modify (removing 
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only the harm to males), then neither the strong or weak form would cause potential conflict. 
The issue of partial versus full modification is likely much broader than mitochondrial 
conflict, as it also arises when considering potential modification of a greenbeard gene 
(removing either just the signal, or the behaviour too).  
The trait which is being conflicted over must also be clear. Maternal inheritance 
means that whilst mitochondrial genes aren’t in conflict with the rest of the genome over help 
given to siblings, they may conflict over help given to other relatives, such as offspring of 
male siblings (who don’t share inheritance of mitochondrial DNA). Consequently, a 
mitochondrial gene may benefit from discriminating offspring of brothers from offspring of 
sisters, so that help can be withheld from the former and directed towards the latter. Again, 
constraints will be relevant here. In the example of imprinting genes, maternal- and paternal-
origin genes can be in conflict because a maternal-origin gene will have higher relatedness to 
siblings than a paternal-origin gene if multiple mating occurs (Haig, 2002). This potential 
conflict is similar to the mother’s curse in some regards, however imprinting conflict can 
become actual conflict through simple changes to the probability or magnitude of help given 
to siblings (i.e. help those in the nest with me more/less). For mitochondrial genes, it may be 
much more difficult to obtain the information required to enact conflict (the ‘recognition 
problem’ of selfish genes: Ridley, 2000). The recognition problem could however be avoided 
if there is sex-biased dispersal, such that indiscriminate helping will provide benefits to the 
‘right’ recipients (due to the assortment created by biased dispersal). In this way, the biology 
of the system is important in determining what constraints should be assumed. Regardless of 
the possibility for potential conflict however, it seems likely that much of the costs of the 
mother’s curse to males occurs without ‘potential’ conflict, making such a definition too 





Modification in Lemmings 
 Lessons about the unpredictable nature of conflict may be learned from a pair of 
interesting examples in rodents. The wood lemming Myopus schisticolor has a large deletion 
on the X chromosome termed X* (Fredga et al., 1976; Liu et al., 1998) which turns X*Y 
males into females. A similar effect occurs in the Arctic lemming Dicrostonyx torquatus 
(Gileva, 1987). When these mutations first arose, it seems most likely that X*Y females 
produced mostly X* eggs, and a few Y eggs (in accordance with similar systems in mice; 
Sakurada et al., 1994). Such incomplete meiotic drive of the X* chromosome causes fertility 
issues (YY pairings are possible, and will fail), and therefore causes conflict with the rest of 
the genome. There are several possible evolutionary responses to this. A modifier could arise 
on the Y chromosome to supress the effect, such that X*Y* individuals developed normally 
as males. Alternatively, a modifier with the same effect could arise on the autosomes (Hurst 
et al., 1996). The two species appear however to have taken different routes to modification. 
In the wood lemming, X*Y females produce exclusively X* eggs (Winking et al., 1981). As 
such, the meiotic drive is now stronger. Whilst this solves the fertility issue (caused by YY 
pairings), it also generates new conflict over the sex ratio, as the population will now be 
heavily female-biased. In Arctic lemmings, the response appears to have been compensatory 
meiotic drive on the Y chromosome, causing males to produce significantly more Y gametes 
than expected (Gileva, 1987), partially compensating for the lack of males caused by X*Y 
turning males into females (Bulmer, 1988). Could we predict a priori which route would be 
taken? It seems that this example highlights the importance of stochasticity in responses to 
conflict, but there are some lessons that can be learned about how the genetics and biology of 
the system are important. On the face of it, it seemed that a modifier on the Y chromosome 
was the likely response (Maynard Smith & Stenseth, 1978), however given that the Y is 




Conflict as a metaphor 
Evolutionary biology makes rich use of metaphors, and has borrowed heavily from 
everyday phrases to describe the behaviour of species across the diversity of life. In the field 
of social evolution, terms such as altruism, cheating, spite, and selfishness are used as standard 
terminology (West et al., 2007a). Whilst parts of this program has been criticised for language 
implying intent (Bronstein, 2001), others have argued that natural selection gives rise to 
adaptation and the appearance of design, justifying the use of such intentional language (Ghoul 
et al., 2014). Problems can however occur when words have broad meaning that is open to 
(mis)interpretation. Conflict is one example in particular where confusion can occur. In 
general terms, conflict is often used as a synonym for disagreement. With this in mind, it is 
possible to extend the idea of conflict in biology to all kinds of ends, such as to the 
‘disagreement’ of a predator and a prey over whether the predator will consume the prey 
(Queller & Strassmann, 2018). We must however question the utility of any chosen approach, 
and consider any pitfalls in opportunities for misinterpretation and hiding of biological details 
that the metaphor creates (Olson et al., 2019). In our approach, we are focussing on 
maladaptation, a tragedy of the commons caused by selection on individuals. In this sense, we 
are referring to conflicts of interest at one level that may cause maladaptation at another level, 
in line with how the term is used in the intragenomic literature (Hurst et al., 1996; Werren, 
1998; Rice, 2013; Gardner & Úbeda, 2017). Of course there is much room for disagreement 
and alternative use of concepts, much of which ultimately comes down to different 
perspectives or questions that researchers are trying to answer. As someone who is interested 
in why groups can end up in their ‘defective’ rather than ‘cooperative’ equilibrium (i.e. a 
tragedy of the commons), I prefer a pragmatic approach to conflict that includes both the clear 
differences of inclusive-fitness interests, as well as the constraints and trade-offs that causes 




A large part of my perspective focuses on the important distinction between potential 
and actual conflict, and highlighting the need to consider each system on within its own 
genetics and biology to make assumptions about what constraints are likely and possible. 
Throughout this thesis, constraints on information have been a key theme, as indeed they are 
in explaining why potential conflicts don’t manifest as actual conflicts throughout nature. In 
general, we may expect microbes to suffer more form this constraint, due to the inability to 
use visual and olfactory cues to assess relatedness. However, there are many ways that 
microbes can detect relatedness, often through greenbeards, of which there has been a recent 
explosion in empirical discoveries. Greenbeards are different to kin recognition in that they 
cause individuals to act based on relatedness at one locus only, rather than according to the 
average across the genome. In this way, greenbeards provide more information about allele 
sharing that kin recognition does. Indeed, evidence from my own study species D. discoideum 
suggests that a greenbeard, the tgr locus, likely plays a role in the information strains are able 
to acquire. However, there seems to be a discord between theory and empirics about what the 
greenbeard concept is, and how we expected greenbeard genes to evolve, with most 
empiricists viewing them as analogous to single-locus genetic kin recognition. Importantly, 
the study that described tgr in D. discoideum  as a greenbeard found that the social behaviour 
in question, segregation, correlated strongly with variation at the tgr locus, but not the genome 
as a whole (Gruenheit et al., 2017). Further, we would expect greenbeards to evolve different 
from kin recognition, particularly in relation to potential conflict with the rest of the genome. 
Given the confusion of the greenbeard concept, and its likely importance in governing the 
strategic cooperation I was observing in the previous chapters, we decided to write a 
perspective piece to try and bring clarity to the idea, and guide future research away from the 
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to the paper  
The idea to write a manuscript about the development of the greenbeard concept, 
particularly in light of a surge in empirical interest in the concept, was devised by 
LJB and PGM. The focussed idea to present an argument in favour of disposing 
of Dawkins’ formulation to re-focus empirical work was drafted into a proposal 
by PGM and JBW, with comments from LJB. 
 
The review of the theory of greenbeards that forms the basis of the ‘From thought 
experiment to real gene’ section was conducted by PGM and LJB, including the 
content detailed in Table 1 about the proposed reasons for greenbeards not 
existing. Our argument for the important underlying principle of greenbeards 
(presented in the ‘fundamental principle in the greenbeard concept’ section) was 
devised by LJB and PGM. 
 
The ideas for how empiricists could present evidence that a greenbeard gene is 
genuinely acting as a greenbeard (‘Evidence that a gene is a greenbeard’) were 
devised by LJB and PGM. The review of the empirical literature on proposed 
greenbeard gene examples (presented in the ‘Preliinary findings’ section and 
Table 2) was conducted jointly by PGM and LJB. The ‘concluding remarks’ 
section (including the list of outstanding questions) was devised by PGM and LJB. 
 
For all sections, the original draft was produced largely by PGM and LJB, and 
revised and edited by JBW. Both figures are inspired by similar figures from other 




This paper reports on original research I conducted during the period of my Higher 












Greenbeard genes: theory and reality 
Authors: Philip G. Madgwick1, Laurence J. Belcher1, and Jason B. Wolf1 
Affiliations: 1Milner Centre for Evolution and Department of Biology & Biochemistry, 




Abstract: Greenbeard genes were proposed as a cartoonish thought experiment to explain 
why altruism can be a selfish strategy from the perspective of genes. The likelihood of finding 
a real greenbeard gene in nature was thought to be remote because they were believed to 
require a set of improbable properties. Yet, despite this expectation, there is an ongoing 
explosion in claimed discoveries of greenbeard genes. Bringing together the latest theory and 
experimental findings, we argue that there is a need to dispose of the cartoon presentation of 
a greenbeard to refocus their burgeoning empirical study on the more fundamental concept 
that the thought experiment was designed to illustrate. 
 
Highlights 
• The greenbeard concept was conceived to illustrate why genes are always 
fundamentally ‘selfish’, rather than to provide empirically-testable predictions about 
the properties of real genes underlying social behaviours.   
• Despite their apparent implausibility in nature, in recent years there has been an 
explosion of claimed examples of greenbeard genes.  
• The theory of greenbeard genes has largely recognised the underlying principle that 
the concept set out to explain, whilst the empirical study of greenbeards has been 
constrained by inessential features of its cartoonish presentation. 
• Kin selection and the greenbeard effect are alternative explanations for the evolution 
of a social behaviour, which can be experimentally distinguished with appropriate 
evidence.  
• Experimental findings of how greenbeard genes function and evolve both inform and 




From thought experiment to real gene 
To help readers understand why altruism (see Glossary) is selfish from the 
perspective of genes, Dawkins (1976) reformulated a thought experiment originally devised 
by Hamilton (1964b), where a gene is able to produce a signal (like a ‘green beard’), identify 
that signal in others, and respond by being altruistic towards those individuals. By directing 
altruism towards individuals that contain copies of itself, these ‘greenbeard’ genes benefit 
their own replication, even if paying the cost of such altruism harms the success of other genes 
in the same genome. The fanciful nature of Dawkins’ cartoon scenario caught the imagination 
of evolutionary biologists, but greenbeard genes were thought to require a series of special 
properties that render them biologically unrealistic, or at least highly unlikely to be detected 
(see Table 1) (Dawkins, 1979, 1982; Grafen, 1984, 2006a; Crozier, 1986; Hamilton, 2001; 
West & Gardner, 2013). 
Despite appearing fantastical, in recent years there has been an explosion in claimed 
discoveries of greenbeard genes (Keller & Ross, 1998; Queller et al., 2003; Smukalla et al., 
2008; Pathak et al., 2013; Heller et al., 2016; Gruenheit et al., 2017), as well as the 
reinterpretation of known genes as greenbeards (Ridley & Grafen, 1981; Haig, 1996, 2013; 
Gardner & West, 2010; Unterweger & Griffin, 2016; Danka et al., 2017; Gruenheit et al., 
2017). This explosion coincides with the application of new methodologies from molecular 
biology to understand the evolution of social behaviour, especially in focusing on cellular 
interactions and social behaviours in microbes (Haig, 1996; West et al., 2006; Foster, 2009). 
With such new focus and techniques, recent studies have found evidence that real genes can 
exhibit the properties that Dawkins identified (i.e. signal, receiver, altruism). However, the 
scope of these empirical advances has often been impeded by researchers losing sight of the 
fact that these properties were never intended to represent a rigid set of ‘necessary and 
sufficient’ criteria for the greenbeard effect (Dawkins, 1979, 1982). Rather, they were 
presented in this abstract way to provide a simple and intuitive illustration of the fundamental 
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phenomenon of genes manipulating a social behaviour to suit their own self-interest (Dawkins, 
1976, 1982). This disconnect has led to confusion about how to apply the greenbeard thought 
experiment to nature (e.g. what constitutes evidence), and ultimately how to convert its 
abstract logic into a useful concept for empirical research. 
In contrast to empirical applications, work on the theoretical side has largely 
recognised the underlying logic of the fundamental principle that Hamilton (1964b) identified 
and Dawkins (1976) set out to explain (Hamilton, 1964b, 1972, 1975; Ridley & Grafen, 1981; 
Queller, 2011; Grafen, 1984, 1985; Queller, 1984, 2002; Biernaskie et al., 2011, 2013; 
Marshall, 2015). Therefore, while empirical work has been constrained by Dawkins’ 
cartoonish setup of the greenbeard thought experiment, theory has continued to expand 
applications of Hamilton’s concept to understand its role in broader evolutionary phenomena. 
In the process, theoretical advances have shifted expectations about when and where 
greenbeard genes can arise, how they evolve, and the kinds of situations that can favour their 
evolution. These advances have even applied the greenbeard concept to shed light on 
seemingly disparate evolutionary problems (e.g. habitat choice (Dawkins, 1979; Pepper & 
Smuts, 2002), Müllerian mimicry (Guilford, 1985, 1988), interspecific mutualism (Frank, 
1994; Quickfall & Marshall, 2017), sexual selection; Moore et al., 2002; Faria et al., 2018). 
Despite the continued empirical pursuit of greenbeard genes in nature and the 
concurrent development of related theory, there continues to be a disconnect between the two 
which hinders progress on both sides. Empirical researchers are still often focused on seeking 
evidence for the presentation of the greenbeard concept as laid out by Dawkins (1976). 
Theoretical research often operates at a level of abstraction that provides limited grounding in 
natural systems. Here, making use of recent advances from empirics and theory, we argue that 
there is a timely need to completely dispose of the cartoon illustration of a greenbeard 
presented by Dawkins in order to refocus empirical research on the more fundamental concept 
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originally laid out by Hamilton (1964b), and to guide the further development of greenbeard 
theory towards models that make predictions that can be tested in empirical research.  
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Table 1. Arguments for why greenbeards are unlikely to be found in nature.  
Argument  For Against 
 
Existential arguments: why greenbeards are unlikely to evolve in the first place 
 
Far-fetched 




Greenbeards require three distinct 
functions (Hamilton, 1964b; Dawkins, 
1976, 1982). Such pleiotropy seems 
highly unlikely because it requires a 
single locus – whether being a single 
gene or multiple linked genes – to gain 
access to the right information and, at 
the same time, have the ability to 
modulate a social behaviour (Dawkins, 
1976, 1982; Gardner & West, 2010). 
 
Some types of genes can encode 
proteins with the three functions (e.g. 
genes for cell surface receptors) (Haig, 
1996, 2013) or multiple genes can form 
a greenbeard locus by linkage. But, a 
locus does not need to directly ‘encode’ 
those three functions to be a greenbeard 
(e.g. it could regulate rather than 
produce the social behaviour)  
(Hamilton, 1975; Haig, 1996; Pepper & 





Greenbeards require a relatively 
deterministic mapping between the 
genotype and phenotype (West et al., 
2007b; Zhang & Chen, 2016), which is 
not found in many species, especially 
not among vertebrates where 
development introduces significant 
environmental variation into organisms’ 
phenotypes (which is liable to provide 
information for kin recognition via the 
‘armpit effect’) (Dawkins, 1982; 
Hamilton, 2001; West et al., 2007b). 
 
The strongest evidence for genes 
evolving under the greenbeard effect 
comes from microbes that have a simple 
relationship between genotype and 
phenotype (Gardner & West, 2010). 
However, we might also expect 
greenbeards in ‘complex’ multicellular 
organisms, governing molecular-level 
interactions (rather than behaviours that 
are controlled by the central nervous 
system), which can make the genotype-
phenotype relationship simpler (Haig, 
1996, 2013; Springer et al., 2011). 
  
 







Greenbeards are likely to evolve under 
strong selection, leading a greenbeard 
allele to rapidly spread to fixation 
(Dawkins, 1982; Crozier, 1986). Once at 
fixation, the allele is no longer 
detectable as a greenbeard because it 
would not exhibit a conditional social 
behaviour (Dawkins, 1982; Queller et 
al., 2003; Gardner & West, 2010; 
Biernaskie et al., 2013). 
 
There can be genetic constraints that 
prevent a single greenbeard allele from 
reaching fixation, like homozygote 
lethality (e.g. Gp-9) (Hurst & McVean, 
1998; Keller & Ross, 1998; Hamilton, 
2001) or, more commonly, a rare-type 
advantage (Grafen, 1990; Jansen & van 
Baalen, 2006; Biernaskie et al., 2013; 






When greenbeards are involved in costly 
social behaviours that reduce individual 
fitness, a modifier allele at another locus 
could benefit from silencing the 
expression of a greenbeard (Dawkins, 
1982; Rothstein & Barash, 1983; 
Alexander & Bargia, 2003). If 
greenbeard genes were not modified, 
they might rapidly accumulate and – 
owing to their deleterious effects on 
individual fitness – drive their host-
species to extinction (Hamilton, 2001). 
Although silencing a greenbeard gene 
can sometimes benefit a modifier, this 
may not be possible due to pleiotropic 
constraints (i.e. essential functions). 
Some greenbeard genes can provide a 
net benefit to the individuals that carry 
them, potentially making them immune 
to modification (Ridley & Grafen, 
1981). After-all, a greenbeard is selected 
because its benefits outweigh its costs, 
so greenbeards are unlikely to cause 
host-species extinction (Pepper & 
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 Smuts, 2002; Gardner & West, 2010; 
Biernaskie et al., 2011). 
 
 






The association between the signal-
receiver and behaviour functions of the 
greenbeard is liable to be disrupted by 
partial modification by genes at other 
loci, recombination (if the greenbeard is 
formed by linked genes), or mutation to 
knock-out the behaviour function, 
which can produce ‘falsebeards’ that 
possess the greenbeard signal but do not 
engage in a social behaviour. Because 
the social behaviour is expected to be 
costly, falsebeards can cheat 
greenbeards and drive them extinct 
(Dawkins, 1976, 1982; Ridley & 
Grafen, 1981; West et al., 2007b; 
Gardner & West, 2010; Biernaskie et al., 
2011, 2013).   
  
In some systems, falsebeards may not be 
able to evolve due to the signal-receiver 
directly causing the social behaviour 
(Haig, 1996). When falsebeards can 
evolve, greenbeards can persist by rare-
type advantage, which leads to signal-
receiver polymorphism (‘beard colour’ 
variants) (Grafen, 1990; Jansen & van 
Baalen, 2006; Biernaskie et al., 2013; 
Krupp & Taylor, 2015). Such signal-
receiver polymorphism reduces the 
advantage of being a falsebeard, which 
can lead to their extinction (or non-
invasion) or a mixed equilibrium with 
greenbeards and falsebeards (Grafen, 






Many types of greenbeards have 
frequency-dependent invasion 
conditions (see Box 1). The benefits of 
being a greenbeard only arise once a 
greenbeard allele’s frequency is above a 
critical threshold, because the social 
behaviour is otherwise too costly 
(Grafen, 2006a; Jansen & van Baalen, 
2006; Gardner & West, 2010; 
Biernaskie et al., 2011, 2013).  
 
This problem affects greenbeards of all 
types except facultative-helping because 
all other types of greenbeard express 
their costly social behaviour when rare, 
which can also be accentuated by higher 
signal costliness (‘beard cost’) (Gardner 
& West, 2010; Biernaskie et al., 2011, 
2013). Population structure can alleviate 
this condition by giving new mutants 
locally higher frequency (Gardner & 
West, 2010; Faria et al., 2018).   
 
† Falsebeard-driven extinction is the primary reason why greenbeards have not been expected to be 
found in nature since the greenbeard thought experiment was originally conceived.  
The fundamental principle in the greenbeard concept  
Dawkins’ (1976) presentation of the greenbeard thought experiment was a simple 
illustration of Hamilton’s (1964b) more general scenario, and so many of the features of 
cartoonish presentation are inessential. In the general scenario, a greenbeard gene enhances 
its fitness by modulating the targeted recipients of a social behaviour via an ‘assortment 
factor’ (Pepper & Smuts, 2002), which indicates (or is at least associated with) the presence 
or absence of the gene within social partners. For example, the greenbeard could create the 
assortment factor, such as a ‘green beard’ phenotype, and cause individuals to behave 
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altruistically in response to its presence. But, a greenbeard gene need not create the assortment 
factor, it only needs to respond toward it (Hamilton, 1975; Dawkins, 1979). For example, the 
greenbeard could cause individuals to follow a scent to a particular flower species and then 
act altruistically to those that are on that flower. In this case, the assortment factor would be 
the act of following that flowers’ scent, which increases the likelihood that the recipients of 
the altruistic behaviour share the greenbeard gene. In this way, Dawkins’ (1976) presentation 
of the greenbeard thought experiment is but one of the ways which a greenbeard can enhance 
its own fitness (see Box 1 for further details). 
 The greenbeard effect is conceptually analogous to other related, but fundamentally 
different, forms of selection. Hence it is important that we distinguish the properties that make 
greenbeard genes different from genes shaped by these other forms of selection. Most 
critically are kin-selected genes, which, like greenbeard genes, also increase their own fitness 
by modulating the recipients of social behaviour (Hamilton, 1964b; Grafen, 1985; Frank, 
1998). However, despite their conceptual similarity, the two types of genes give rise to 
fundamentally different fitness effects, reflecting the key differences in the process driving 
their evolution. Kin selection relies upon the individuals being affected by the social 
behaviour sharing the causal gene with the actor due to common ancestry (Dawkins, 1982; 
Grafen, 1985; Frank, 1998; West & Gardner, 2013). But common ancestry does not ensure 
that individuals share an allele at a particular locus, it only means that individuals have some 
increased probability of sharing alleles at any locus in the genome (which is determined by 
the degree of relatedness). In contrast, greenbeard genes utilise an assortment factor that 
specifically changes the probability of sharing an allele at the greenbeard locus. Hence, we 
would expect to see elevated relatedness of interactants at the greenbeard locus, while all other 
loci would show the background level of relatedness (determined by the ancestral relationship 
of the individuals). Thus, a greenbeard gene can enhance its own fitness in excess of the other 
genes in the rest of the genome, whilst a kin-selected gene enhances its own fitness alongside 
the other genes in the rest of the genome. In this way, the greenbeard effect is a form of ‘kind 
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selection’ (Queller, 2011), which clarifies that a greenbeard (unlike a kin-selected gene) is a 
selfish genetic element. Like other kind-selected (e.g. meiotic drive) genes, a greenbeard can 
generate genetic conflict with other loci elsewhere in the genome (Biernaskie et al., 2011; 
Gardner & Úbeda, 2017). However, a greenbeard differs from other selfish genetic elements 
by enhancing its fitness using an interaction between individuals (i.e. social behaviour) rather 
than within an individual (e.g. gamete killing). This difference can have important 
ramifications for how gene conflict plays out (Ridley & Grafen, 1981; Gardner & West, 2010; 
Biernaskie et al., 2011), and therefore it is important to differentiate greenbeards from other 
types of selfish genetic element. Thus, when contrasted with other related phenomena (kin 
selection and other forms of kind selection), the critical feature of the greenbeard concept is 
that a gene is selected because it manipulates a social behaviour to enhance its own fitness in 
excess of other genes in the rest of the genome. 
In empirical studies, the distinction between greenbeards and kin-selected genes has 
historically been ignored because greenbeards were dismissed as biologically unrealistic. 
Consequently, studies have tended to focus on testing whether or not a social behaviour 
evolves under individual selection or kin selection, rather than finding ways to distinguish 
between kin and kind selection. Furthermore, because of the challenges inherent in identifying 
the genes governing social behaviours, empirical research has tended to make assumptions 
like the ‘phenotypic gambit’ (Grafen, 1984) that explicitly ignore any genetic conflicts that 
could indicate a role for greenbeards. However, recent advances in molecular biology have 
enabled the first steps towards a greater understanding of the genetics behind social 





Box 1: Different types of greenbeard genes 
Greenbeards manipulate social behaviour to enhance their own fitness in excess of 
other genes in the rest of the genome using an assortment factor that ensures that they direct 
the social behaviour towards individuals dependent upon their possession of the greenbeard 
gene (Hamilton, 1964b; Grafen, 1985; Frank, 1998). The possible mechanisms by which a 
greenbeard can achieve this outcome are highly variable: using phenotypic or environmental 
assortment factors, different forms of Hamiltonian social behaviours (altruistic, mutualistic, 
selfish, and spiteful behaviours [Hamilton, 1964b]), targeting individuals with or without the 
greenbeard gene and so on. Because the possible mechanisms that greenbeards can exploit are 
so varied, greenbeards are more often grouped into types based on their associated 
evolutionary dynamics. To this end, two details of their mechanisms are critical, which in 
combination create four basic types of greenbeard (Gardner & West, 2010) (Box 1 Figure I). 
This is not to say that outside the abstract neatness of theoretical classifications real genes 
could not be intermediate types [e.g. Unterweger & Griffin 2016] – as, indeed, this is what we 
often find (see Table 2). 
Greenbeards can be helping or harming, which determines whether their associated 
social behaviour causes recipients to gain or lose fitness (Gardner & West, 2004b, 2010). A 
helping greenbeard targets a beneficial effect toward individuals with a copy of itself, and 
therefore the behaviour increases in frequency as the greenbeard allele increases in frequency 
(Box 1 Figure IA and IB). In contrast, a harming greenbeard targets a detrimental effect toward 
individuals without a copy of itself, which occurs at its maximum at intermediate frequency 
because of the balance between having a large frequency of social partners to both give and 
receive harm (Figure IC and ID). 
Greenbeards can also be facultative or obligate, depending on how actors and 
recipients engage in the social behaviour (Queller, 1984; Gardner & West, 2010). A facultative 
greenbeard only pays the cost of performing the social behaviour upon interacting with a social 
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partner that the social behaviour targets (i.e. conditional action), whilst an obligate greenbeard 
always pays the cost of performing the social behaviour, but the social partner is only affected 
by it if they are the social behaviour’s target (i.e. conditional response). Consequently, a 
facultative greenbeard pays the costs of social behaviour at the rate at which it encounters 
target social partners (Figure IA and IC), whilst an obligate greenbeard always pays a fixed 





Box 1 Figure I. The patterns of frequency-dependence for the four different types of greenbeard 
(figure redrawn from Gardner & West, 2010). The x-axis is the greenbeard allele’s frequency (0 ≤
𝑝 ≤ 1) and the y-axis corresponds to either the frequency of the greenbeard-associated social 
behaviour in the population (black) or the magnitude of the fitness effect for greenbeard carriers 
(green). For obligate greenbeards (B&D), the frequency of the behaviour equals the frequency of the 
greenbeard gene 𝑝 since the behaviour is always expressed. For facultative greenbeards (A&C), the 
frequency of the behaviour is the frequency at which greenbeard carriers interact with either other 
greenbeard carriers 𝑝2 (facultative-helping) or non-carriers 𝑝(1 − 𝑝) (facultative-harming). 
Facultative greenbeards (A&C) receive the fitness effect of the behaviour at the same frequency as 
they exhibit the behaviour, since the behaviour is only exhibited in the presence of the target 
recipients (either carriers or non-carriers). Obligate greenbeards (B&D) receive the fitness effect at 
the frequency that carriers interact with recipients, which equals 𝑝2 for helping greenbeards and 
𝑝(1 − 𝑝) for harming greenbeards. 
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Evidence that a gene is a greenbeard 
Why do we want to describe real genes as greenbeards? The greenbeard thought 
experiment, was never intended as an empirically-useful concept, but describing a gene as a 
greenbeard can be a useful working hypothesis for understanding its evolution (e.g. generating 
revealing predictions). A greenbeard is a selfish genetic element, enhancing its own fitness in 
excess of other genes in the rest of the genome, and so a greenbeard hypothesis suggests ‘who 
benefits’ from the gene’s function, which could explain or predict unusual properties. To 
demonstrate that a gene is a greenbeard, there would need to be conclusive evidence that the 
gene has evolved (or is evolving) because of its greenbeard effect. It would obviously be 
necessary to show that there are allele-specific outcomes for social interactions, but exactly 
what represents ‘conclusive evidence’ is an open question that we believe is best settled within 
the constraints of an empirical system (see also Outstanding Questions). 
We believe that all empirical systems currently fall short of ‘conclusive evidence’, but 
we propose that there is a pivotal piece of (often absent) evidence required to constructively 
hypothesise that a gene is a greenbeard. There must be evidence that the assortment factor is 
– at least, in part – independent of common ancestry (see Box 2). We consider kin selection 
to be the ‘null hypothesis’ for why a gene would modulate social behaviour, and so kind 
selection has the onus of proof. To this end, patterns associated with a candidate gene must be 
examined within natural settings, because the assortment factor may have a correlation with 
the genome-wide probability of sharing an allele in nature that is absent in artificial laboratory 
settings. For example, a gene for helping your neighbours could evolve under kin or kind 
selection depending on the cause of population structure. For kin selection, limited dispersal 
could mean that neighbours all share a common ancestor and thereby have the same 
probability of sharing any gene in the genome (Hamilton, 1964b). For kind selection, if an 
allele causes individuals to congregate in the same habitat, then neighbours would only have 
an elevated probability of sharing the greenbeard allele (Dawkins, 1979) and some 
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background level of relatedness at the rest of the genome (which will depend on various 
factors, like recombination rates and population viscosity). In a laboratory setting, the 
population structure may not mirror natural settings and consequently may incorrectly suggest 
that one or other driver is at work.   
Preliminary findings about real greenbeard genes 
Numerous greenbeard genes have been identified across a broad range of biological 
systems and modes of action (e.g. bacteriocins (Gardner & West, 2004b, 2010; Biernaskie et 
al., 2013), cell-binding proteins (Haig, 1996), contact-dependent inhibition factors 
(Unterweger & Griffin, 2016; Danka et al., 2017), quorum-sensing pherotypes (Pollak et al., 
2016; Ben-Zion et al., 2019), imprinted RNAs; Haig, 2013). However, empirical studies of 
greenbeards are still often preliminary, with few directly demonstrating that the gene has 
evolved by kind rather than kin selection in natural settings (Table 2). Nevertheless, these 
empirical studies can hint at the features of real greenbeards that are underappreciated or 
contrary to the expectations of current theory (see also Box 2).  
To understand the nature of empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis that a gene 
is a greenbeard, we can first consider a cautionary example where new data has drastically 
altered the understanding of a proposed greenbeard gene. A queen-killing phenotype was 
observed in the fire ant Solenopsis invicta, which was explained by allelic variation at the gp-
9 locus that encodes an odour-binding protein (Keller & Ross, 1998; Trible & Ross, 2015). 
The greenbeard was suggested to be facultative-harming (Hurst & McVean, 1998), but 
subsequently the gp-9 locus has been located on a social chromosome (Sb), which is a large 
linkage group (or supergene) containing over 600 genes that act as a single greenbeard locus 
(Wang et al., 2013; Pracana et al., 2017). Such linkage at a greenbeard locus doesn’t appear 
unusual; similar social chromosomes have also been discovered in other ant species (Huang 
& Wang, 2014; Purcell et al., 2014) and many other candidate greenbeard systems involve 
large linkage groups (Linksvayer et al., 2013; Thompson & Jiggins, 2014). But it does caution 
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the ascription of properties to candidate greenbeards as, for example, Sb appears responsible 
for numerous social traits other than queen killing, including polygyny (i.e. forming nests with 
multiple queens). As such, the initial characterisation of the greenbeard was incomplete 
because it did not recognise Sb’s role in both helping (polygyny) and harming (queen-killing) 
social behaviours. Consequently, out of caution, we restrict our discussion to systems where 
the putative greenbeard genes that have received the most attention, whilst accepting that all 
the findings are potentially subject to changes in evidence. 
The ever-increasing array of examples of greenbeard genes suggests that theory has 
underappreciated the relationship between allorecognition (i.e. detecting self from nonself) 
and the greenbeard effect. Although vertebrate immune genes have been discussed as 
greenbeards (Haig, 1997b), it is likely that these genes are predominantly selected for asocial 
reasons (e.g. killing parasites) that are under individual selection. However, allorecognition 
also applies to organisms that interact with conspecifics in ways that allows allorecognition 
systems to also serve a role in the genetic recognition of potential social partners, such as in 
marine invertebrates and bacterial colonies (Grafen, 1990; Crampton & Hurst, 1994). 
Examples of candidate greenbeards broadly fall into the categories of genes governing 
aggregation for a particular cooperative endeavour and fusion for longer-term cooperation 
(Table 2). Fusion often involves rejecting or killing individuals that do not possess the right 
recognition signal, whether these be migrants or mutants. Therefore, in both cases, 
greenbeards have a functional role in ‘privatising’ a group’s resources for the exclusive use of 
those that share the same greenbeard allele. Consequently, greenbeards explain why detecting 
self from nonself is useful – because avoiding interactions with social partners that are unlikely 
to cooperate (or, worse, cause harm) (Buss, 1982) enables the causal genes to help others that 
share the gene and harm those that do not. 
As examples of greenbeard genes continue to accumulate, they suggest that 
greenbeard genes often possess two apparently puzzling properties. Firstly,  examples of real 
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greenbeard genes show that they often possess multiple ‘colour’ variants, which is only 
theoretically anticipated when each colour variant has its own ‘falsebeard’ cheater (Grafen, 
1990; Biernaskie et al., 2013). In general, greenbeard genes are expected to exhibit a common-
type advantage against one another leading to monomorphism (Crozier, 1986; Grafen, 1990). 
However, there is little evidence of any falsebeard alleles in any of the current examples. This 
empirical observation raises the theoretical challenge of explaining why greenbeard colour 
polymorphism is maintained. Secondly, many of the examples of greenbeard genes involve 
multiple (most often a pair of) tightly-linked genes and, in some cases, there are multiple 
unlinked greenbeard genes involved in the conditional expression of the social behaviour. For 
example, successful outer-membrane fusion in the social bacteria Myxococcus xanthus is 
reliant upon cells having matching traA/B alleles for incipient cell fusion, but fusion only 
persists if cells have matching alleles at the unlinked sitAI locus (Vassallo et al., 2017). To the 
best of our knowledge, no theoretical analysis has ever examined the co-evolution of two or 
more greenbeard genes at different loci, presumably because one greenbeard gene was thought 
implausible enough. Overall, preliminary empirical findings suggest that theoretical work has 
yet to fully characterise the properties of greenbeard genes, and emphasises an increasing need 




Table 2. Greenbeard loci that have received the most attention in the literature, grouped by 
their mode of action in governing aggregation or fusion.  
Gene and Species Signal-Receiver † Social Behaviour ‡ 
 
Aggregation: genes governing which individuals come together 
 
csA 
Social Amoeba  
(Dictyostelium 
discoideum)  
(Queller et al., 2003) 
 
Causal monomorphic. 
The csA locus is responsible for the 
production of the gp80 protein that is 
necessary for cells to bind one another 
during streaming, which can be shown 
in the lab using knock-outs (Queller et 
al., 2003). In nature, strains do not 
show allelic variation at the csA locus, 
and so it is not clear whether or not the 
origin and maintenance of this gene is 
because of a greenbeard effect.  
 
Facultative helping. 
As adhesion itself is the social 
behaviour, there is no clear 
distinction between a ‘signal-
receiver’ and the ‘social 
behaviour’, as these two aspects 
are pleiotropic functions of the 
same physical act of cell-binding 
(Haig, 1996; Queller et al., 
2003). The csA gene does not 
control any downstream social 
behaviours like fruiting-body 
formation, though it could 
clearly influence the identity of 
social partners if it were 
polymorphic.   
 
flo1 
Budding Yeast  
(Saccharomyces 
cerevisiae)  




FLO1 is a cell membrane protein that 
binds cell wall carbohydrates 
(Smukalla et al., 2008). Variation in the 
number of 100bp repeats determines 
binding affinity, where genes with 
fewer repeats produce FLO1 proteins 
with stronger binding affinities 
(Verstrepen et al., 2005). However, this 
variation does not produce different 
beard ‘colours’. Rather, there is one 
greenbeard colour (dependent on 
whether or not cells have a function 
copy, flo1+), and various different 
‘shades of green’ that determine how 
strongly cells bind one another 
(Gruenheit et al., 2017). 
Facultative helping. 
Cells that bind together are 
protected from external stresses 
by reducing contact with the 
environment through 
aggregation (Smukalla et al., 
2008). There is no clear 
distinction between a ‘signal-
receiver’ and the ‘social 
behaviour’ itself, as these two 
functions are pleiotropic 
functions of the same physical 
act of aggregation.  
   
                  
 
Fusion: genes governing which individuals successfully merge together 
 
gp-9 (or Sb) 
Fire Ant  
(Solenopsis invicta) 
(Keller & Ross, 
1998) 
Informative polymorphic.  
The gp-9 locus produces an odour-
binding protein that, along with 9 of 24 
other odour-binding genes, are located 
on the Sb social chromosome. Sb 
contains over 600 genes, which have 
become tightly-linked into a supergene 
via chromosomal inversion (Wang et 
al., 2013; Pracana et al., 2017). 
Unsaturated cuticular hydrocarbons are 
likely to provide the signal (Trible & 
Ross, 2015). Genetic variants of the b 
allele (b′ alleles) have never been 
Facultative helping/harming. 
BB homozygote queens are killed 
by b-carrying workers, but bb 
queens die prematurely for 
developmental reasons, leading 
to stable behavioural variation 
(Keller & Ross, 1998; Trible & 
Ross, 2015). The gp-9 locus has 
previously been described as a 
facultative-harming greenbeard 
(Hurst & McVean, 1998; 
Gardner & West, 2010), but Sb 
also controls polygynous nest 
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shown to naturally or experimentally 
co-occur in the same colony. 
 
formation by mated queens 
returning to their mother’s nest 
(Pracana et al., 2017). Thus, the 
allele must also be facultative-
helping because of its pleiotropic 
effect on social behaviours, 
which provide the social 
conditions for queen-killing to 






(Pathak et al., 2013) 
Informative polymorphic.  
The tra genes are tightly linked and 
highly polymorphic, encoding cell-
surface receptors that bind to each other 
(Pathak et al., 2013). There are >60 
major recognition groups based on 
traA/B similarity (Cao et al., 2019). 
Switching a single residue in traA is 
sufficient to change the recognition 
group of a strain (Cao & Wall, 2017).  
 
Facultative helping. 
Matching at traA/B leads to 
fusion and outer membrane 
exchange. The exact reasons for 
this are unknown, but the transfer 
of lipids and proteins has several 
potential benefits, including 
coordinating social interactions 






(Vassallo et al., 
2017) 
 
Causal polymorphic.  
The sitAI genes are polymorphic toxin-
antitoxin pairs that are transferred 
between cells matching at the tra locus 
(Vassallo et al., 2017). In natural 
conditions, incompatibility between 
strains often occurs independently of 
tra similarity, and cannot be fully 




Matching at traA/B leads to 
fusion and outer membrane 
exchange. After initial fusion, 
sitA toxins can be transferred to 
social partners that are killed if 
they lack the matching sitI 
immunity protein (Vassallo et 
al., 2017). 
tgrB1/tgrC1 
Social Amoeba  
(Dictyostelium 
discoideum) 




The tgr genes are tightly-linked 
(Benabentos et al., 2009) and are 
amongst the most diverse genes in the 
genome (Gruenheit et al., 2017). Tgr 
proteins are cell surface proteins, where 
TgrB1 acts as a receptor to bind the 
TgrC1 ligand (Benabentos et al., 2009; 
Hirose et al., 2011). Reciprocal 
transplantation of variant sequences of 
the tgr genes demonstrates that 
matching tgr alleles causes a change in 
social behaviour due to the act of 
successful binding, which has 





Because chimeric aggregations 
can be costly, strains may 
segregate out and develop a 
separate fruiting body 
(Benabentos et al., 2009; Hirose 
et al., 2011; Gruenheit et al., 
2017). Thus, successful 
aggregation is reliant upon Tgr-
binding, as segregation is 
correlated to relatedness at tgr 
rather than genome-wide 
relatedness (Gruenheit et al., 
2017). Strains are known to 
exhibit partner-specific social 
behaviour after initial 
aggregation in the process of 
fruiting-body development 
(Hirose et al., 2011), which is not 
fully explained by Tgr-binding.  
 
doc1/doc2/doc3 
Ascomycete Fungi  
(Neurospora crassa) 
(Heller et al., 2016) 
Informative polymorphic.  
The polymorphic doc1/2/3 are linked 
genes that produce cell-surface 
receptors that predict whether or not 
strains will successfully fuse together 
(Heller et al., 2016). Reciprocal allele 
Facultative helping. 
Somatic fusion of populations 
mediated by doc1/2/3 allows 
many possible benefits including 
a reproductive division of labour 
and benefits from sharing 
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transfers demonstrate that doc1 and 
doc2 are necessary and sufficient for 
defining which individuals fuse. There 
is, however, no evidence that doc1/2/3 
has any influence on the downstream 
social benefits of somatic fusion. 
 
organelles and nutritional 
resources (Richard et al., 2012). 
Further, as fusion only occurs 
with matching doc alleles, doc is 
likely to regulate fusion to share 
benefits (Heller et al., 2016).  
 
fuhc-sec/tm 
Golden Star Tunicate 
(Botryllus schlosseri) 
(Gruenheit et al., 
2017) 
 
Informative polymorphic.  
The fuhc locus contains two linked 
genes that produce a secreted and a 
transmembrane protein (Nydam et al., 
2013). A match at one or both alleles is 
required for fusion to occur, otherwise 
a rejection reaction will occur (Scofield 
et al., 1982). Although the genes are 
highly polymorphic (De Tomaso, 
2018), lower polymorphism correlates 
with the probability of successful 
fusion (Nydam et al., 2013). The exact 
function of two genes is, however, 
unclear, as fuhc matching has not been 
shown to be sufficient for successful 




The joining of tissues during 
fusion has several potential 
benefits, many of which likely 
relate to the survival and 
fecundity benefits of larger 
colony size (De Tomaso, 2018) 
or the sharing of public goods 
(Scofield et al., 1982). If fuhc 
alleles don’t match then toxic 
rejection occurs, which can 
involve damage and death to 
cells and tissues (De Tomaso, 
2018). The degree of rejection 
correlates with genetic 
dissimilarity at the fuhc locus 
(Scofield et al., 1982), 
suggesting that fusion has an 
obligate-harming side when a 
match doesn’t occur. 
 
alr1/alr2 




Informative polymorphic.  
The polymorphic alr1/2 locus encodes 
transmembrane proteins that bind to 
each other. If colonies share both 
alleles, they will fuse permanently 
(Cadavid et al., 2004). alr1/2 variation 
predicts successful fusion in wild and 
lab strains (Nicotra et al., 2009) and in 
vitro experiments demonstrate highly 
specific Alr binding (Karadge et al., 
2015).   
 
Facultative helping. 
Fusion of colonies mediated by 
alr1/2 has several potential 
benefits, such as increased 
colony size aiding strong spatial 
competition (Karadge et al., 
2015). Successful fusion may 
also help to avoid germline 
parasitism, given that some cells 
can differentiate into germ cells 
throughout the lifecycle.  
 
 
† Causal vs informative: a causal gene encodes both the signal-receiver component and the 
social behaviour itself, because the two are one and the same. For example, the flo1 locus 
houses the gene for a cell surface receptor that binds carbohydrates on the surface of other 
cells, thereby bringing together cells with flo1 alleles (where aggregation itself is the social 
behaviour because it protects cells from environment stressors). An informative gene only 
encodes the signal-receiver component, which acts to regulate the downstream social 
behaviour that is itself encoded by other genes. For example, the Sb genes do not directly 
encode all the proteins involved within the process of polygynous nest formation, but they do 
encode the signal-receiver proteins that set a whole chain of interactions in motion between 
a great many proteins leading to these outcomes. 
‡ Monomorphic vs polymorphic: there is only a single greenbeard ‘colour’ variant, vs 
multiple colour variants. Colour variation reflects different signal-receiver forms only, rather 




Box 2: Are greenbeard genes involved with simple or sophisticated social traits? 
Theory has suggested that greenbeards should be associated with simple traits, whilst 
kin-selected genes would be associated with more complex traits (Grafen, 1985, 2006b; Frank, 
1998; West & Gardner, 2013). There are indeed many examples of greenbeards that do little 
more than produce a protein that directly causes individuals with that protein to aggregate 
together (see Table 2; e.g. flo1; Smukalla et al., 2008). However, suggesting that greenbeards 
are only associated with simplistic traits likely reflects the original scenario envisioned by 
Dawkins, where the greenbeard gene directly produces a behaviour, which is not a necessary 
feature of real greenbeard genes. To be favoured by selection, a real greenbeard gene simply 
needs to be able to modulate social traits in a way that gives them an advantage by ensuring 
that the social behaviour’s recipients share (or do not share) the greenbeard. As such, 
greenbeards can be ‘informative’ master regulators – directing a social behaviour toward some 
recipients rather than others, instead of producing the social behaviour itself (Hamilton, 
1964b). In this role, greenbeard genes can be involved with social traits that are just as 
‘sophisticated’ as those associated with kin-selected genes, which is supported by empirical 
findings because many examples of greenbeards involve fusion (see Table 2; e.g. doc; Heller 
et al., 2016) – a complex social behaviour involving the concerted action of many genes.  
Greenbeard genes and kin-selected genes are both favoured because they 
preferentially affect the fitness of other carriers of the gene, and hence they may often work 
together in producing the same social trait. However, because they are expected to show a 
different relationship to social partners, they can also conflict with each other about the social 
trait’s optimum (Biernaskie et al., 2011; Gardner & Úbeda, 2017). This difference arises 
because the greenbeard’s relatedness to social partners depends on its assortment factor, whilst 
all other (non-greenbeard) genes’ relatedness depends on the ancestral relationship between 
social partners. Consequently, greenbeard genes have greater certainty of sharing (or not) a 
particular allele with social partners, so they can benefit from more marginal gains than can 
kin-selected genes (Box 2 Figure I). Although this creates the potential for gene conflict 
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(Gardner & Úbeda, 2017), a kin-selected gene may be unable to prevent a greenbeard’s 
‘corruption’ because of constraints (e.g. ‘causal’ greenbeards; see Table 1) and so the potential 
conflict may not precipitate into actual conflict (sensu Ratnieks et al., 2006). Thus, there is no 
reason why greenbeards cannot be involved with social traits that are equally as sophisticated 






Box 2 Figure I. The potential for conflict between a greenbeard and kin-selected gene (which acts 
as a fully-suppressing modifier) that govern the expression of altruism across social trait values. 
Potential conflict is assessed using a simple Hamilton’s rule 𝑟𝑏 − 𝑐 > 0, where 𝑏 is a measure of 
benefits to recipients, 𝑐 the costs to the actor r gives the relatedness between interacting individuals. 
The greenbeard gene leads to assortment such that actors interact with recipients that share the 
greenbeard (𝑟 = 1), whilst the kin-selected gene leads actors to interact with recipients that are 
siblings (𝑟 = ½). For genes along a chromosome (inspired by Grafen, 1985; A), the greenbeard (and 
any linked gene) has greater certainty as to whether two individuals share the greenbeard (𝑟 = 1; 
blue) or not (𝑟 = 0; red) compared to other loci in the genome (𝑟 = ½; black). Across benefit and 
cost parameters (inspired by Gardner & Ubeda 2017; B), the greenbeard gene is favoured when 𝑏 −
𝑐 > 0 (below the green line; indicated by green arrows) whilst the kin-selected gene is favoured 
when ½𝑏 − 𝑐 > 0 (below the black line; indicated by black arrows). Under conditions where a 
greenbeard is favoured whilst the kin-selected gene is not (grey-shading; as shown by green and 
black arrows pointing opposite directions), there is potential for conflict as a kin-selected gene would 






Concluding Remarks and Future Perspectives  
The greenbeard concept was intended as a thought experiment, and it is immensely 
surprising that experimental research suggests that these genes may actually exist. However, 
we believe that the future direction of these important empirical studies into candidate 
greenbeard genes should not get bogged down in trying to interpret real genes through the lens 
of the thought experiment laid out by Dawkins (1976). Instead, experimental work should 
focus on the more fundamental underlying concept from Hamilton (1964b), which Dawkins’ 
cartoon was designed to illustrate. With the benefit of hindsight, Dawkins’ suggestion of a 
cartoon scenario of a greenbeard gene is in fact amongst the most unlikely forms of 
greenbeard, in supposing a pleiotropic gene governing multiple aspects of cognitive behaviour 
in humans. Although greenbeards are possible in humans, they are more likely to mediate 
social behaviours via interactions played out at the molecular level rather than the cognitive 
processes of the central nervous system (see Table 1). Furthermore, the last major review of 
greenbeard genes (Gardner & West, 2010) highlighted how Dawkins formulation of the 
greenbeard thought experiment was but one of four possible types of greenbeard gene (whilst 
also dealing with arising misconceptions). We have emphasised an even broader range of 
types of greenbeard (informative vs causal), alongside a persistent disconnect between 
theoretical work that recognised the underlying logic of the fundamental principle originally 
identified by Hamilton (1964b) and experimental research that has been overly-wedded to 
features of Dawkins’ (1976) presentation of that fundamental principle. Therefore, we propose 
that there is a need to dispose of the cartoon illustration of a greenbeard presented by Dawkins 
which can help to align theoretical and experimental research to study greenbeards in unison. 
Although there is only preliminary evidence that any gene is a greenbeard, Dawkins 
cartoon can begin to be replaced with the diversity of genes that capture Hamilton’s more 
fundamental principle – grounding the greenbeard concept within genuine expectations for 
empirical examples. We are only just beginning to understand the possible functions of 
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greenbeard genes, with preliminary evidence suggesting a common role within allorecognition 
in establishing a group of cooperative social partners. For the most part, greenbeards do not 
appear to be involved with the production of the social behaviour, but instead they act as a 
master regulator in governing which individuals the social behaviour targets. Within this 
capacity, greenbeards have a number of genetic properties, several of which are hard to explain 
from current theory, such as polymorphism of colour variants (rather than different 
falsebeards). 
The study of greenbeards is only in its infancy, but it clear that empirical work has 
established the plausibility of finding greenbeard genes in nature, and now we need to 
investigate their importance (see Outstanding Questions). This involves empirically testing 
kin and kind selection as alternative hypotheses for the evolution of social behaviour, which 
necessarily involves a greater understanding of the genetics behind social behaviours in order 
to investigate any candidate greenbeard gene’s role. We tentatively suggest that greenbeard 
genes may be far more common than previously anticipated, contrary to arguments against 
their biological relevance (Table 1), because species across the tree of life encounter the 
problem of allorecognition which (from empirical research) appears to be a setting where 
greenbeards evolve. However, establishing how and why this scenario favours greenbeards 




Outstanding Questions  
At present, there are numerous suggestions for genes that may be greenbeards (or indeed may 
be kin-selected) and many genes that are currently thought to be kin-selected may turn out to 
be greenbeards. For empirical research, there is a great need to amass further evidence for both 
new and existing candidate greenbeards, especially in marrying evidence of plausibility that a 
gene operates like a greenbeard with evidence that rules out other explanations (especially kin 
selection). There are some groups of organisms (e.g. plants) and types of behaviour (e.g. 
mutualism) where greenbeard genes have yet to be proposed, and it would be interesting to 
uncover whether this represents a lack of data or a genuine absence. When approaching any 
study system, we think there are three critical points to establish if the greenbeard effect is to 
be constructively suggested to have any role: 
1. For a conditionally expressed social behaviour, what exactly is the assortment factor? 
Are individuals responding to the presence or absence of that factor?  
2. Given the recognition of an assortment factor, what exactly is the social behaviour? 
Have we correctly identified all downstream effects and consequences of assortment?  
3. Does the assortment factor correlate with common ancestry in natural settings? Why 
doesn’t kin selection explain the observed patterns of the social behaviour?    
For theoretical research, there is a need to seek greater empirical grounding. Within the 
‘Preliminary findings about real greenbeard genes’ section, we identified some key puzzles:  
4. How is greenbeard colour polymorphism maintained? And why don’t falsebeard 
cheaters invade or be maintained? 
5. How do greenbeards at different loci coevolve? How does relatedness between 
individuals impact genetic conflict arising from greenbeard genes? 
6. What factors drive the linkage of greenbeards from different loci? And when do we 





Social behaviour: any interaction between individuals of the same species. Although the term 
is sometimes used more broadly to include interspecific interactions, we use the traditional 
and more restrictive definition that requires interactants to be conspecifics, which critically 
means that that social partners may be genetically related.    
Altruism: social behaviour that is costly to the actor whilst benefitting a recipient.  
Individual selection: the form of selection that favours genes because they enhance the fitness 
of the individual that carries them.  
Kin selection: the form of selection that favours a gene with a given social behaviour because 
of its effect on others that share the gene based on the genealogical relationship between social 
partners.  
Relatedness: the probability that two individuals share the same alleles over and above the 
random expectation.   
Kind selection: the form of selection that favours a selfish genetic element because of a 
conditional fitness effect, depending on the presence or absence of that specific gene among 
interactants. 
Selfish genetic element: a gene produces a function that enhances its own fitness in excess of 
the other genes in the rest of the genome. 
Greenbeard effect: a form of kind selection, whereby a ‘greenbeard gene’ enhances its own 
fitness in excess of the other genes in the rest of the genome by modulating a social behaviour 
that affects the fitness of others that share the greenbeard gene because of an assortment factor. 
Assortment factor: a distinguishing feature that correlates with the presence or absence of a 
gene within social partners, thereby assorting individuals into those that share the gene and 
those that do not.  
Falsebeard: an allele competing at the same locus as a greenbeard allele that appears to 
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Commentary – the 







Our perspective (Chapter 4) argued that empirical research into greenbeards could be 
hindered by focussing on the Dawkins presentation, of a gene producing (1) a recognisable 
trait, (2) the ability to recognise the trait in others, and (3) the ability to preferentially benefit 
bearers of the trait (Dawkins, 1976). Dawkins was only aiming to present the ideas of 
Hamilton (1964) in an intuitive way, but empirical research has been driven by his presentation 
of the idea. In Chapter 4, I argued that the recent spate of new greenbeard discoveries 
warranted a rethink of the fundamental principle of greenbeards. In this commentary I will 
discuss how our perspective on greenbeards fits with one particular example; the tgr locus in 
D. discoideum. Furthermore, I will address some of the questions of whether greenbeards (as 
we now view them) actually exist. 
The tgr genes 
As mentioned in the main text, the tgr genes are a pair of tightly-linked cell-surface 
proteins. When two strains come together, conflict can occur over who builds the stalk (the 
public good), with the potential for exploitation. To avoid this conflict, strains can segregate 
and develop separate fruiting bodies (Ostrowski et al., 2008; Benabentos et al., 2009), with 
the degree of segregation depending on the strength of binding of TgrC1 to TgrB1 (Gruenheit 
et al., 2017). Evidence that tgr is a greenbeard comes firstly from the fact that allele-swap at 
the tgr locus is necessary and sufficient to change the social behaviour (Hirose et al., 2011). 
Whilst this study showed that tgr causes assortment, the crucial experiment (Gruenheit et al., 
2017) showed that the degree of segregation correlated significantly with tgr distance (𝑟 =
0.49, 𝑝 = 0.2), but not with whole-genome distance (𝑟 = 0.09, 𝑝 < 10−22) in a set of 
naturally co-occuring strains (Gruenheit et al., 2017). As such, tgr may be evolving through 
kind selection rather than kin selection. Currently, this is the only greenbeard example for 
which the distinction between a behaviour directed towards kin and a behaviour directed 
towards kind has been demonstrated. 
Arguments against greenbeards 
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In the main text, we highlighted some of the commonly mentioned arguments against 
greenbeards occurring in nature (see Table 2). Here, I will briefly address how some of these 
arguments related to the tgr example. Greenbeards were thought to be unlikely to exist due to 
far-fetched pleiotropy - a single locus having to have all the properties of Dawkins’ greenbeard 
(Gardner & West, 2010). We argue however that this is not necessary; a gene can be a ‘master 
regulator’ that directs social behaviour toward some recipients rather than others, rather than 
producing the behaviour itself. In this way a greenbeard could be a simple receptor that 
receives information and sits at the head of a cascade of social responses. Indeed, a recent 
study found 1650 ‘social genes’ that exhibited expression mainly in social stages (de Oliveira 
et al., 2019). Further evidence of the master regulator role of tgr comes from experiments 
demonstrating that mutations in other genes can restore social behaviour caused by a mismatch 
between tgrB1 and tgrC1 (Li et al., 2016). 
A commonly cited argument against the detection of greenbeards is fixation, the idea 
that a greenbeard would increase in frequency and reach fixation, at which point everyone 
would have the greenbeard, and no conditional behaviour would occur (Queller et al., 2003; 
Gardner & West, 2010). In the context of our work on strategic behaviour in D. discoideum 
however (see previous chapters) a simple solution to this problem arises. Imagine a mutation 
in tgr that generates a new recognition group. It would necessarily be rare, allowing it to 
exploit groups by withholding contributions to the public good, achieving a relative fitness 
advantage (Chapter 1)(Madgwick et al., 2018). Such rare-type advantage could preserve 
polymorphism in greenbeard loci. 
Perhaps the most widely discussed argument against greenbeards in nature is 
falsebeards, a gene that possess the signal and benefits from the behaviour of others, but 
doesn’t perform the social behaviour itself (Gardner & West, 2010; Biernaskie et al., 2013; 
Gardner, 2019). With the tgr genes, this could occur through a mutation in tgrB1 (the 
receptor), such that the signal (tgrC1) still matches, eliciting the behaviour from a social 
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partner, but the mutant doesn’t perform the behaviour itself. This is certainly possible, as 
demonstrated by knockout experiments demonstrating that the presence of TgrC1 alone is 
sufficient for recognition (Hirose et al., 2015).  Whether this occurs in nature is still unknown, 
but rare-type advantage could help greenbeards to persist regardless.  
 
As it stands, the tgr example is probably the most robust example of a greenbeard, 
with experiments distinguishing between kin- and kind-selection not performed for other 
candidates.  
 
Do greenbeards really exist? 
In the ‘Highlights’ section of the paper, we state that; 
“Kin selection and the greenbeard effect are alternative explanations for the evolution 
of a social behaviour, which can be experimentally distinguished with appropriate evidence.” 
With the greenbeard effect defined as;  
“a form of kind selection, whereby a ‘greenbeard gene’ enhances its own fitness in 
excess of the other genes in the rest of the genome by modulating a social behaviour that 
affects the fitness of others that share the greenbeard gene because of an assortment factor.” 
Given this definition of the greenbeard effect, the assertion that greenbeards and kin selection 
are alternative explanations for the evolution of social behaviour is correct. In other words, if 
a gene can modulate a social behaviour based on the sharing of a greenbeard allele, and if this 
allows the gene to enhance its fitness in excess of others in the genome (e.g. by causing an 
individual to help non-relatives who share the greenbeard allele) then this is an alternative 
route for evolution to evolve - compared to kin selection. However, whether greenbeards and 
kin selection are actually alternative explanations in practice is still unknown - a fact we 
emphasise in the paper – and the ultimate proof will come from empirical researchers. The 
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key point is that a greenbeard can appear to all intents and purposes to be acting as a 
greenbeard, and can fit all of Dawkins’ ideas about what a greenbeard is and does, but still be 
involved in social interactions between relatives that causes cooperation to spread via kin 
selection. Many empirically researchers take this view by default, using greenbeards as a 
simple analogy for genetic kin recognition, but the alternative explanation (that the trait is 
evolving via a greenbeard effect and not kin selection) is rarely tested – which we view as a 
key area for future empirical research.  
To illustrate this point further, I will briefly consider the information we have about another 
candidate greenbeard, Alr in the Cnidarian Hydractinia symbiolongicarpus (see main text 
Table 2 for further details on this example). When natural populations have been surveyed, 
hundreds of distinct alleles can be found – the overwhelming majority of which are extremely 
rare in the population (Gloria-Soria et al., 2012). When a new allele arises in the population, 
the individual(s) carrying it are necessarily highly related to each other – so any social 
behaviour that occurs conditional upon the greenbeards presence will also be occurring via 
kin interactions. This correlation between greenbeard and whole-genome matching will of 
course erode over time, but if all alleles are very rare, it may be that the greenbeard is in fact 
acting like a single locus kin recognition system. I hope that in future years we can use the 
perspective on greenbeards presented in this chapter to guide research into whether 


















































Each Chapter contains a discussion that is relevant to the particular study, so here I 
provide a general discussion in relation to the themes and aims of this thesis – in particular 
about whether the ‘cheater avoidance’ perspective of cooperation accurately captures why 
individuals contribute (or not) to public goods, and how this might change our understanding 
of cooperation and conflict.  
In Chapter 1 I presented a theoretical framework for understanding when individuals 
should make contributions to public goods. The framework had the key features of allowing 
(1) quantitative, and (2) conditional contributions to public goods. As such, rather than 
imaging fixed ‘cooperator’ or ‘cheater’ strategies, I was envisaging flexible strategies that 
changed depending on the social context (i.e. relatedness to the group). I then tested the 
predictions of this framework in the social amoeba D. discoideum and found a close match 
between predictions and data: strains are ‘strategic investors’ that quantitatively vary their 
contributions to public goods depending on their relatedness to the group. This finding argues 
strongly against the cheater perspective that dominates D. discoideum in particular, and the 
field more broadly. This study provides a compelling example of conditional cooperation, and 
one that is more complex that the quasi-conditional ‘facultative’ strategies (Santorelli et al., 
2008; Gore et al., 2009; Pollak et al., 2016) of binary switches between cooperation and 
cheating (as suggested by games such as the Prisoner’s dilemma). The existence of such 
strategies seems plausible in many other species (in microbes and beyond) that feature 
cooperation through contributions to public goods. Some of the examples mentioned in this 
thesis include pyoverdine production in Pseudomonas aeruginosa (Kümmerli et al., 2015), 
collective nursing in mice (Ferrari et al., 2016), and mongooses (Vitikainen et al., 2017), and 
contributions to social immunity in burying beetles (Duarte et al., 2016). I hope that the kind 
of framework presented in this thesis for analysing a public goods game could be instructive 
here too.  
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In Chapter 2 I expanded the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 1 from two-
player interactions to N-player interactions. The motivation behind this was to move past the 
usual qualitative depictions of the tragedy of the commons to see if I could predict how much 
a group in some social scenario would suffer from the tragedy of the commons (due to the 
strategic behaviour of each individual), and how and why this may be avoided. I demonstrated 
that the framework can make accurate quantitative predictions of the collective contributions 
to public goods of groups varying in number of players and relative relatedness of those 
players. Consequently, I was able to predict the degree to which groups suffered from the 
tragedy of the commons. However, I surprisingly found that groups avoided the predicted 
complete collapse, never collectively contributing nothing to the public good. In the Chapter 
and follow commentary I highlighted how this result can be explained by constrains on 
strategy and information providing non-adaptive ‘rescue’ from the tragedy of the commons. 
A further constraint I briefly mentioned, and that may be broadly relevant in social species, is 
that of selection. In D. discoideum, strains go through many rounds of clonal growth between 
each social interaction, which can relax constraints on selection on social genes that are not 
used during these periods (de Oliveira et al., 2019).  
In general, I believe that non-adaptive constraints have been somewhat overlooked in 
the explanations for cooperation and conflict. Obviously these constraints will very much 
depend on the genetic and biology of the system in question, but I believe the general themes 
of constraints on (1) strategy (2) information, and (3) selection provided a broadly applicable 
description of what to look for in a given system. In this way, whilst all of my experimental 
work (for Chapters 1 and 2) is using D. discoideum, I believe that the theoretical framework 
and findings are much more widely applicable across nature, which is something that I discuss 
throughout in relation to other examples of public goods.  
In Chapter 3 I continue the theme of looking at why the strategic decisions of 
individuals can cause groups to suffer, to the detriment of all. In this Chapter I investigated 
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the concept of ‘conflict’ as it is used in evolutionary biology, focussing on how cooperation 
is often more vulnerable to the strategic behaviour of all individuals, rather than simply due 
to cheating. In this way, I suggested that conflict is often used as an umbrella term for 
distinctive processes. In particular, I used the logic from our theoretical framework to highlight 
how conflict can be ‘motivational’ when some individuals in the group have no reason to 
contribute (due to the costs and benefits), or ‘escalatory’ when the motivations of competing 
individuals undermine each other, such that an individual contributes much less than is 
predicted based on individual motivation. Motivational conflict is easily captured in a simple 
Hamilton’s rule, and covered by the fitness-interests approach that assess whether parties gain 
from pulling a ‘joint phenotype’ (Queller, 2014) in different directions. Escalatory conflict is 
however importantly different in that both parties agree on the joint phenotype, but critically 
disagree on who will pay the cost. This may be a consequence of the study of intragenomic 
conflict (Werren et al., 1988; Burt & Trivers, 2006; Gardner & Úbeda, 2017) where the idea 
of genes in a genome disagreeing on which one pays the cost to produce a trait doesn’t apply 
in the same way. 
In Chapter 3 I further brought attention to some of the disagreement of how the term 
‘conflict’ is applied, suggesting that much of this is due to a difference of perspective and 
interests. Consequently, I wanted to be clear on what I believed the purpose of the idea of 
‘conflict’ is, so that my chosen way of viewing it could be framed in those terms. My own 
interest in conflict is as the ‘other side of the coin’ from cooperation in the sense that I want 
to understand maladaptation and the breakdown of (potentially) cooperative groups of genes 
or individuals. Many of the constrains on selfishness that I highlighted in Chapter 2 are 
relevant again here, but I caution that the outcomes are likely to be difficult to predict, even 
with knowledge of the constraints. I believe that a more nuanced understanding of conflict is 
crucial for the development of the field going forward, and hope that some of the ideas 
discussed in this Chapter become more widely discussed. 
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In Chapter 4 I present an ‘opinion’ article about greenbeard genes. In order for 
strategic individuals to express their optimal behaviour in a conditional way, they require some 
information about the social context they are in (either through direct measurement, or some 
evolved expectation). A reasonable hypothesis would be that some kind of kin recognition is 
occurring, but in D. discoideum we already knew that the social behaviour of segregation was 
conditional not upon kinship, but upon similarity at the tgr ‘greenbeard’ gene (Gruenheit et 
al., 2017). The discovery that self-recognition in D. discoideum was governed by a greenbeard 
gene coincided with a flurry of other proposed greenbeard genes (Karadge et al., 2015; Heller 
et al., 2016; Cao & Wall, 2017; Vassallo et al., 2017) suggesting that this mechanism, widely 
written-off for a number of reasons (discussed in Chapter 4), could be an important part of the 
evolution of cooperation. The newly claimed greenbeards (both those discussed in Chapter 4, 
and more speculative claims not discussed) highlighted how the empirical study of 
greenbeards was still very much wedded to the Dawkins concept, rather than the fundamental 
underlying principle. Greenbeards differ from kin recognition in that they provide more 
information about allele sharing (i.e. presence vs absence) than a kin-recognition cue (i.e. a 
genome-wide average). Furthermore, greenbeards can evolve differently from kin recognition, 
particularly with regards to conflict with the rest of the genome. For these reasons,  in Chapter 
4 I present an argument for a rethinking of the greenbeard concept, highlighting how 
greenbeards don’t need to fulfil Dawkins (1976) three criteria of (1) perceptible signal (2) 
ability to distinguish the signal in others, and (3) ability to conditionally act based on the 
signal. Instead, greenbeard genes can act as ‘master regulators’ that direct social behaviour 
dependant on some ‘assortment factor’ that indicates the presence (or absence) of the 
greenbeard gene. Furthermore, we point out that many of the empirical examples are highly 
polymorphic, containing multiple ‘colour’ variants, a factor not understood through Dawkins 
framework. Such polymorphism can be maintained by scenarios such as the public goods 
game modelled here (Chapters 1-3), whereby rare variants have a relative fitness advantage, 
because they contribute less to public goods. In this way, Chapter 4 aims to bring clarity to 
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the greenbeard concept by making it an empirically useful concept, rather than just an abstract 
thought experiment for theoreticians. In my opinion, the jury is still out on whether many of 
these examples really are greenbeard genes (as the alternative hypothesis of kin recognition is 
rarely explicitly tested), but the point stands that greenbeard genes are a plausible mechanism 
for individuals to obtain the kind of information required to enact the strategic strategies that 
are the subject of this thesis. 
In this thesis I have used the model system of the social amoeba D. discoideum to 
build an argument for the importance of quantitative and conditional contributions in the 
evolution of conflict and cooperation in public goods. I have developed a simple theoretical 
framework of such ‘strategic’ contributions, and empirically tested it in both simple and 
complex social groups, finding a close match between model predictions and empirical data 
(Chapters 1-2). Furthermore, I have shown how such strategies have important consequences 
for how we think about conflict (Chapter 3) and how self-recognition can evolve through the 
greenbeard effect (Chapter 4). This work highlights that the nature of conflict and cooperation 
in nature is more complex (but still empirically tractable) than a binary ‘cooperate’ vs ‘cheat’ 
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Fig. S1. Patterns of individual investment, relative payoffs and collective investment for 
different optimal levels of collective investment (G) and strengths of selection (). Each of 
the first two rows (parts A to F) show the same relationships as in Figure 2, but for two 
different optimal levels of collective investment (G = 0.2 for A to C and G = 0.4 for D to 
F), with lines in each figure showing the pattern expected for varying strengths of selection 
() (which essentially cover the entire possible range of parameter space from very weak to 
very strong selection on investment; the legend imbedded in the first figure of each row gives 
the line color of each strength of selection, with all nine panels using the same color coding). 
The last two rows (parts G to L) show these same relationships for two different strengths of 
selection (= ¼ for G to I and  = 12 for J to L), with the lines in each figure showing the 
pattern for different optimal levels of collective investment. The labels in parentheses relate 
the figures to the patterns expected for the D. discoideum system. The first figure in each row 
(A, D, G and J) shows the pattern of individual investment into the public good (stalk 
investment) as a function of the player’s relatedness to (frequency in) the group. The second 
figure in each row (B, E, H, and K) shows the pattern of relative payoff (fitness) as a function 
of the player’s relatedness to (frequency in) the group. The last figure in each row (C, F, I, and 
L) shows the pattern of collective investment as a function of a focal player’s relatedness to 






Fig. S2. Patterns of absolute fitness as a function of relatedness (frequency in a group). A) 
Patterns of fitness (which represents the total payoff) as a function of relatedness (frequency 
in a group) when individuals show the ESS pattern of investment in the public good. All 
patterns were calculated for the same optimal level of investment (G = 0.3), with the different 
lines corresponding to different strengths of selection (). B) Patterns of absolute fitness as a 
function relatedness (frequency) with varying degrees of error in measurement of relatedness 
(frequency). All patterns were calculated for the same optimal level of investment (G = 0.3) 
and the same strength of selection ( = ), with different values of error (). C) The pattern of 
absolute fitness calculated following the same method used to process the experimental data. 
Parameter values match those used in Figure 4. D) Experimental estimates of absolute fitness 
based on the patterns of stalk investment (Figure 4D) and the probability of fruiting body 
collapse (Figure 6A). The black points represent the estimates at the measured frequencies. 
The line represents the best fit line based on a cubic regression using these estimates, with the 





Fig. S3. The distributions of errors in players’ measurement of relatedness (frequency) that 
were used to generate patterns under imperfect information. Illustrated are five different 
probability density functions that differ in the level of error in the measurement of relatedness 
(frequency) (). The distributions are Gaussian with a mean of zero and a standard deviation 
given by . The deviations represent the difference between the relatedness (frequency) that 
player estimates for their group and their true relatedness. Because relatedness (frequency) is 
constrained to the range of zero to one, the distribution is necessarily truncated when used in 
calculations. For example, if a player’s true relatedness is 0.25, the deviations will be truncated 
at −0.25 and 0.75 (where the mean of zero indicates that they have correctly measured their 






Fig. S4. Predicted patterns of individual investment, relative payoffs and collective investment 
for different strengths of selection () and levels of error in measurement of relatedness 
(frequency) (). The general structure of the figures follows that of Figure S1, except the rows 
show the same relationships for two different strengths of selection ( = ½ for A to C, and  
= 12 for D to F), which, combined with the values illustrated in Figure 3 essentially cover the 
entire range of parameter space. The lines in each figure show the pattern expected for varying 
amounts of error in the measurement of relatedness (frequency) () (see the legend imbedded 
in the first figure). All examples were calculated for the same optimal level of collective 
investment (G = 0.3) since the exact optimum has a minor effect on the patterns (see Figure 













Fig. S5. Patterns of stalk investment, relative fitness, and collective investment as a function 
of the frequency of a strain in a chimeric aggregation for two high resolution pairs of natural 
strains combined in chimeras. A) Stalk investment (𝑰𝒊∣𝒑𝒊) by NC105.1 (in red) and NC34.2 (in 
blue) in chimeric mixtures of the two, plotted as a function of the frequency of NC105.1 
(designated as the focal strain) in the mix, B) Stalk investment (𝑰𝒊∣𝒑𝒊) by NC63.2 (in red) and 
NC28.1 (in blue) in chimeric mixtures of the two, plotted as a function of the frequency of 
NC63.2 (designated as the focal strain) in the mix. C) Relative fitness (𝝆𝒊) of NC105.1 (in red) 
and NC34.2 (in blue) in chimeric mixtures of the two, plotted as a function of the frequency 
of NC105.1 in the mix, D) Relative fitness (𝝆𝒊) of NC63.2 (in red) and NC28.1 (in blue) in 
chimeric mixtures of the two, plotted as a function of the frequency of NC63.2 in the mix. E) 
Collective stalk investment (𝑰𝑮) by chimeras composed of NC105.1 and NC34.2 as a function 
of the frequency of NC105.1 in the mix, F) Collective stalk investment (𝑰𝑮) by chimeras 
composed of NC 63.2 and NC28.1 as a function of the frequency of NC63.2 in the mix. Each 
panel shows the estimated means (with their standard errors) at each frequency measured (with 
values estimated by the mixed model describe in the Methods, but using frequency as a 
categorical factor). In all cases, the y-axis values are scaled as proportions of the maximum 
value observed. In parts A-D the bold curve represents the best-fit estimated from the cubic 
regression model (here fitted to the estimated means) and the like-colored shaded regions give 
approximate 95%-confidence intervals around those curves. For parts E and F the curve 
represents the best-fit estimate from a quadratic regression model (fitted to the estimated 






Fig. S6. Spontaneous fruiting body collapse as a function of focal strain frequency for six 
strain pairs. Points represent the mean observations (with standard error bars) and the curve 
illustrates the best-fit polynomial relationship (with 95%-confidence intervals as grey-
shading). The six pairs appear as: A) NC28.1+NC105.1, B) NC60.1+NC99.1, C) 






Fig. S7. Representative images of fruiting bodies for six strain pairs across a range of focal 
strain frequencies. A) NC34.2+NC105.1, B) NC60.1+NC34.2, C) NC60.1+NC63.2, D) 






Fig. S8. The pattern of relative fitness as a function of frequency in a group. The parts in blue 
correspond to the estimated pattern for chimeric mixes. They therefore match the pattern of 
relative fitness shown in Figure 4E and are included here for comparison. The parts in red 
correspond to the pattern for clonal self-mixes, which were estimated following the same 
method used to calculate the chimeric pattern, with the labelled cells considered as the ‘focal’ 
strain. The points indicate the means and the bars their standard errors, both estimated from a 
mixed model. The lines represent the best fit relationship (which is cubic for the chimeric data 
and linear for the clonal data), with the shaded region indicating one standard error on either 
side. The slope of the best fit line for the clonal data is not significant (F1, 195 = 1.65, p = 0.2, 
but is included as an illustration of the relationship. 
 
